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This dissertation contributes to the knowledge on the emergence of political institu-
tions related to checks and balances as well as their effects on economic outcomes.
The first two chapters analyze the determinants of constitutional limits on executive
authority and the implication of these limits for policy-making. The third chapter
studies the process by which institutional reforms are enacted.
While the past century witnessed a gradual adoption of limits on executive power,
countries that oscillate between periods of strong and weak executive constraint-
regimes still exist. The literature explains the emergence of strong political institu-
tions that effectively curb the power of the executive with competitive electoral races.
However, empirical evidence indicates that governments facing similar electoral pres-
sures have made widely ranging institutional decisions on this issue. This observation
suggests that factors besides a country’s degree of electoral competitiveness must be
influencing the extent of its reforms.
To shed light on this discrepancy between the theoretical literature and the data,
the first chapter of this dissertation constructs a dynamic model of political com-
petition in which limits on executive decision-making that will constrain the future
government are chosen by the current party in power. The basic results affirm an
incumbent’s main trade-off identified in the literature: While loose executive con-
straints permit an incumbent to enact his desired policies in case of re-election, the
same would apply to his opponent under the opposite scenario. This chapter’s contri-
bution is to show that this trade-off is not constant. Specifically, the incentives that
ii
shape an incumbent’s institutional decision evolve with his country’s level of public
sector development. The analysis suggests that this evolution is due to governments
being more inclined to make common cause with their opponents when there exist
mutually beneficial gains to be realized from public sector investments such as infras-
tructure spending. In these circumstances, the common cause motivation dominates
the inherent conflict between parties over unproductive political spending. Conse-
quently, executive constraints would initially be kept looser in order to enable such
investments.
The main results corroborate the empirical evidence by showing that higher levels
of public sector development in a country will be associated with tighter constraints
on the executive branch. Moreover, these tighter constraints will be less sensitive to
swings in political power. While these results confirm the importance of the degree
of electoral competitiveness in determining institutional outcomes, they offer an im-
portant qualification: The role played by elections depends on the country’s public
sector development. In addition, this chapter finds that public goods will be under-
provided, even when political parties share the same preferences over it, due to the
ever-present motive to restrict an opponent’s political spending through institutional
design. Overall, this chapter offers an explanation for the observed trend in executive
constraints by focusing simultaneously on its relationship to indicators of electoral
competitiveness and of public good provision.
Generalizing the framework employed in the first chapter, the second chapter of
this dissertation focuses on the broader question of why democratic regimes tend to
persist once they are established. The model of political competition developed in
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this chapter features an incumbent who can make reversible investments into a fu-
ture government’s ability to reform constraints on the executive branch. Examples
of these investments include strengthening of press freedoms or of judicial indepen-
dence. The main results suggest that polarization between the political parties and
the competitiveness of elections lead to high and persistent levels of such investments.
These higher costs of institutional reform in turn result in durable strong executive
constraint-regimes.
The final chapter turns its attention to the process of institutional reform by
analyzing within a bargaining framework the effect of a referendum option on the
reform proposals already passed in the legislature. The findings indicate that sur-
plus coalitions may be observed even though smaller coalitions would be sufficient
for passage. An important result is that disparities in post-bargaining power such as
campaigning resources incentivize challenge procedures to the detriment of grand bar-
gains. Moreover, when achieved, such a grand bargain empowers the smaller parties
in the legislature through favorable provisions in the reform bill. These results carry
potential policy implications for forms of post-bargaining power during referendum
campaigns, such as caps on campaign contributions.
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Dynamic Inefficiency of Public
Investments
1.1 Introduction
Political institutions that impose strong constraints on executive authority are an im-
portant feature of democracies. Examples of such institutions include legislative rules
that allow for a fair representation of opposition political parties, strong protection of
minority rights, or an independent judiciary that enforces constitutional principles.
In this chapter, I focus on constitutional limits on the actions of the executive as a
representative institution of checks and balances.
I measure the extent of limits on executive authority by the executive constraints
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score constructed in the Polity IV Project’s “Regime Authority Characteristics and
Transitions Datasets”. Using a seven-point scale, this dataset categorizes executive
decision-making from representing “Unlimited authority” to “Executive parity or sub-
ordination”.1 Evidence in support of a country being characterized as an unlimited
authority regime include frequent use of rule by decree or blatant violations of the
constitution by the executive. At the other extreme end, regimes with executive
subordination are described as having the executive branch heavily dependent on a
legislature for decision-making.
Analyses of constitutional limits on executive authority based on Polity IV scores
indicate that while the past century witnessed the gradual adoption of executive con-
straints, regimes that oscillate between periods of strong and weak scores still persist.2
Based on a sample of countries that have been in existence since the beginning of the
20th century, the data exhibits periodic fluctuations until the 1970s in the number
of countries with the highest executive constraint scores. These fluctuations follow
the historical democratization trends of the last century.3 The mid-70s mark a break
with this trend as the democratization movements start taking hold in parts of Latin
America and Asia. Figure 1.1 is reproduced from Besley and Persson (2011) and
summarizes these movements.
1Various data on political institutions of each country is collected by the Polity IV Project and is
available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. The score of interest in this chapter is
coded as “XCONST”. In order of strengthening executive constraints, a country can be categorized
as “Unlimited Authority”, “Intermediate Category”, “Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive
Authority”, “Intermediate Category”, “Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority”, “Interme-
diate Category”, or “Executive Parity or Subordination”.
2See Besley and Persson (2011), Chapter 7, p. 261 for a discussion on the evolution of executive
constraints.
3See Huntington (1991) and Hobsbawm (1994).
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Figure 1.1: Prevalence of high executive constraints in countries independent since
1900.
The optimism created by the upward trend in Figure 1.1 towards strong execu-
tive constraints is shadowed once countries that have gained their independence after
World War II are added to the sample. Among these countries, we observe that only
a small fraction, including India, Israel and Botswana, have managed to successfully
integrate strong checks and balances into their constitutional systems. The more
common outcome is for the scores to fluctuate, which is observed in countries such as
Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Indonesia. Figure 1.2 represents the evolution of average exec-
utive constraint scores over time based on the sample of newly-independent countries.
It is easily observed that while these countries have shared in the historical democra-
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Figure 1.2: Prevalence of executive constraints in countries that have gained their
independence after 1945.
tization movements, the upward trend towards stronger executive constraints is more
muted. Figure 1.3 documents country-specific trends, focusing on Japan, Belgium,
and Israel on the left column, and Argentina, Sri Lanka, and Turkey on the right
column. While each of these countries has a unique history of economic development
and political conflict, they demonstrate the different paths institutionally stable and
unstable countries have taken. Specifically, Japan, Belgium, and Israel exhibit the
stability of strong executive constraints in the post-war period, whereas Argentina,
Sri Lanka, and Turkey represent cases of institutional instability.
This chapter studies the determinants of executive constraints with a focus on
4
Figure 1.3: Examples of countries with stable versus unstable executive constraints.
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understanding the factors that lead to the divergent experiences exemplified in Figure
1.3. The literature has predominantly linked the strength of a regime’s executive con-
straints to its political turnover characteristics by arguing that leaders who are more
likely to remain in power do not have an incentive to promote strong constraints on
their rule.4 However, these studies have not addressed the question of why electorally-
powerful incumbents in democratic regimes do not weaken these constraints. For
example, the Polity IV data indicates that the thirteen years of Labour governments
between 1997 and 2010 have not resulted in a reversal of U.K’s strong executive con-
straint scores. Likewise, consecutive governments led by Sweden’s Social Democratic
Party have not engaged in attempts to roll back the country’s strong system of checks
and balances. These observations suggest that factors besides electoral uncertainty
must be influencing the institutional decisions of governments across regimes and
resulting in different responses to similar political environments. Therefore, while
middle regimes with oscillating executive constraint scores fit the predictions of the
existing theoretical models, the resilience of strong institutions in the face of electoral
advantage in established democracies poses a challenge to their results.5
The aim of this chapter is to reconcile this discrepancy between data and the
theoretical literature by focusing on the relationship between a country’s level of ex-
ecutive constraints and the development of its public sector. There exists an extensive
4See Besley, Persson and Reynal-Querol (2014), who find that reform of executive constraints is
more likely after the death of a leader who has been in office for a long time. Jones and Olken (2009)
reach the similar conclusion that assassinations of undemocratic leaders have triggered positive
institutional reforms.
5As will be discussed subsequently in the Related Literature section, Besley, Persson and Reynal-
Querol (2014) provide evidence that political turnover affects the choice of executive constraints only
in weak executive constraint-regimes.
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empirical literature documenting the correlation between the democratic attributes
of a country and positive indicators of public good provision.6 These studies have
used data on public education enrollment levels, availability of public health care, the
quality of infrastructure, or the taxation capacity of the state in order to measure
and compare public good provision across countries. Their overall findings indicate
that democratic regimes provide better public services to their citizens than autocra-
cies or dictatorships, where the spending preferences of governments lie with targeted
political spending as opposed to common interest public goods. Lack of competitive
elections or the role of a politically connected elite in non-democratic regimes are
among the explanations that the literature has offered into this empirical finding.7
The relationship established by these studies between a regime’s institutional cre-
dentials and the quality of its public good provision constitutes the motivation for
the thesis of this chapter. Figure 1.4 documents the correlation between the ex-
ecutive constraints score of a country and its public sector development, measured
by the “Government Effectiveness” score from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
compiled by the World Bank.8 The figure clearly indicates that countries with high
executive constraint scores are also the countries with high government effectiveness.
6See Lott (1999), Lake and Baum (2001), Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith
(2003), and Deacon (2009) for empirical evidence on the relationship between public good provision
and regime characteristics. See Besley and Persson (2011), Figure 1.9, for evidence of correlation
between the executive constraints score from the Polity IV Project and the fiscal capacity of the
state, measured by total tax revenues as a share of GDP.
7Specifically, see Lake and Baum (2001) for an electoral argument and Bueno de Mesquita,
Morrow, Siverson and Smith (2003) for a government capture by the elite argument.
8The World Bank governance indicators are collected on a yearly basis and measure governance
based on the following six dimensions: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corrup-
tion. The data is accessible at www.govindicators.org. A country’s score on government effectiveness
captures the quality of its public services and the delivery of these services by its civil servants.
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Figure 1.4: Institutional and public sector development are correlated.
This chapter argues that the correlation in Figure 1.4 can potentially explain the
differences in the institutional decisions of governments facing similar electoral envi-
ronments.
To study the determinants of executive constraints in light of Figure 1.4, I focus
on the interaction between a government’s two types of decisions, institutional and
policy, and ask the following questions: How do constitutional limits on executive
authority affect the level of public goods and targeted political spending? Which fac-
tors contribute to the choice of strong executive constraints and better public good
provision? What is the role of political uncertainty in this interaction and how does
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this role change over time? To address these questions, I build a dynamic model of
political competition in which the party in power determines both the policy and the
level of executive constraints. I model executive constraints as an endogenous limit
on the government’s policy choice. The motivation for treating an institution as a
constraint on payoff-relevant policies is to emphasize its instrumentality: agents only
have intrinsic policy preferences and care about an institution insofar as it enables or
inhibits their implementation. Accordingly, an institution as a strategic choice vari-
able is meaningful only in the presence of political uncertainty, because an incumbent
would impose constraints on policy-making only as a bulwark against a future gov-
ernment with different preferences.
The model consists of an economy with agents who belong to one of the two groups
in the society and who care about their private consumption and a public good. In
each period, a representative agent from one of the two groups is exogenously elected
to become the new incumbent and unilaterally makes the following decisions: 1) a
policy choice that includes the level of investment to a public good that equally ben-
efits all citizens (e.g. environmental or R&D spending) and private transfers of the
consumption good to each group (e.g. pork spending); and 2) an institutional choice
on the level of executive constraints for the next period. While there exists complete
agreement over the public good decision, parties disagree over which group the trans-
fers should be targeted at. Thus, the policy choice incorporates both a common cause
and a conflict dimension.
In each period, both a budget and an executive constraint apply to the policy deci-
sion. The budget constraint represents the exogenous surplus created in the economy
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that the incumbent can levy in order to finance his policies. On the other hand,
the executive constraint limits the adoption of extreme policy choices. For exam-
ple, while a budget set imposes no limits on disinvesting the society’s entire stock of
the public good as long as doing so has a zero price, an executive constraint in this
model outlaws such extreme policies. I assume that the executive constraints limit
the choice of public goods and private transfers simultaneously. An incumbent picks
the levels of investment and pork spending under the executive constraints he inherits
from the previous government and chooses those that will constrain the next period’s
incumbent.
The levels of the public good and the executive constraints constitute the two
state variables of the model. I first solve the two-period version of the model, which
is sufficient to demonstrate an incumbent’s institutional choice trade-off. However,
this setting naturally does not allow for a full interaction between the two state vari-
ables. Therefore, I extend the model to four periods, which is the minimum number
of periods necessary to observe a single feedback loop between the levels of the public
good and the executive constraints. The results of this analysis demonstrate an in-
cumbent’s complete trade-off in both his policy and institutional choices. I find that
for any given distribution of political power between the two parties, the executive
constraints get tightened in equilibrium as the public good approaches an optimality
benchmark. As the parties alternate in office, the model generates endogenous fluc-
tuations in the level of these constraints. Based on these dynamics, I discuss how
public good provision can be improved from its equilibrium levels.
The following trade-off describes the institutional decision in equilibrium: While
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weak executive constraints permit the incumbent to enact his desired policies in case
of re-election, the same applies to his opponent in the opposite scenario. Specifically,
the incumbent’s motivation for picking looser constraints in order to enjoy levels of
investment and private transfers close to his ideals conflicts with the incentive to pro-
tect himself from his opponent’s future pork spending. The distribution of electoral
power determines which of these two effects dominates in equilibrium.
One of the main insights from this analysis is that the above-mentioned role of
political uncertainty on an incumbent’s institutional decision is not constant. The
parties’ shared investment interests dominate the conflict over private transfers at
too low or too high states of the public good, because there exist large potential
mutually beneficial gains to be realized. At these states, the ability to invest (or
disinvest) takes precedence over the ability to make political transfers so that both
parties discount the role of politics as a result and re-election uncertainty becomes
a relatively less important determinant of executive constraints. However, as these
gains get exhausted, the parties no longer need to tolerate each other’s pork spending
for the sake of being able to implement the much-needed investments. Consequently,
an incumbent assigns less weight on a future government’s freedom to invest and more
weight on shielding himself from potential transfers to the other group when choosing
the next period’s institution.
A similar trade-off applies to the public good decision. Although the parties have
a shared incentive to move toward better states of the public good, they also antic-
ipate that this movement would imply a growing role for politics and hence tighter
executive constraints in equilibrium, limiting their ability to make transfers to their
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respective groups should they become the incumbent. As a result, each party holds
back on their public good decisions. Moreover, this aversion motive grows as an in-
cumbent’s political power increases.
The main theoretical results of this chapter corroborate the empirical evidence by
showing that better public good provision is associated with stronger executive con-
straints that are less sensitive to swings in political power. Despite the parties’ shared
preferences over it, the public good is still under-provided as the conflict over private
transfers takes common cause hostage: Some investment will always be sacrificed to
pork politics even at highly sub-optimal levels of the public good.
Confirming the existing results in the literature, I find that the strongest execu-
tive constraints arise in societies with the highest political uncertainty. However, this
result only holds for a given level of the public good. More specifically, the compet-
itiveness of the electoral process can explain the differences in executive constraints
only among those countries with similar levels of public sector development. I show
that the response of these constraints to shifts in the distribution of political power is
more muted in countries that have already exhausted the gains from investments in
the public good. These results suggest that other characteristics of a country’s public




Focusing on the interaction between the level of executive constraints and the provi-
sion of public goods, this chapter contributes to a large literature on the determinants
and effects of political institutions. These two complementary branches of the liter-
ature have their intellectual foundation in Buchanan’s two-stage analysis of public
decision-making that consists of a constitutional and a post-constitutional stage.9
The rest of the section discusses the main studies in the areas to which this chapter
contributes.
Determinants of Executive Constraints:
A growing number of studies on the constitutional stage look at institutions that
limit executive power. Among them, both the theoretical and the empirical results in
Besley, Persson and Reynal-Querol (2014) that link executive constraints to political
turnover are the most relevant for the development of the ideas in this chapter. The
authors model checks and balances as the share of rents an incumbent must share
with the other groups in the society and analyze the policy decision of an incumbent
between public goods and private transfers along with an institutional decision. The
main theoretical finding of this study is that a high probability of losing office drives
the adoption of strong executive constraints. This is supported by empirical evi-
dence, which indicates that the presence of a resilient leader decreases the probability
of positive institutional reform by 1 percentage point compared to the incumbency
9The constitutional stage represents the adoption of rules for policy-making such as voting rules,
level of checks and balances, or the system of government. The payoff-relevant policies are then
chosen during the post-constitutional stage according to these rules. See Buchanan and Tullock
(1962) for an in-depth discussion.
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of a non-resilient leader. However, the authors find no effect of leadership resilience
on the transition from strong to weak executive constraints. While their significance
result confirms the importance of leadership change on the determination of execu-
tive constraints, the fact that they find no evidence of this in strong regimes offers a
compelling motivation for the ideas in this chapter.
An alternative interpretation of checks and balances is offered by Aghion, Alesina
and Trebbi (2004), who characterize the optimal size of supermajorities that are con-
stitutionally mandated to pass legislation. Other important papers that endogenize
institutions related to accountability and executive constraints include Maskin and
Tirole (2004), Ticchi and Vindigni (2010), and Robinson and Torvik (2013).10 By
focusing on the interaction between executive constraints and public sector decisions,
this chapter takes a different approach from these studies.
The structure of an institution employed in this chapter is closely related to La-
gunoff (2001), who analyzes the determination of legal rules that protect the rights of
the minorities as an example of a constraint on majority decision-making. The model
features a majority deciding on the set of activities that are permitted to the general
citizenry. The main finding indicates that tolerant limits will be imposed even though
the majority preferences are not necessarily as tolerant. This arises due to possible
interpretation errors on the set of permissible actions and the majority’s reluctance
to unwillingly impose limits on its own behaviors. His conclusion that societies with
higher political uncertainty will exhibit more liberal constitutional rules mirrors this
10The choice of voting rule and delegation of authority are other examples of institutions that
have led to a number of interesting papers, including Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and (2001),
Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Barbera and Jackson (2004), Jack and Lagunoff (2006), and Lagunoff
(2009).
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chapter’s finding on the increasing tightness of executive constraints.
Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik (2013) focus on the puzzle that voters have his-
torically voted for politicians who have used their electoral mandate to relax various
measures of checks and balances that limited their executive powers. They argue that
even though such measures protect the citizenry from the abuse of political power,
they also decrease the cost of influencing politicians through bribes. Therefore, citi-
zens face a trade-off between constrained politicians and a corrupt political system.
Although different in its focus on voters and corruption, their analysis is relevant to
the central questions of this chapter for understanding alternative channels through
which executive constraints are influenced.
Implications of Alternative Institutions for Public Good Provision:
By comparing public good provision under different levels of executive constraints,
this chapter contributes to the literature on the efficiency implications of institutions.
One branch of this literature studies how inefficient policies are generated as the elites
use their power to perpetuate the institutions that serve their interests. Prominent
examples of studies in this branch include Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), Acemoglu,
Egorov and Sonin (2010), and Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2011). A more closely
related branch compares the performance of public good provision under alternative
institutional settings. For example, Lizzeri and Persico (2001) compare the provi-
sion of public goods under proportional and majoritarian electoral rules based on
the politicians’ trade-off between efficiency and targetability of benefits. Battaglini,
Nunnari and Palfrey (2012) dynamically study the same question by comparing a
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legislative decision mechanism with a decentralized one. Bowen, Chen and Eraslan
(2014) focus on budgetary institutions of mandatory versus discretionary spending
on public goods and find that mandatory public good spending creates more efficient
outcomes. They establish their results within a dynamic bargaining model in which
the previous year’s mandatory spending constitutes today’s endogenous status quo.
This paper is especially relevant to the present one in terms of its explicit comparative
focus on alternative institutional frameworks and modeling of public good decisions
within a governmental mechanism. Therefore, along with the previous two papers, it
constitutes a building block to the focus of this chapter on the policy implications of
executive constraints.
The Implications of Political Power for Public Good Provision:
Without an explicit focus on institutions, Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007),
Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008), and Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2012) study
dynamic policy models with power fluctuations and find public good provision to be
inefficient. In contrast to this chapter, the inefficiency result of these studies can
be traced to inherent preference differences between political parties over the public
good. Azzimonti (2014) also builds a dynamic model of political competition that
results in underinvestment, but her model generates this inefficiency not due to fun-
damental preference differences but due to how a current government can manipulate
the level of the public good in order to restrict an opponent’s future spending. How-
ever, these models all treat the constitutional setting as exogenous and therefore do
not allow for a simultaneous analysis of policy and institutional decisions.11
11This broad literature studies how policies determined by self-interested politicians instead of
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Bai and Lagunoff (2011) study a dynamic model of policy-making with endoge-
nous political turnover in which the incumbent faces a trade-off between re-election
and implementing desired policies. Theirs is one of the first papers to explicitly model
the indirect effects of current policy choices on the identity of future governments in
a fully dynamic setting. The resulting dynamics on the co-evolution of governments
and policies are relevant for extensions of this chapter to environments that allow for
voting and therefore endogenous political turnover.
The underlying framework of this chapter is built upon the ideas in Battaglini
and Coate (2007). Within a legislative bargaining model, they analyze the legisla-
tors’ taxation, private spending, and public good investment decisions. As in the
present chapter, the dynamics are created by the previous period’s investment deci-
sion. They find that for all states of the economy described by a public good that
is below an established threshold, investment decisions will be efficient as the public
good needs are great. However, as the economy accumulates the public good and the
needs decrease, legislators start to underinvest and allocate pork to their districts.
The authors focus exclusively on the policy-making aspect of government without
allowing the institutional setting to change. This chapter can be seen as an extension
of their main idea to an environment where the limits of policy-making designated
by the level of executive constraints are also endogenous.
A Re-interpretation of the Modernization Hypothesis:
Finally, the results of this chapter can be interpreted in light of the debate on
benevolent dictators affect the allocation of public resources. Some earlier important papers include
Wittman (1989), Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), and Besley and Coate
(1998). An excellent overview of this literature can also be found in Persson and Tabellini (2001).
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the relationship between economic development and democratization. There exists
a large literature on the validity of the modernization hypothesis, first put forward
by Lipset (1959) who argued that income drives democracy.12 By emphasizing the
feedback loops between strong institutions (proxied by executive constraints) and eco-
nomic development (measured by the provision of public goods), this chapter provides
a basis for a more dynamic interpretation of this hypothesis. I take the view that
understanding the determinants and effects of institutions should not necessarily be
perceived as separate exercises. Along with others, this study constitutes a beginning
in that direction.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.3 introduces the model
and Section 1.4 provides an optimality benchmark by presenting the permanent au-
thority case. Sections in 1.5 characterize the equilibrium under political uncertainty
for the two and four period models. The provision of public goods in political equi-
librium is compared to the permanent authority benchmark in Section 1.6. Section
1.7 concludes.
1.3 The Model
The model presented in this section is built upon Battaglini and Coate (2007). The
economy consists of agents belonging to one of the two groups in the society, A and B.
Each agent within a group is homogeneous. Therefore, for simplicity of exposition, I
12A more recent treatment on the modernization hypothesis can be found in Przeworski, Alvarez,
Cheibub and Limongi (2000). Barro (1999) is one of the most famous papers that reject this
hypothesis. Other studies that argue against it include Acemoglu, Johnson and Yared (2008). Che,
Lu, Tao and Wang (2012) provide recent supporting evidence.
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treat the economy as consisting of two representative agents.
There are two goods in the economy: a private consumption good y and a public
good g. Each agent i’s preferences are described by a quasi-linear utility function
given by
u(yi, g) = yi + Āg
α (1.1)
for i = A,B, where Ā is a constant that represents the relative importance of the
public good to the private consumption good and α ∈ (0, 1). I assume that each agent
receives his (equal) share K̄ of the economy’s exogenous surplus of the consumption
good. In addition, each agent discounts future utility by the common discount factor
β.
In each period t, an election takes place and an incumbent government is realized
according to an exogenously fixed probability qi for i = A,B, where qA + qB = 1. I
assume that each agent is purely policy-motivated. The incumbent agent in period t,
given by the realization of the state κt ∈ {A,B} according to qi, becomes the dictator
for that period and unilaterally makes a policy and an institutional decision (without
any bargaining with the opposition).13
The following subsections describe an incumbent’s two types of decisions:
Policy Choice: In each period t, the incumbent κt makes the following policy de-
cisions: investment It to the stock of gt; private transfers of the consumption good
13Battaglini and Coate (2007) features decision-making within a bargaining framework whereas
decisions are taken unilaterally here. In their model, the legislature follows a Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) bargaining protocol to make a policy decision that is similar to the one made unilaterally
by the incumbent in this chapter. However, this chapter’s main interest is in how institutional
constraints interact with these policy decisions. Therefore, the present model differs from theirs in
its focus on modeling both a given institutional state and the incumbent’s institutional decision for
the next period.
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yA,t and yB,t to agents A and B; and uniform lump-sum taxes τ̄t to finance these
investment and private transfers.
The model assumes that while there exists complete agreement over the public
good decision between the two agents, they disagree over private transfers of the
consumption good. The public good represents projects such as military exercises,
environmental clean-up, or infrastructure construction that both agents enjoy equally.
On the other hand, the transfers are targeted to a specific agent; while both agents
pay their share of taxes for a given transfer of good y to agent i, only the type-i agent
receives utility from it.
I assume that the public good depreciates each period at the rate δ and its evolu-
tion is given by the standard formulation
gt+1 = (1− δ)gt + It. (1.2)
Investment is reversible so that there does not exist a non-negativity constraint
on its choice. Assuming a production technology given by g = y
p
for the public good,
the price of a unit of investment can be conveniently represented by p. On the other
hand, I assume that disinvestment is free and that its proceeds can be consumed as a
private good. I further assume that the cost of providing private transfers is convex.
Specifically, the cost of transferring yi units of the private good to agent i (including
the transfer) is given by x(yi) = (yi)
b, where b > 1.
There exists no debt in the model so that the government must balance its budget
every period. As a result, the following government budget constraint needs to hold
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in any given period t:
x(yA,t) + x(yB,t) + pIt ≤ τ̄t. (1.3)
Since an incumbent will never leave tax revenues unspent, 1.3 always holds with
equality. A type-i agent’s stage utility after the government makes its policy and
taxation decisions can be written as




Suppressing the constant surplus K̄ to reduce clutter and substituting the government




[x(yi) + x(yj) + pI] + Āg
α, (1.5)
where j 6= i. Note that since the government budget constraint always holds with
equality and taxation is non-distortionary, the decision on the level of τ̄t need not be
separately considered.
In addition to the budget constraint that needs to be satisfied each period, an in-
cumbent faces an executive constraint that it inherits from the previous government
when choosing a policy. The modeling of this constraint and its choice for the next
period are described in the following subsection.
Institutional Choice: Executive constraints are modeled as a limit on the extreme-
ness of an incumbent’s policy choice. Let Γt ⊂ R3 denote the institutionally feasible
set that represents the level of executive constraints in period t. I assume that all
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the policies lying on the boundary of the set Γt are equidistant from the origin in R3.
In each period, the incumbent chooses the policy vector (It, yA,t, yB,t) ∈ Γt, since the
period-t incumbent κt inherits the level of executive constraints from his predecessor
κt−1.
Given this structure, let Φ denote the set of all possible institutionally feasible sets.
Then, the incumbent’s institutional choice is equivalent to defining a set Γt+1 ∈ Φ
by choosing d(0, z) for some z ∈ R3, where d is the Euclidean metric and 0 is the
origin in R3. The boundary points z̄ ∈ argmax d(0, z) ∀ z ∈ Γt+1 represent the most
extreme policies that are permitted by the executive constraints represented by Γt+1.
Note that the structure of an institutionally feasible set in this model does not
allow an incumbent to impose separate limits on investment and private transfer
choices; the executive constraints bind all policy choices simultaneously. The moti-
vation for this structure can be summarized as follows: First, an incumbent should
always be allowed to do nothing, i.e. choose a zero level of investment and private
transfers to each agent. This implies that the origin should always belong to the set
Γ. Second, the model interprets extremeness as the Euclidean distance of a policy
from the origin. For example, while a policy that involves very high levels of spending
on all three policy dimensions is considered extreme, the same applies to a different
policy that allocates all of the economy’s tax revenues to one agent’s private consump-
tion. As more policies are gradually allowed starting from the origin, a constraint on
extremeness means that all the policies lying on the boundary of the institutionally
feasible set should be equidistant from the origin.
The underlying rationale for this structure is that an incumbent should not be
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able to fine-tune his choice of Γt+1.
14 Choosing a singleton Γt+1 whose only member
is the incumbent’s ideal policy is one extreme example of such fine-tuning and should
be ruled out in order to make the problem interesting. Instead, under the present
structure, an incumbent not only ensures he can implement his desired policies if he is
re-elected by allowing for more extreme policies in Γt+1, but also allows his opponent
to do the same in the opposite scenario. This trade-off will be important in obtaining
non-trivial dynamics from the model.
While it may not be applicable to all policy decisions, the present modeling strat-
egy for an executive constraint is consistent with the design of institutions of interest
to this chapter in the real world. Since an institutional reform entails constitutional
changes subject to review by a Supreme Court that is mandated to enforce equal
treatment clauses, an incumbent is legally barred from designating a feasible set that
disproportionately allows his favored policies while outlawing those of his opponent.
For example, a party in office has the power to award government contracts to its
supporters, but it cannot design a competition agency that only permits the party’s
supporters to participate in bids for public contracts.
1.4 The Dictatorship Solution
Studying executive constraints as an endogenous limit on policy-making is only non-
trivial under political uncertainty; a social planner or a dictator who will remain in
office forever would never willingly tie his own hands. However, before analyzing the
14An alternative interpretation and modeling of executive constraints that also satisfy this criteria
is presented in Appendix A, followed by a discussion on why the present structure is preferred.
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model under political competition, characterizing a dictator’s optimal investment and
private transfers decisions creates a benchmark for evaluating public good provision
under political governments.
Without loss of generality, let qA = 1 and qB = 0 so that agent A is the dictator.
Let (I∗(g), y∗A, y
∗
B) denote dictator A’s ideal policy when the public good is given by
g.15 For a more concise exposition, I assume that the economy’s exogenous surplus is
sufficient to finance dictator A’s ideal policy through lump-sum taxes.




∗(g) ≤ K̄. (1.6)
In the rest of this section, I first solve for dictator A’s infinite-horizon problem.
Although the political model is only solved for a finite horizon and hence finite horizon
dictatorial benchmarks are needed for any comparisons, studying the infinite-horizon
solution allows for a better understanding of an agent’s investment motives. Second, I
solve the finite-horizon problem, which yield a basis for a direct comparison between
the dictatorial and the political equilibria. Finally, I discuss why the dictatorial
solution is a meaningful benchmark for evaluating the political equilibrium.
Within the infinite-horizon framework, the objective of dictator A is to maximize
his dynamic utility.16 In the absence of an institutional decision, he chooses the level
of investment I and the private transfers yA and yB in order to solve the following
15Note that an institutionally unconstrained dictator has a finite optimal level of private transfers
since the cost function x(·) is convex.
16Note that agent A is identical to a benevolent social planner who assigns all the weight in the
society’s aggregate utility to the type-A agent.
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program:17
V A(g) = max
I,yA,yB
yA − x(yA)− x(yB) + Āgα − pI + βV A(g′) (1.7)
subject to
yi ≥ 0 for i = A,B; (1.8)
I ≥ −g; (1.9)
g′ = (1− δ)g + I. (1.10)
Notice that the choices of yA and yB are purely static in the dictatorship problem.
Moreover, they do not interact with the choice of I as a result of Assumption 1 and
the absence of executive constraints. Therefore, by this separability of the transfer
and investment decisions, the above problem can be written as the sum of a static
and a dynamic component.
First, consider dictator A’s static problem:
max
yA,yB
yA − x(yA)− x(yB) (1.11)
subject to yi ≥ 0 for i = A,B. This problem implies that dictator A always chooses
yB = 0, because he receives no utility from the private consumption of the type-B
agent. Since taxation is non-distortionary, transfers to himself are positive at all
states of the public good. Also note that the optimal amount of private transfers
17From this point on, I let x(yA), x(yB) and pI denote the per-capita costs of these policies in
order to limit the amount of notation used.
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to the dictator agent is always the same regardless of the identity of the dictator,
because both agents enjoy the consumption good linearly and face symmetric costs
of providing private transfers. Therefore, the conflict is solely over the target agent.
Second, consider dictator A’s investment decision, which constitutes the dynamic
component of the problem.18 Let γ∗ denote his equilibrium investment rule such that
γ∗(g) = g′. Then,
γ∗(g) ∈ argmax
I≥−g
Āgα − pI + βV A(g′) (1.12)
subject to g′ = (1 − δ)g + I. From the first-order condition for investment, the






The right-hand side of 1.13 is the constant marginal cost of the public good (in
tomorrow’s dollars). The left-hand side represents the total marginal benefit of the
public good: While Āα[g′]α−1 is the marginal benefit from its direct consumption,
the second term captures the strategic link between periods. Specifically, it is the
marginal effect of today’s investment decision on future states of the public good and
depends on the derivative of an unknown equilibrium rule γ∗(g). If the sign of this
derivative is positive, today’s investments lead to higher future levels of the public
good by reinforcing the marginal benefit component. Otherwise, the public good is
18The dictatorship problem is fairly standard and previous papers such as Battaglini and Coate
(2007) establish the existence of an optimal policy.
19Note that the first-order condition yields Dg′V
A(g′)DIg
′ = pβ , where DIg
′ = 1 and
Dg′V
A(g′) = Āα[g′]α−1 + βDg′′V
A(g′′)Dg′g
′′. Taking the first-order condition one period forward
yields Āα[g′]α−1 + pDg′g
′′ = pβ . Substituting the expression for dictator A’s equilibrium investment
rule γ∗, we obtain 1.13.
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inefficiently high and the optimal action is to disinvest.
The solution to 1.12 implies the existence of a threshold level of the public good ĝ
below which the dictator finds it optimal to invest and above which he disinvests. To
see this, suppose g is such that the marginal benefit of investing exceeds the constant
marginal cost. At these inefficiently low states, the left-hand side of 1.13 must decrease
by investing in g. As g increases, the marginal benefit decreases, eventually hitting
the constant marginal cost curve at the point where g equals ĝ and the optimal level
of investment is zero. Hence, solving the dictator’s Euler equation 1.13 for ĝ by letting
Dg′γ








For all levels of g above ĝ, the public good is inefficiently high; the dictator will
be disinvesting and consuming the proceeds. Since disinvestment is costless, the
dictator always finds it optimal to sufficiently disinvest such that γ∗(g) = (1− δ)ĝ for
all g > ĝ.20
Figure 1.5 plots the equilibrium investment rule γ∗ and shows how the steady-
state is determined. Note that the dictator’s stage utility and value function V A(g)
are both strictly concave, yielding a unique equilibrium investment rule γ∗. Since the
slope of γ∗ is always less than 1, there exists a unique steady-state of the public good
given by g∗. Moreover, since γ∗(g∗) = g∗, it must be the case that the function γ∗ is
increasing at g∗. Therefore, the threshold state ĝ must be higher than g∗. Starting
20Note that since the public good can be laundered into the consumption good by disinvesting
and taxation is non-distortionary, a sufficiently low price for g could make it optimal to invest just
to consume these investments in the next period. In order to rule out this possibility, I assume that







Figure 1.5: Steady-state level of the public good under dictatorship.
from any initial level of g, the public good converges monotonically to this steady-
state.
The increasing section of the dictatorship rule γ∗ captures both the direct benefit
of higher public good consumption and the indirect benefit of having to invest less in
the future. Since taxation is non-distortionary, the indirect benefit translates either
into tax savings or higher transfers, weakly increasing all agents’ private consumption.
At these states, the total marginal benefit curve decreases at a decreasing rate but
always remains above the constant p. As g increases above ĝ, the marginal benefit
keeps decreasing at a slower rate, reflecting the consumption benefits of disinvestment
proceeds.21
Since both types of dictators face the same marginal cost and marginal benefit
from the public good, they follow the same investment rule in equilibrium. The
21Since p > β, the marginal benefit curve will always lie below p despite the disinvestment proceeds
for all g > ĝ. Note that the different behavior of the marginal benefit curve above and below ĝ does
not imply a discontinuity in the dictator’s value function.
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conflict over targeted transfers represents the static component of policy choice and
therefore has no effect on the degree of common cause over investments between the
two agents.22 This common investment rule that would be followed under either type
of permanent authority provides a benchmark for evaluating public good provision
under political equilibrium, because any deviation from γ∗(g) decreases the dynamic
component of each agent’s utility. Therefore, I denote the level of the public good that
would be chosen by either type of dictator as the “benchmark state”. However, note
that this benchmark state does not necessarily correspond to Pareto-optimal levels of
the public good, because given the quasi-linear specification of the economy, it may
be possible to increase the total utility of the agents by diverting some resources from
public good investments to the private consumption of the agent who is not receiving
any transfers under dictatorship.
Appendix B characterizes the optimal levels of investment for a dictator when the
model consists of four periods. These solutions to the dictatorship problem for each
period establish the states that will provide a benchmark for evaluating public good
provision in the four-period political model that will be subsequently analyzed.23 This
is because the same argument made in the above paragraph holds when we consider
the finite-horizon version of the problem: In the absence of executive constraints that
will lead their public good decisions to diverge, both agents maximize the dynamic
component of their utilities by choosing the same levels of investment each period.
Hence, any level of investment not equal to the solution of the dictatorship problem
22This will allow for a more succinct representation of their ideal points in the following section.
23This analysis is relegated to the Appendix, because it only serves as a comparative technical
benchmark for later analysis and the infinite-horizon solution to the dictator’s problem presented
above gives a more succinct and intuitive analysis of decision-making under permanent authority.
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results in both agents enjoying lower utilities from public good consumption.
1.5 Equilibrium under Political Uncertainty
In the absence of an institutional decision, the optimal policy of an incumbent facing
political uncertainty would be equivalent to the dictatorial solution. This is because
the decision on private transfers is static and would be separable from the investment
decision, and the agents share the same preferences for the public good. Specifically,
without a binding budget or executive constraint, incumbent i would choose his static
ideal for yi, make zero transfers to group j 6= i, and invest in the public good following
the dictatorial rule.
Let ẑig = (I
∗(g), y∗A, y
∗
B) denote agent i’s ideal policy vector in the absence of
executive constraints when the level of the public good is given by g. Since it is
never optimal to make positive transfers to the other agent (i.e. yj,t = 0 ∀t when
κt = i, j 6= i), an ideal policy for incumbent i can be described by the vector
ẑig = (I
∗(g), y∗i ) ∈ R2. Figure 1.6 plots these ideal policies for both agents as g
changes. In this figure, the x-axis represents investments to the public good and
the y-axis represents an agent’s private transfers to himself. While the first two
quadrants represent a policy space for agent A, the third and the fourth quadrants
are for agent B. Although the ideal policies ẑAg and ẑ
B
g do not lie in the same space,
it is convenient to express them as in Figure 1.6 by exploiting the fact that the ideal
amount of transfers to the other agent is always zero.
























Figure 1.6: The evolution of ideal policies for agents A and B.
denoted by y∗i for agent i ∈ {A,B}. In contrast, the ideal level of investment depends
on the state of g and is derived from the dictator’s equilibrium investment rule.
Starting from a low state such as g0, investment needs decrease as g increases toward
the threshold ĝ where the optimal investment equals zero. As g increases above
ĝ to high levels such as g2, disinvestment needs increase. As also shown in the
figure, the dependence of ideal investments on the stock of the public good implies a
corresponding evolution of the parties’ ideal policy vectors in R2 as a function of g.
Recall that the model formalizes executive constraints by the length of the policy
vector whose terminal point lies on the boundary of the institutionally feasible set.
In R2, this implies that the Γt+1 choice is equivalent to choosing the radius of a circle,
denoted r, with origin at (0, 0). Figure 1.7 illustrates two institutionally feasible sets
for a given level of g. While the outer circle permits both agents’ ideal policies ẑAg
and ẑBg to be implemented, the smaller circle is more restrictive.
In order to build the intuition for the optimal choice of executive constraints in









Figure 1.7: Two representations of Γ in R2.
by the inverse of the difference between the marginal benefit and marginal cost of a
unit of investment, given by | Āαgα−1 − p |−1. At very low levels of the public good
below ĝ, the marginal benefit of investing largely exceeds the marginal cost so that the
constant disagreement over private transfers translates into a low value of polarization.
This is because there exist high potential gains to be realized from investing and
common cause is dominant. However, as g increases toward the threshold level ĝ,
the difference Āαgα−1 − p decreases and equals zero at ĝ. At this point, all the
mutually beneficial gains from investing have been exhausted. As g further increases
above ĝ into the disinvestment range, (the absolute value of) this difference increases
again, now reflecting the potential gains from disinvesting and the resulting decrease
in polarization. This discussion is summarized in the following remark:
Remark 1. As the public good moves away from the investment cut-off state ĝ in
either direction, polarization decreases at an increasing rate.
The second-order property of the polarization measure is a consequence of the
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behavior of the marginal benefit curve. It implies that as we move to states of the
public good at which investment (or disinvestment) needs are increasingly pressing,
common cause starts to dominate the conflict over private transfers at an increasing
rate.
To see how the degree of polarization relates to an institutionally feasible set in
R2, let r̄ : R+ → R+ be a function such that the executive constraint defined by r̄(g)
is the tightest one that still allows both agents’ ideal policies to be implemented when
the public good state is g. Figure 1.8 illustrates four different values of the r̄ function
for some g0, g1, g2 and g3, where g0 < g1 < ĝ < g2 < g3. For example, when the state
of g is given by a low level such as g0 and the corresponding ideal policy for agent i is
represented by ẑig0 for i = A,B, the value r̄(g0) is given by the radius shown in blue.
At this state, the circle with radius r̄(g0) and origin at (0, 0) allows both agents’ ideal
policies to be implemented. Likewise, the value of r̄ at a state such as g1 closer to
the investment cut-off ĝ is represented by the red radius that allows the ideal policy
ẑig1 for both i = A,B.
For any radius r ∈ R+, let Γ(r) = {(a1, a2) ∈ R2 | (a1)2 + (a2)2 ≤ r2} denote the
circle with origin (0, 0) and radius r. Then, r̄(g) can be interpreted as the shortest
radius r for which (I∗(g), y∗i ) ∈ Γ(r) for agent i. The following lemma describes the
behavior of the r̄ function:24
Lemma 1. For each agent i ∈ {A,B}, there exists a function r̄ : R+ → R+ such
that r̄(g) = min{r | (I∗(g), y∗i ) ∈ Γ(r)} is increasing at an increasing rate as g moves
away from ĝ in either direction.






















Figure 1.8: Examples of values the function r̄ may take.
Note that the function r̄ is constructed based only on the agents’ ideal policies
and does not incorporate equilibrium behavior under political uncertainty. However,
because it indicates a tightening of the minimum radius that still permits an agent’s
ideal policy as g changes, the equilibrium level of executive constraints must be char-
acterized in relation to the values the r̄ function takes. To see why r̄ is convex as
g moves away from ĝ, notice that it tracks the movement of the marginal benefit of
investment and hence of polarization.
In the following section, I begin the equilibrium analysis by formally defining a
political equilibrium.
1.5.1 Political Equilibrium
I look for a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) to the T -period finite-horizon
game described in Section 1.3. At any given period t, the payoff-relevant states of
the world are the institutionally feasible set Γt (described by the radius rt from here
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on) and the public good gt. An incumbent’s equilibrium strategies will be functions
of only these two state variables.
Given the executive constraint state rt and the public good state gt, a pure pol-
icy strategy for incumbent i in period t consists of a pair of private transfer rules
Υij,t : R2+ → R+ for j = A,B and an investment rule γit : R2+ → R+ such that
(γit(rt, gt) − (1 − δ)gt,Υij,t(rt, gt)) ∈ Γ(rt). The equilibrium private transfer rules
Υij,t(rt, gt) for j = A,B yield the amount of private transfers incumbent i allocates
to agent j in any given period t and for any level of rt and gt. The equilibrium
investment rule γit(rt, gt) = gt+1 yields the level of the public good incumbent i des-
ignates for period t + 1 through his choice of investment in period t. In addition, a
pure institutional strategy for incumbent i in period t is an executive constraint rule
ρit : R2+ → R+, where ρit(rt, gt) = rt+1 yields the radius defining the next period’s
institutionally feasible set Γ(rt+1).
Let σt ≡ (σAt , σBt ) denote a strategy profile for period t, where σit = (ΥiA,t,ΥiB,t, γit, ρit)
for i = A,B. When the period-t level of executive constraints is given by rt, the level
of the public good is given by gt, and the agents are following the strategy profile
σt, let the function V
i
t (rt, gt) denote agent i’s period-t payoff if he is the period-t
incumbent and W it (rt, gt) his period-t payoff if he is not in power. Specifically, let
V it (rt, gt) = Υ
i
i,t(rt, gt)−x(Υii,t(rt, gt))−x(Υij,t(rt, gt)) + Āgαt − p[γit(rt, gt)− (1− δ)gt)]
(1.15)
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for agent i if κt = i, where j 6= i, and let










t (rt, gt)− (1−δ)gt)]
(1.16)
for agent i if κt = j, where j 6= i.
Note that even though Assumption 1 still holds, the investment and the private
transfer decisions are no longer separable due to the introduction of executive con-
straints. Given rt and gt in any given period t, the incumbent κt = i with T − t future










t+1(rt+1, gt+1) + (1− qi)W it+1(rt+1, gt+1)]
where j 6= i, subject to the following constraints:
yk,t ≥ 0 for k = A,B; (1.18)
It ≥ −gt; (1.19)
(It, yk,t) ∈ Γ(rt) for k = A,B; (1.20)
rt+1 ≥ 0; (1.21)
25To reduce clutter, I again suppress the economy’s surplus K̄ in the incumbent’s objective func-
tion.
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gt+1 = (1− δ)gt + It. (1.22)
The following is the definition of a political equilibrium to this model:




t ) for t = 1, ..., T constitutes a Sub-
game Perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if incumbent i’s private transfer rules
ΥiA,t(rt, gt) = yA,t and Υ
i
B,t(rt, gt) = yB,t, investment rule γ
i
t(rt, gt) = gt+1, and exec-
utive constraint rule ρit(rt, gt) = rt+1 solve the problem 1.17 subject to the associated
constraints 1.18 - 1.22 for all periods t, state pairs (rt, gt) ∈ R2+, and i ∈ {A,B}.
In the following section, I solve the model for T = 2. The political equilibrium of
the two-period model demonstrates an incumbent’s full trade-off in his institutional
decision. However, this model is not sufficient to observe the full dynamics in an
incumbent’s policy and institutional choices. Therefore, I solve the model with T = 4
in Section 1.5.3, which is the minimum number of periods necessary to have a single
feedback loop between the two endogenous state variables of the model.
1.5.2 A Two-Period Model
When the agents live for only two periods, the model can be summarized as follows:
The given incumbent at t = 1 chooses a policy vector (I1, yA,1, yB,1) for the current
period and the level of executive constraints r2 for the next period, taking g1 and r1
as given. At the beginning of period t = 2, a new incumbent κ2 is realized according
to the fixed probability qi for i = A,B. Now taking g2 = (1−δ)g1 +I1 and r2 as given,
the incumbent κ2 chooses the second-period policy vector (I2, yA,2, yB,2). Based on
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Definition 1, I solve this two-period model via backward induction for the optimal
levels of investment and private transfers in both periods.
First, consider the policy choice of the second period incumbent κ2 = i ∈ {A,B}.
Since agent i does not receive any utility from the private consumption of agent j 6= i,
he optimally chooses
Υij,2(r2, g2) = 0 (1.23)
for any state pair (r2, g2) ∈ R2+. In contrast, the optimal amount of private transfers
incumbent i chooses for himself is given by
Υii,2(r2, g2) = min{r2, b
1
1−b} (1.24)
for any (r2, g2) ∈ R2+. In 1.24, yi,2 = b
1
1−b represents either agent’s ideal level of
transfers to himself.26 Whenever r2 > b
1
1−b so that the executive constraints are
sufficiently weak, incumbent i is free to transfer this ideal amount to himself. If the
opposite is true, this implies that the executive constraint must be binding and the
incumbent has to transfer an amount less than his ideal to himself.
Since there are only two periods in this model, the optimal level of investment in
the final period equals zero, i.e.
γi2(r2, g2) = (1− δ)g2. (1.25)
26To see this, maximize the static component of agent i’s utility given by yi−x(yi)−x(yj), where
j 6= i, by choosing yi. This is agent i’s ideal level of private transfers to himself in the absence of a
binding executive constraint.
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In the first period, the incumbent κ1 = i ∈ {A,B} solves 1.17 for T = 2 subject to
the associated constraints 1.18 - 1.22, anticipating the optimal second-period choices
given in 1.23, 1.24, and 1.25 by future incumbent κ2. The full solution to the two-
period model is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let T = 2 and κt = i ∈ {A,B} for all t. The Subgame-Perfect
Nash equilibrium strategies of incumbent κ2 is given by 1.23, 1.24, and 1.25. The
Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibrium policy strategies of incumbent κ1 are characterized
as follows:
Āβα[γi1(r1, g1)]






which implicitly defines the equilibrium investment strategy γi1(r1, g1) for any g1 ∈ R+
when the executive constraint r1 is binding, where I1 = γ
i








for any g1 ∈ R+ when r1 is not binding. Furthermore,
Υij,1(r1, g1) = 0 ∀ (r1, g1) ∈ R2+ (1.28)
where j 6= i; and
Υii,1(r1, g1) = min{
√
(r1)2 − (I1)2, b
1
1−b}. (1.29)










The optimal choice of executive constraints characterized in 1.30 demonstrates
an incumbent’s basic institutional trade-off. Before moving on to a discussion of
this important trade-off, the following corollary to Proposition 1 summarizes how the
optimal choice of r2 responds to changes in re-election uncertainty.
Corollary 1. As qi decreases, the optimal level of ρ
i
1(r1, g1) = r2 decreases.
To see why the executive constraints get tightened as an incumbent’s re-election
probability decreases, first suppose qi = 1 so that incumbent κ1 = i has no reason
to fear his opponent in the future. When there exist only two periods so that the
optimal level of I2 is zero, incumbent i chooses r2 so as to be able to only implement
his ideal level of private transfers given by y∗i = b
1
1−b in the final period. Clearly, any
r2 ≥ y∗i satisfies this.
Now suppose qi < 1 so that there exists a positive probability that incumbent i
will have to pay for transfers to the other agent in the second period. Equation 1.30
indicates that as qi decreases, the first-period incumbent responds to this loss of po-
litical power by tightening the executive constraints (since 1− b < 0) that will apply
to the future incumbent. These optimal levels of r2 less than y
∗
i reflect his incentive
to shield himself from the potential undesirable pork spending of his opponent in the
second period. The higher the probability that he will not be re-elected, the stronger
is this protection motive.
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Note that the equilibrium institutional strategy ρi1 only reflects incumbent i’s pri-
vate transfer preferences when the agents live for two periods. This is because the
optimal level of I2 always equals zero regardless of the identity of the incumbent.
27
If there existed future periods for today’s executive constraint decisions to affect not
only the future incumbent’s ability to make private transfers to himself but also to
invest or to disinvest, the equilibrium strategy ρit would be expected to reflect an
incumbent’s public good preferences as well.
In addition to the absence of investment preferences from an incumbent’s insti-
tutional decision, the fact that I2 = 0 obscures a second trade-off a longer-lived
incumbent would face in his public good decision, which will be introduced in the
following section. In the current model, there do not exist enough time periods to
allow for investment decisions to affect future levels of executive constraints, and
vice-versa. In order to demonstrate a full feedback loop between the model’s two
endogenous state variables, I now turn to the analysis with a longer time-horizon.
1.5.3 Characterizing a Single Feedback Loop
In order to see why we instead need four periods to characterize a single feedback loop
between executive constraints and the public good, consider a three-period model:
First, since there exist no future periods for g3 to impact in a three-period economy,
the level of I2 will be identical in equilibrium regardless of the identity of the in-
cumbent. This is because the agents share the same fundamental preferences for the
27I assume that Ā is sufficiently large so that disinvesting to consume the public good in the form
of consumption good y is not optimal.
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public good and the second-period investment is undertaken solely for its consump-
tion benefits in the final period. Second, in addition to identical I2 choices, either
type of incumbent would choose the same level of I1 in the first period. The intuition
for these identical decisions is as follows: The public good state g2 determined by I1
affects g3, but not r3. This is because the second-period executive constraint choice
on the level of r3 solely reflects private transfer preferences, since the optimal amount
of investment in the final period is always zero. With agents deciding identically on
the level of g3, there is no conflict in their I1 decision. Therefore, an additional period
is needed in order to observe differences in induced preferences over the public good
stemming from its future impact on the level of executive constraints.
The following proposition presents a full characterization of the four-period model:
Proposition 2. Let T = 4 and κt = i for i ∈ {A,B} and all t. The Subgame-Perfect
Nash equilibrium strategies of each period’s incumbent are characterized as follows:
1. The Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibrium private transfer strategies of incumbent
κt are given by
– Υij,t(rt, gt) = 0 for all t and (rt, gt) ∈ R2+, where j 6= i.
– Υii,t(rt, gt) = min{
√
(rt)2 − (It)2, b
1
1−b} for all t and (rt, gt) ∈ R2+, where It
is as characterized in item 2 below.
2. The Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibrium investment strategies of incumbent κt
are given by
– γi4(r4, g4) = (1− δ)g4 for any (r4, g4) ∈ R2+.
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– The optimal I3 is as characterized in 1.26 and 1.27. Moreover, the equi-
librium rule γi3 is such that γ
A
3 (r3, g3) = γ
B
3 (r3, g3) for all (r3, g3) ∈ R2+.
– When the executive constraint r2 is binding, γ
i
2(r2, g2) is implicitly defined
for any g2 ∈ R+ by
Āβα[γi2(r2, g2)]









where I3 is as given in 1.26. Moreover, the equilibrium rule γ
i
2 is such that
γA2 (r2, g2) = γ
B
2 (r2, g2) for all (r2, g2) ∈ R2+.
– When the executive constraint r1 is binding, γ
i
1(r1, g1) is implicitly defined
for any g1 ∈ R2+ by
Āβα[γi1(r1, g1)]

























where I2 is as given in 1.31 and I3 is as given in 1.26.
3. The Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibrium institutional strategies of incumbent κt
are given by








– For any (r2, g2) ∈ R2+, r3 = ρi2(r2, g2) is implicitly defined by
[
qi − b(Υii,3(r3, g3))b−1
] ∂Υii,3(r3, g3)
∂r3




where I3 is as given in 1.26.
– For any (r1, g1) ∈ R2+, r2 = ρi1(r1, g1) is implicitly defined by
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where I2 is as given in 1.31 and I3 is as given in 1.26.
The equilibrium characterized in the above proposition demonstrates an incum-
bent’s basic trade-offs with regards to his policy and institutional decisions. The
first part of Proposition 2 focuses on the static component of policy choice. The fact
that agents’ private transfer decisions have no future ramifications is the main driver
behind the result that the optimal amount of transfers to the other agent is always
zero. Therefore, an agent’s enjoyment of the consumption good does not play a role
on the dynamics of the model. The second and the third parts of Proposition 2 focus
on these dynamics in the simplest finite-horizon framework possible.
Part 2 of Proposition 2 characterizes an incumbent’s optimal investment decision
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in each of the four periods when the executive constraint is binding. The left-hand
side of equations 1.26 and 1.31 indicate that the marginal benefit of a unit of public
good consumption is tempered from its ideal level by the extent to which that period’s
institution restricts investment. In 1.26, the right-hand side represents the constant
marginal cost of investing in period 3. For the period-2 choice, the right-hand side
of 1.31 reflects not only this constant marginal cost but also the savings from having
to invest less in period 3. Thus, the period-2 investment choice includes the dynamic
linkage between periods that we would observe in a standard capital accumulation
problem.
The more important observation from 1.26 and 1.31 for the purpose of this chapter
is the non agent-specificity of the I2 and I3 decisions. The intuition for why either
type agent would make the same I3 decision when in power is straight-forward: g4
is payoff-relevant only for its consumption benefits. Since the agents have identical
preferences over public good consumption, they would invest the same amount in the
period leading to the final one. To see why the optimal I2 decision also does not
depend on the type of incumbent, note that while g3 affects the level of g4, it does
not affect r4. This can be observed from the fact that ρ
i
3(r3, g3) depends only on the
parameters b and qi. Specifically, the r4 decision is motivated solely by an agent’s pri-
vate transfer preferences in the final period (since I4 = 0). Therefore, when deciding
on the level of g3, the period-2 incumbent only considers its effect on g4. Because g4
only yields consumption benefits, the resulting I2 decision is conflict-free.
Conflict in the agents’ investment decisions starts to exhibit itself in equation 1.32,
which characterizes the optimal I1. The presence of the agent-specific re-election pa-
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rameter qi in this equation results in the dependence of I1 on the identity of the agent
in power. A closer inspection of 1.32 suggests that this dependency arises due to the
effect of I1 on the future private transfers that either agent could potentially decide
on if they come to power. Since this effect works through future states of executive
constraints, I will first discuss their equilibrium behavior before offering a more de-
tailed explanation of why agents make different I1 decisions.
Consider the equilibrium institutional strategies characterized in Part 3 of Propo-
sition 2. The intuition for the optimal r4 is the same as in the two-period problem
summarized in Corollary 1. In contrast to this decision that only reflects an incum-
bent’s private transfer preferences, equations 1.33 and 1.34 indicate that the optimal
r3 and r2 decisions reflect an incumbent’s preferences for both policy components.
Specifically, incumbents choose r3 and r2 so that the net marginal benefit from the
additional private transfers enabled by a unit increase in r exactly equals the (nega-
tive) net marginal benefit from the additional investments enabled by the same unit
increase. To see this more clearly, re-arrange 1.33 and focus on the range g < ĝ where
















The left-hand side of 1.35 represents the total marginal benefit and the right-hand
side represents the total marginal cost of a unit increase in r3. Specifically, if incum-
bent κ2 chooses a marginally higher r3, thereby relaxing the executive constraints for
period 3, he receives the following benefits: First, an expected benefit of qi from each
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extra unit of private transfers enabled by the marginally higher r3, and second, the
marginal benefit from public good consumption, measured by Āαgα−14 , for each extra
unit of investment. When choosing r3, the incumbent weighs these benefits against
the costs of such a relaxation, which consist of the constant marginal cost of investing
and the marginal cost of private transfers. The optimal r3 decision occurs at where
the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs. Equation 1.34 for the optimal choice
of r2 indicates a similar intuition, extended to an additional future period. Notice
that since private transfer preferences always play a role on the institutional deci-
sion, the agent-specific parameter qi appears on all the equilibrium values of ρ
i
t(rt, gt).
Therefore, as long as agents face different re-election probabilities, their optimal ex-
ecutive constraint decisions will be different.28
The following proposition describes how incumbents respond to changes in the
distribution of political power when making their institutional choices:
Proposition 3. In the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium characterized in Proposition
2, the value of ρit(rt, gt) is increasing in qi for all t and i = A,B.
Proposition 3 affirms the main results in the existing literature by asserting that
the executive constraints get tightened as an incumbent’s re-election prospects de-
teriorate and weakened as they improve. As an incumbent becomes more confident
of his ability to determine policy in the next period, he relaxes the rules that will
constrain his policy choices. Specifically, he exploits his political advantage in order
28Even though r2 and r3 decisions reflect an incumbent’s preferences for both types of policies,
note that the agents make identical investment decisions in t = 2 and t = 3. Therefore, private
transfer preferences are the only reason why agents make different executive constraint decisions
in these periods. In order to observe differences in the r decision attributable to differences in
investment preferences, we would need to extend the model to T = 5.
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to freely transfer more resources to himself to the potential detriment of his opponent.
However, note that Proposition 3 holds only for given states of the public good. In
other words, the predicted response of executive constraints to changes in re-election
uncertainty is for a constant level of public good development. It is therefore unin-
structive to compare this response across economies who are at different stages of
development.
The following proposition describes the behavior of executive constraints as the
public good varies:
Proposition 4. In the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium characterized in Proposition
2, the value of ρit(rt, gt) decreases as polarization increases for all t, i ∈ {A,B}, and
any given level of qi. Moreover, the difference between r̄(gt) and ρ
i
t(rt, gt) is positive
for all (rt, gt) ∈ R2+.
Proposition 4 states that for any given level of re-election uncertainty, the execu-
tive constraints get tightened as the level of g approaches the investment cut-off state
ĝ from either direction. At too low or too high states of g, the common investment
needs of the society are sufficiently pressing that incumbents have an incentive to keep
the executive constraints loose regardless of the distribution of political power. These
are the states of the public good at which polarization between the agents is low. As
the economy moves away from these states by investing or disinvesting, the constant
disagreement over private transfers translates into higher measures of polarization,
resulting in tighter executive constraints.
Proposition 4 offers an important qualification to the main results established in
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the literature and re-iterated in Proposition 3: While the executive constraints do
respond to re-election uncertainty, the extent of this response varies based on the
economy’s level of public good development. Comparing two countries that are char-
acterized by the same distribution of political power but different states of the public
good, Propositions 3 and 4 together suggest that the executive constraints in the less
developed country would respond more to a given change in re-election uncertainty
than those in the developed country. Recall that since an executive constraint simul-
taneously restricts both policy dimensions, its optimal level will be co-determined by
the incumbent’s investment and private transfer preferences. This chapter predicts
that private transfer preferences play a relatively more important role on the determi-
nation of executive constraints in the developed country because of the disappearance
of common cause between its agents.
Having described the behavior of the executive constraints with respect to re-
election uncertainty and public good development, I return to the discussion of an
incumbent’s investment decision. Equation 1.32 demonstrates an incumbent’s public
good trade-off that emanates from having executive constraints as a strategic choice
variable and results in different I1 decisions despite shared public good consump-
tion preferences. In the absence of an institutional decision, each type of incumbent
would invest by the same amounts, because the only dynamic effect of investing (dis-
investing) would be higher (lower) future levels of the public good. In a model in
which the public good affects agents’ utilities only through its consumption bene-
fits, there would be no reason to expect different investment behavior. However, in
the present model, the public good also determines the level of polarization between
49
agents, thereby affecting their choice of executive constraints. Since executive con-
straints imply restrictions on the private transfers an agent can carry out (over which
there is conflict), we observe different induced preferences over the public good. The
following proposition focuses on the source of this difference.
Proposition 5. In the Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibrium characterized in Proposi-
tion 2, the difference between γA1 (r1, g1) and γ
B
1 (r1, g1) is increasing in | qA − qB |.
Proposition 5 formalizes the idea that an incumbent’s investment decision cannot
be motivated solely by a shared interest in public good consumption when executive
constraints are subject to strategic choice. Specifically, even though an incumbent still
has an incentive to accelerate the accumulation (or the decumulation) of the public
good towards the investment cut-off state ĝ, he is also aware of the tighter executive
constraints such states of g would imply, impairing his ability to make transfers to
himself should he become the incumbent. This tightening effect, shown in Proposition
4, introduces an aversion motive to the investment decision. As an incumbent becomes
more confident that he will be the agent determining private transfers in the next
period, this aversion motive that slows the movement of g towards ĝ grows stronger.
Propositions 3, 4, and 5 together demonstrate an incumbent’s full trade-off based
on the endogenous feedback-loop between the states of g and r. Because the agents
equally enjoy the consumption of the public good and private transfers is a static
decision, the only source of dynamic asymmetry in the model is political power.
The extent of this asymmetry leads to varying degrees of divergence between the
agents’ induced preferences over executive constraints. The next section focuses on
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the implications of this divergence for public good accumulation by comparing it to
the dictatorial benchmark established and discussed in Section 1.4.
1.5.4 An Evaluation of Political Equilibrium
The results established in the previous section indicate that identical preferences for
public good consumption does not translate into identical investment decisions. To
reiterate, the state of the public good affects the optimal level of executive constraints
by determining the degree of polarization between the agents. In turn, incumbents
choose future states of the public good under these constraints, mindful of their
decision’s implication for future degrees of polarization and hence for executive con-
straints. Therefore, with an institutional structure that restricts the extremeness of
policies instead of placing separate bounds on the level of each policy dimension, the
investment decision can no longer be uncoupled in equilibrium from the incumbent’s
preference for making transfers to himself.
With exogenously given executive constraints, the investment decision of each
agent would be politics-free and hence identical, driven entirely by their shared pref-
erences over the public good. However, in a dynamic setting with endogenous exec-
utive constraints, this is no longer the case. Based on this discussion, the following
proposition compares the provision of the public good in political equilibrium with
the dictatorial benchmark:
Proposition 6. Compared to the dictatorial benchmark, the provision of public goods
in political equilibrium is sub-optimal.
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There are two main sources to the result in Proposition 6: First, the disagree-
ment over private transfers between the agents lead an incumbent to restrict future
investments or disinvestments despite shared preferences over public good consump-
tion. Second, investment is further held back by incumbents who fear the increase
in polarization and the consequently tighter constraints better states of the public
good would bring. The underlying reason behind both can be traced to universal
taxation for financing agent-specific consumption. Accordingly, the political equilib-
rium would be equivalent to the dictator’s equilibrium in the absence of distributive
politics. Similarly, the dictatorial benchmark as defined in Section 1.4 that maximizes
both agents’ utilities from public good consumption would be restored if each agent
could credibly commit to making sub-optimal transfers to himself and maintaining
weak executive constraints. However, the absence of a commitment technology rules
out this possibility.
Based on Proposition 6, the question arises as to which parameters of the model
amplify this result. Since executive constraints are its main driver, parameter shifts
that influence the balance an incumbent strikes between his private transfer and in-
vestment preferences when choosing the optimal level of executive constraints can be
expected to play a role. Consequently, the difference between a dictator and incum-
bent’s investment rules increases with the uncertainty of elections and decreases with
the common-cause parameter Ā and the cost parameter b.
To see why incumbents facing less electoral uncertainty would invest similarly to a
dictator, note that an incumbent’s problem approaches that of a dictator as his polit-
ical power becomes absolute. The weakening of his protection motive as his political
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power increases implies that he optimally chooses looser executive constraints. In the
limit as qi approaches 1, incumbent i picks the level of executive constraints so as to
be able to implement his ideal policy vector, which includes dictatorial investment
levels. The public good provision would be equivalent to the dictatorial solution, but
this comes at the expense of the type-j agent paying for unrestricted transfers to
agent i. Therefore, the equilibrium would still not be Pareto efficient.
Similar to political uncertainty, the parameters b and Ā affect the political equi-
librium by changing the terms of an incumbent’s institutional trade-off. Specifically,
an increase in b decreases an agent’s static optimum for private transfers to himself,
weakening the incentive to restrict each other’s pork spending. As a result, execu-
tive constraints would be kept weaker at all states of g, resulting in less restrictions
on investments. Likewise, an increase in Ā, for instance due to a natural disaster,
increases either agent’s optimal investment at any given state of g. This results in
a higher weight on investment preferences in the incumbent’s institutional decision,
leading to weaker executive constraints.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter analyzed the dynamics between political institutions that limit execu-
tive decision-making and the provision of public goods. With a dynamic model of
political competition between two policy-motivated agents, I characterized the trade-
off between productive investment and pork spending when both the policies and the
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institutions are endogenous.
The states of the public good and the executive constraints constitute the dy-
namic linkages between periods. An incumbent’s institutional decision is shaped by
his opposing incentives to push the public good to its dictatorial benchmark level
while restricting his opponent’s potential private transfers in the future. The degree
of polarization between the agents and the exogenous distribution of political power
determine which of these effects dominates in equilibrium. The feedback loops be-
tween the two state variables are created as forward-looking incumbents anticipate
the increase in polarization better states of the public good would imply. As higher
polarization leads to tighter executive constraints that limit each agent’s future ability
to make private transfers to himself, investment is held back by an aversion motive.
As a result, public good provision is sub-optimal in equilibrium compared to the
dictatorial benchmark even though the agents share the same preferences over its
consumption.
The dynamics of the model offer an insight into why countries with higher levels
of public sector development and strong political institutions retain their institutions:
If we consider two societies with similar distributions of political power but different
stages of public good development, the executive constraints of the more developed
country will be oscillating within a narrower band than those of the less developed
country for a given shift in political power. In other words, the executive constraints
in less developed countries are more sensitive to the electoral environment. The main
driver behind this result is the role polarization plays on an incumbent’s institutional
decision.
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The theoretical results of this chapter lead to some interesting positive implica-
tions. First, I find that better states of the public good are associated with tighter
executive constraints, corroborating the existing evidence. Accordingly, exogenous
factors that derail or boost a country’s public good accumulation process will affect
its institutional development. The second implication I consider concerns an old de-
bate on the effect of competitive politics on economic development. Specifically, my
results imply that while competitive elections hurt public good accumulation dur-
ing the early stages of development, they lead to a more balanced political spending
regime. In addition, I show that a distribution of political power that does not award
an overwhelming advantage to one agent is necessary for enacting tight constraints
on executive decision-making.
For tractability, I make a number of modeling choices that could be modified.
For example, I exogenously fix re-election probabilities so that the incumbents only
consider the effect of their decisions on future policies. Explicitly introducing voter
preferences into this framework would certainly yield richer dynamics, but would
come at the expense of higher complication. Another possible extension involves
endowing the agents with institutional preferences, thereby diverging from the pure
instrumentality assumption on executive constraints. It is also important to note that
this chapter focuses on one among numerous possible structures for an institutionally
feasible set. Although I believe that the equidistant-from-the-origin approach is a
reasonable proxy for considering institutions that limit extremeness of policy choices,
different structures could be more appropriate for settings in which incumbents have
the ability to impose separate limits on policies.
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Finally, this chapter is silent on the role of social classes in bringing about insti-
tutional change. Explicitly introducing groups such as elites, a middle class, or the
military will potentially yield rich results on their interaction. This branch of the
literature offers various interesting areas for future research.
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Chapter 2
A Model of Democratic Capital
Accumulation
2.1 Introduction
This chapter continues the focus of the dissertation on political institutions related to
curbing the decision-making powers of the government’s executive branch. In Chap-
ter 1, I built a model of political competition in which the incumbent governments
strategically determine the future level of executive constraints in order to explain
the following empirical observation: While there exist countries with strong exec-
utive constraints that have managed to retain them over time, the institutions of
others exhibit fluctuations between strong and weak periods.1 The first two sections
in Chapter 1 discussed the existing literature’s theoretical finding of a link between
1The measurement of executive constraints is based on the same Polity IV Project data as in
Chapter 1.
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strong constraints on executive decision-making and the uncertainty of election out-
comes. However, the empirical evidence in Besley, Persson and Reynal-Querol (2014)
confirms that this relationship only holds in weak executive constraint-regimes.
Based on these observations, which were more extensively discussed in Chapter
1, the question arises as to which factors besides the distribution of political power
explain the divergence between countries’ institutional decisions. More generally, why
do strong institutions of checks and balances persist under certain regimes but not in
others, even when these regimes share electoral characteristics? The previous chapter
offered to fill the gap between the empirical and theoretical results by focusing on
a country’s public sector development. As an alternative, this chapter considers the
explicit costs of institutional reform as a possible explanation into this quagmire.
In order to study the effect of institutional reform costs on the determination of
executive constraints, this chapter builds a model of political competition in which
an incumbent can make reversible investments into the future incumbent’s ability to
reform the level of executive constraints. The model features two political parties,
one of which becomes the incumbent in each period. As before, I exogenously fix the
re-election probabilities in order to focus exclusively on an incumbent’s trade-off in
reforming the executive constraints by abstracting away from the potential electoral
consequences of such reforms. In each period, the incumbent decides on a policy,
the level of executive constraints, and the amount of investment into the economy’s
stock of “democratic capital”, which constitutes a measure of the difficulty of insti-
tutional reform. An incumbent chooses a policy under the executive constraints he
inherits from the previous government and chooses those that will limit the future
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incumbent’s policy choice. If the incumbent chooses to change the existing level of
executive constraints for the next period, he incurs a cost that is equal to the stock
of democratic capital in the economy. For simplicity, I assume that this out-of-pocket
cost does not vary with the extent of institutional reform. In addition, the incumbent
can influence the future stocks of democratic capital by investing or disinvesting in
it. Hence, executive constraints and the democratic capital stock constitute the two
endogenous state variables of the model.
The analysis starts with a benchmark model that does not incorporate democratic
capital either as an exogenous stock or as a strategic choice variable. The purpose is
to replicate the results of the previous literature in order to demonstrate its short-
comings. Specifically, I build a simple two-period model in which today’s incumbent
faces an exogenous re-election probability and determines the executive constraints
under this uncertainty that will limit tomorrow’s policy choice. In this environment,
the incumbent has an incentive to decide on weaker constraints if he is likely to be
re-elected so that he can more easily implement his desired policies. On the other
hand, if his opponent is likely to be the future incumbent, he optimally chooses to
tighten the executive constraints. This is due to the same protection motive from the
opponent’s undesirable policy choice identified in the previous chapter.
As mentioned above, this theoretical result fails to hold empirically as we observe
incumbents with similar re-election prospects behaving differently under their respec-
tive regimes. This chapter introduces differences in the societies’ stocks of democratic
capital as an explanation for this discrepancy between theory and empirics. The
main finding indicates that greater electoral uncertainty lead to tighter executive
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constraints and higher stocks of democratic capital. These results shed light on our
empirical observations: The strong executive constraints of those countries that have
persistently had competitive elections will withstand one-time electoral advantages by
a political party, because both incumbents will have contributed to the accumulation
of the society’s stock of democratic capital in the past. I also emphasize the im-
portance of having political parties with polarized policy preferences for democratic
capital accumulation to take place. Otherwise, the protection motive that propels
an incumbent to invest in the difficulty of institutional reform would disappear. On
the other hand, when re-election probabilities favor one party, the democratic capital
stock of the economy fluctuates as it is only the underdog party who invests whenever
he gets to be in office.
While it is convenient to model the difficulty of implementing institutional reforms
as an out-of-pocket expense that needs to be paid by the incumbent at the time of the
reform, this modeling choice is intended to represent broader aspects of institutional
processes that are more challenging to quantify. The goal of this chapter is to capture
through the democratic capital variable the institutional provisions that make it more
difficult for governments to tinker with the constraints that bind them. For example,
we may think of the power enjoyed by the opposition in a political bargaining frame-
work as representing the difficulty of institutional reform. The stronger the opposition
is (as a result of quorum or filibuster rules, for example), the more difficult it is for
the incumbent to change the level of executive constraints to its advantage. Another
example is a strong judiciary with the right to overrule institutional decisions. For
both examples, incumbent governments rarely view the costs of institutional reform
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as untouchable. Instead, they can take actions that would increase or decrease these
costs. Understanding the factors that lead an incumbent to choose to increase them
is the subject of this chapter.
2.2 Related Literature
This chapter contributes to a large literature on the determinants of political insti-
tutions. However, in contrast to the first chapter, it is silent on its effects.2 Since
the first two chapters of this dissertation analyze the same political institution of
executive constraints and are motivated by the same empirical observations, all the
studies discussed in Section 1.2 are closely related.
By providing its main motivation, Besley, Persson and Reynal-Querol (2014) re-
mains the most relevant study to this chapter. To re-iterate, the authors establish a
theoretical link between political turnover and the strength of executive constraints.
They identify an incumbent’s trade-off between weaker constraints that enable him
to implement his desired policies and stronger constraints that offer protection from
his opponent in case he loses office.3 However, as extensively discussed in Chapter
1 and the introduction to this chapter, this result contradicts the observed stability
of strong political institutions in democratic regimes whose incumbents are facing a
one-time electoral advantage.
An important study that was not previously discussed in Chapter 1 is Persson
2The first chapter of the dissertation had a dynamic policy component and yielded results on the
long-term effects of executive constraints on a public good.
3This result is replicated in the benchmark model in Section 2.5.
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and Tabellini (2009), which is closely related to this chapter’s focus on the explicit
costs of institutional reform. The authors are one of the first to explicitly incorporate
a democratic capital variable, measured by the years of democratic rule in a country,
into a formal analysis in order to explain differences in institutional outcomes. Within
an overlapping-generations model in which the returns to investment depend on the
probability of regime change, they find that higher endowments of democratic capital
spur a country on a virtuous cycle of political and economic development. This result
is due to higher levels of democratic capital making regime transitions into autoc-
racies less likely, thereby increasing the expected returns on investment and hence
growth. While this chapter interprets the democratic capital stock of a country in a
different context related to the cost of reforming executive constraints, its results that
predict positive effects of democratic capital accumulation on political development
mirror theirs.
Among the growing literature that studies the determinants of political institu-
tions, and specifically those that look at executive constraints, a number of them can
be interpreted as implicitly studying the costs of institutional reform. For example,
Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) interpret the checks and balances that limit ex-
ecutive power through the size of the supermajorities needed to block legislation. In
that sense, their supermajority requirement variable is analogous to the cost vari-
able in this chapter. However, this requirement is a static decision and therefore is
silent on the long-term determinants of such provisions. Although it does not study
institutions per se, the capital accumulation in Azzimonti (2014) that manipulates
the spending decisions of future governments can be interpreted in an analogous light
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to the democratic capital accumulation that takes place here. Other papers open to
such possible interpretations include Maskin and Tirole (2004), Ticchi and Vindigni
(2010), Robinson and Torvik (2013), and Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik (2013).
However, to my knowledge, this chapter is the first to simultaneously study institu-
tional reform and the difficulty of implementing such reform.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section introduces the
model. Section 2.4 solves for the dictatorial solution in order to better understand the
incentives political parties face under political uncertainty. Section 2.5 focuses on a
simple benchmark model with no democratic capital variable in order to demonstrate
how this model is related to the existing literature and how I aim to contribute to it.
Section 2.6 defines a political equilibrium and characterizes it. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.3 The Model
The economy consists of two agents, A and B. We can think of these two agents
as representing two different groups within the society. In each period t, one of the
agents i ∈ {A,B} is exogenously elected with probability qi to serve as the incumbent,
where qA + qB = 1. The agents are purely policy-motivated so that they seek office
only for the purpose of being able to implement their desired policies.
Let pt ∈ R denote a policy in period t and let p̂i ∈ R denote the ideal policy of
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agent i.4 Agent i’s preferences are represented by the Euclidean distance function
ui(pt) = −d(p̂i, pt), (2.1)
where d is the Euclidean metric. Each agent discounts future utility by the common
discount factor β. I assume that the incumbent acts unilaterally during his tenure in
office to make a policy choice, an institutional choice, and an investment choice into
the democratic capital stock of the society. Each of these decisions are respectively
described in the following subsections:
Policy Choice: In each period t, the incumbent chooses a policy pt ∈ R. The
policy choice is static in the sense that all of its benefits are consumed in the current
period. Equation 2.1 implies that an incumbent’s stage utility is maximized when
the policy is set at his ideal. However, this policy choice is constrained by the insti-
tutional framework. Specifically, each incumbent maximizes his utility by choosing a
policy pt subject to the executive constraints that he inherits from the previous incum-
bent. The structure of an executive constraint is discussed in the following subsection.
Institutional Choice: As in Chapter 1 of the dissertation, I model executive
constraints as a limit on the extremeness of an incumbent’s policy choice. Let Γt ⊂ R
denote the institutionally feasible set that represents the level of executive constraints




0−p̄ p̄−p̄ p̄p̂A p̂B
Figure 2.1: Two examples of Γt when ideal policies are given by p̂A and p̂B.
in period t. I assume that the policies lying on the boundary of this set are equidistant
from the point zero.5 Therefore, an institutionally feasible set is an interval with zero
as its median point. Since the period-t incumbent inherits the constraints represented
by Γt from the previous incumbent, he chooses pt ∈ Γt. Furthermore, he makes an
institutional decision for tomorrow by designating Γt+1. Figure 2.1 demonstrates two
examples of institutionally feasible sets. While the interval [−p̄, p̄] represents a Γt
that permits the implementation of both agents’ ideal policies, the smaller interval
[−p̄, p̄] represents more restrictive executive constraints.
Given this structure, let Φ denote the set of all possible institutionally feasible
sets. Then, choosing Γt+1 ∈ Φ is equivalent to choosing d(0, z) for some z ∈ R, where
d is the Euclidean metric in R. The policies z̄ ∈ argmax d(0, z) ∀ z ∈ Γt+1 represent
the most extreme policies permitted under the institutional choice Γt+1. Further-
more, this implies that the Γt+1 choice can be thought of as choosing the length of a
line-segment, denoted `, whose midpoint is zero. For any ` ∈ R, I let Γ(`) denote the
line segment with length ` and midpoint zero.
The motivation for imposing this structure on an institutionally feasible set is
discussed in the previous chapter. To reiterate, the most important property of Γt
as defined above is to rule out “fine-tuning” by either incumbent. Specifically, this
structure ensures that an incumbent cannot designate an institutionally feasible set
5Equidistance from any fixed point yields identical results.
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that gives himself an overwhelming policy advantage in the next period. For example,
under the present Γt structure, incumbent i cannot choose tomorrow’s set of permis-
sible policies so that it consists solely of his own ideal policy, i.e. choose Γt+1 = {p̂i}.
Doing so would leave tomorrow’s incumbent with no choice but to implement that
policy and yield only trivial results. Overall, an incumbent must face the following
trade-off in his institutional decision: To the extent that the incumbent weakens the
level of executive constraints by designating a greater interval of permissible policies
for tomorrow, he not only allows himself to move closer to his ideal policy should he
get re-elected, but also allows his opponent to do the same in the opposite scenario.
This is dangerous from his point of view, because it would imply moving away from
his ideal policy as long as agents have polarized policy preferences.
Investment Choice to the Stock of Democratic Capital: In addition to
choosing a policy pt from the set Γt and the next period’s level of executive constraints
represented by the set Γt+1, the incumbent also chooses the amount of investment
into the democratic capital stock of the society. The level of democratic capital
in period t is denoted by ct and determines the difficulty of changing the level of
executive constraints. Specifically, whenever the period-t incumbent changes the level
of executive constraints for tomorrow so that Γt+1 6= Γt, he incurs a cost equal to ct.
The stock of democratic capital is a state variable, because an incumbent inherits it
from his predecessor.
The incumbent can determine tomorrow’s stock of democratic capital by either
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investing or disinvesting in it. Investments (or disinvestments) are denoted by It so
that the democratic capital evolves according to the following standard formulation:
ct+1 = (1− δ)ct + It, (2.2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate. Note that the only constraint on the choice
of It is that disinvestments cannot exceed the existing stock of democratic capital,
i.e.
It ≥ −ct. (2.3)
After the incumbent makes a policy, institutional, and investment decision, his utility
in period-t can be written as
−d(p̂i, pt)− It − ct (2.4)
if he chooses Γt+1 6= Γt, and as
−d(p̂i, pt)− It (2.5)
if he picks Γt+1 = Γt, thereby not reforming the level of executive constraints.
6
The timing of events can be summarized as follows:
• At the beginning of period t, agent i ∈ {A,B} is exogenously elected according
to probability qi to become the incumbent.
6I have normalized the price of investment to 1.
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• Taking Γt and ct as given, the incumbent chooses pt ∈ Γt, It, and Γt+1.
• Period t ends and payoffs are distributed.
• At the beginning of period t + 1, the new incumbent is elected and makes the
same decisions by now taking Γt+1 and ct+1 = (1− δ)ct + It as given.
Before defining and analyzing a political equilibrium of this game, I first solve the
dictator’s problem in order to demonstrate the crucial role electoral uncertainty plays
on the agents’ decisions.
2.4 The Dictatorship Solution
Studying executive constraints and the accumulation of democratic capital that makes
it more difficult to change these constraints is only meaningful under political uncer-
tainty. This is because when making their institutional and investment decisions,
agents consider the possibility that policies they oppose could be enacted in the fu-
ture. Moreover, unlike in Chapter 1 in which a shared preference for the public good
component of policy choice allowed the dictatorial solution to serve as a benchmark,
the static nature of the policy decision here makes such a comparison uninteresting.
Yet, presenting the dictator’s problem clears the intuition for the political problem
ahead.
Suppose without loss of generality that qA = 1 and qB = 0 so that agent A is the
dictator. In any given period t with T−t more periods to live, the dictator maximizes
his dynamic utility by choosing a policy pt, tomorrow’s level of executive constraints
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Γt+1 represented by the interval length `t+1, and the level of investment It to the stock






βt−1[−d(p̂A, pt)− It − ct] (2.6)
subject to
pt ∈ Γ(`t); (2.7)
`t+1 ≥ 0; (2.8)
It ≥ −ct; (2.9)
ct+1 = (1− δ)ct + It; (2.10)
where the ct term is present in the objective function only if `t+1 6= `t. This is the
period in which the dictator pays a positive cost of institutional reform. In contrast,
for all the periods t such that `t+1 = `t, the ct term drops out of 2.6.
If dictator A incurs the one-time cost of ct in period t in order to get rid of any ex-
ecutive constraints on his policy choice, he will enjoy his ideal policy forever starting
in period t+ 1. This is due to the fact that he would never impose constraints on his
own decision-making in the absence of political uncertainty. On the other hand, as
long as he chooses to not reform the executive constraints, he picks the closest policy
to his ideal under the binding institutions.
Let p∗t (`t) denote dictator A’s optimal policy choice when the institutionally feasi-
7Note that agent A is identical to a social planner who assigns all the weight in the society’s
aggregate utility to agent A.
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ble set is given by Γ(`t). Dictator A’s institutional strategy ρ
∗
t : R2+ → R+ such that
ρ∗t (`t, ct) = `t+1 and investment strategy γ
∗
t : R2+ → R+ such that γ∗t (`t, ct) = ct+1
constitute an equilibrium if and only if they solve his maximization problem 2.6 sub-
ject to the associated constraints 2.7-2.10 for all periods t. The following proposition
describes the dictatorship equilibrium for the model with T = 3:8
Proposition 1. A dictator never invests into the society’s stock of democratic cap-
ital or tightens the executive constraints on his rule in equilibrium. Specifically, his
equilibrium institutional strategy can be described as follows:
1. Whenever c1 is sufficiently low and Γ(`1) is sufficiently restrictive such that
c1 ≤ β(1 + β)d(p̂A, p∗t (`1)) (2.11)
for any t, dictator A always reforms the executive constraints by choosing `t 6= `1
such that p̂A ∈ Γ(`t) for either t = 2 or t = 3. Otherwise, maintaining the
status-quo `1 is the optimal action.





1− β + βδ
(2.12)
for any t, dictator A prefers to delay the reform of executive constraints until
t = 2 over immediate reform.
8All the proofs are in Appendix D.
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Proposition 1 indicates that no accumulation of democratic capital takes place un-
less there exists some political uncertainty. An agent who is certain to be re-elected
will neither willingly impose constraints on his own rule nor pay for investments into
increasing the difficulty of institutional reform. Based on this result, the description
of a dictator’s institutional decision in equilibrium is intuitive: Executive constraints
are eventually reformed to allow for the dictator’s ideal policy if the policy cost of
maintaining restrictive institutions justifies paying the cost of reform. However, de-
laying reform until the second period may be profitable for the dictator whenever
depreciation is high enough to obviate the need for disinvestments. On the other
hand, the dictator maintains the existing level of executive constraints if the cost of
reform is forbiddingly high or if the existing constraints are not too restrictive.
The following section analyzes equilibrium under political uncertainty in the ab-
sence of a democratic capital variable. The main motivation for this section is to
demonstrate how a combination of static policies and executive constraints as in the
existing literature falls short of explaining the observed empirical facts.
2.5 The Benchmark Model
Consider the political model presented in Section 2.3 in the absence of a democratic
capital variable. Suppose that the agents live for only two periods and that they have
polarized policy preferences. Specifically, assume that if p̂A > 0, then p̂B < 0, and
vice-versa. As in Section 2.4, let pit(`t) denote the constrained-optimal policy choice
of agent i in period t when the executive constraints are given by Γ(`t). Since the
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agents have complete information on each other’s preferences, the institutional choice
of the first period incumbent can be formulated as designating the policies that would
be chosen by either potential incumbent in the final period.
The benchmark model can be summarized as follows: The period-1 incumbent
chooses today’s policy p1 and tomorrow’s level of executive constraints `2, taking `1
as given. At the beginning of period 2, a new incumbent is realized according to
the fixed probability qi for i ∈ {A,B}. Now taking `2 as given, the second period
incumbent chooses a policy p2.
I solve for the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of this benchmark model via
backward induction. Taking `2 as given, the second period incumbent i chooses
p2 ∈ Γ(`2) in order to maximize his stage utility −d(p̂i, p2). Then, given this optimal




− d(p̂i, p1)− β[qAd(p̂i, pA2 (`2)) + qBd(p̂i, pB2 (`2))] (2.13)
subject to
p1 ∈ Γ(`1); (2.14)
`2 ≥ 0. (2.15)
Incumbent i’s institutional strategy ρi : R+ → R+ such that ρi(`1) = `2 constitutes a
Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if it solves his maximization problem
2.13 subject to the associated constraints 2.14-2.15.9 Based on the above program, the
9Since there is only a single institutional strategy in a two-period game, no time subscripts are
needed on the rule ρi.
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following proposition summarizes an incumbent’s institutional decision in equilibrium:
Proposition 2. In the Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibrium of the benchmark model,
the optimal level of `2 increases as the incumbent’s re-election probability increases.
In the absence of democratic capital accumulation, Proposition 2 describes an incum-
bent’s trade-off when deciding on the next period’s level of executive constraints: As
his re-election probability increases so that he becomes more confident of his ability
to set policy tomorrow, the incumbent has an incentive to weaken the constraints.
On the other hand, as he becomes more likely to suffer through the policy choice
of his opponent, his protection motive propels him to restrict the set of permissible
policies. This way, he can avert the future policy from moving too far away from his
ideal.
As previously discussed in detail, this theoretical result fails to explain the ob-
served behavior of executive constraints. Proposition 2 states that incumbents behave
according to the terms that are dictated solely by their re-election prospects. How-
ever, the empirical evidence in Besley, Persson and Reynal-Querol (2014) indicates
that while some incumbents make institutional decisions in line with the benchmark
model’s predictions, others do not.10 Hence, there must exist other regime charac-
teristics that interfere with how the relationship between executive constraints and
electoral uncertainty works.
The following section introduces the accumulation of democratic capital as a pos-
sible explanation for this empirical observation.
10The introduction to Chapter 1 cites historical cases in which electorally powerful incumbents
in democratic regimes did not attempt to weaken the executive constraints that were likely to bind
them in the future when they returned to office.
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2.6 Equilibrium with Democratic Capital
This section starts by defining an equilibrium to the model described in Section
2.3. Then, I characterize an incumbent’s institutional and investment strategies in
equilibrium.
2.6.1 Equilibrium Definition
I look for a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of the T -period finite-horizon game
described in Section 2.3, where the following two variables constitute the states of
the world at any given period t: the institutionally feasible set represented by `t and
the stock of democratic capital ct. The incumbent’s equilibrium strategies will be
functions of these two state variables.
Given the level of executive constraints `t and the stock of democratic capital ct,
a pure policy strategy for incumbent i in period t is a rule pit : R2+ → R such that
pit(`t, ct) = pt ∈ Γ(`t). Second, a pure institutional strategy for incumbent i in period
t is an executive constraint rule θit : R2+ → R+ such that θit(`t, ct) = `t+1 is the optimal
length of the interval with midpoint zero that defines the institutionally feasible set
Γ(`t+1). Finally, a pure democratic capital strategy for incumbent i in period t is an
investment rule γit : R2+ → R+ such that γit(`t, ct) = ct+1 yields the society’s level of
democratic capital in the next period.
Let σt ≡ (σAt , σBt ) denote a strategy profile for period t, where σit = (pit, θit, γit)
for i = A,B. Given `t, ct, and the strategy profile σt, let V
i
t (`t, ct) denote agent i’s
period-t payoff if he is the incumbent and let W it (`t, ct) denote this payoff if he is not.
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Specifically, let
V it (`t, ct) = −d(p̂i, pit(`t, ct))− [γit(`t, ct)− (1− δ)ct]− ct, (2.16)
where the final ct term is present as a positive cost of institutional reform only if
`t+1 6= `t, and let
W it (`t, ct) = −d(p̂i, p
j
t(`t, ct)), (2.17)
where j 6= i.
Given the current state of executive constraints `t and the level of democratic
capital ct, the period-t incumbent i with T − t future periods to live chooses pt, `t+1,








t+1(`t+1, ct+1)+(1−qi)W it+1(`t+1, ct+1)] (2.18)
subject to
pt ∈ Γ(`t); (2.19)
`t+1 ≥ 0; (2.20)
It ≥ −ct; (2.21)
ct+1 = (1− δ)ct + It; (2.22)
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where the ct term is present only if `t+1 6= `t. Given the above program, the following
defines an equilibrium of this game.11




t ) for t = 1, .., T constitutes a Subgame
Perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if incumbent i’s policy rule pit(`t, ct) = pt, exec-
utive constraint rule θit(`t, ct) = `t+1, and investment rule γ
i
t(`t, ct) = ct+1 solve 2.18
subject to the associated constraints 2.19-2.22 for all periods t, state pairs (`t, ct) ∈
R2+, and i ∈ {A,B}.
Based on Definition 1, since the policy choice pt does not interact with the choice of
`t+1 or It, it is separable from these decisions. Therefore, the static part of incumbent
i’s problem in any given period t can be written as follows:
max
pt∈Γ(`t)
− d(p̂i, pt). (2.23)
The solution to 2.23 implies choosing the closest policy to incumbent i’s ideal in every
period t from the set of permissible policies Γ(`t).
Having described an incumbent’s policy choice in equilibrium, I solve for an in-
cumbent’s equilibrium institutional and investment strategies in the following section
when the game lasts for three periods. The reason for focusing on three periods is that
a two-period model does not allow for sufficient time to characterize an incumbent’s
equilibrium investment strategies. This is because the investment decision in period
1 determines the stock of democratic capital in period 2, which has an effect on the
period-2 institutional decision. However, since there does not exist an institutional
11I suppress the dependence of the functions V it and W
i
t on the strategy profile σt to reduce clutter.
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decision in the final period of analysis, the investment choice is meaningless under a
two-period model.
2.6.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
An important aspect of institutional reform in this model is that it does not depend
on how radical the reform is: Once an incumbent has decided to reform the executive
constraints for the next period, his optimal choice of `t+1 does not depend on the
magnitude of ct. However, his initial decision on whether to change the level of
executive constraints at all or not does depend on ct.










denote agent i’s expected net policy benefit in period t from choosing `t, where j 6= i.12
Specifically, if the incumbent i in period t− 1 designates Γ(`t) for the period-t set of
permissible policies, his net policy benefit from this change consists of the distance
he gains, given by d(pit(`t), p
i
t(`t−1)), by moving closer to his ideal p̂i if he is re-elected





ting his opponent to implement a policy closer to p̂j (and hence further away from
p̂i) with probability qj.
Using this definition, Propositions 3 and 4 below describe an incumbent’s institu-
12In this definition and the following analysis, I suppress the dependence of the policy rule pit on
ct in order to reduce clutter.
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tional and democratic capital strategies in equilibrium:13
Proposition 3. Let T = 3. The Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibrium institutional
strategies of incumbent i in each period t are described as follows:
1. Given `2 and c2, the period-2 incumbent i reforms the level of executive con-
straints so that θi2(`2, c2) 6= `2 whenever
c2
β
≤ εi3(θi2(`2, c2)), (2.25)
where θi2(`2, c2) = `3 is determined by
qi(p̂i − pi3(`3))
d | pi3(`3) |
d`3
+ qj(p̂i − pj3(`3))
d | pj3(`3) |
d`3
= 0, j 6= i. (2.26)
2. The period-t incumbent i becomes more likely to reform the executive constraints
so that θit(`t, ct) 6= `t for t = 1, 2 as his re-election probability qi increases, the
initial cost of reform c1 decreases, and the restrictiveness of the initial con-
straints represented by `1 increases.
3. The period-1 incumbent i is more likely to prefer immediate reform in t = 1 over
delaying reform until t = 2 if the depreciation rate of the democratic capital stock
is low and the cost of blocking opponent j’s institutional decision is high.
The above proposition describes an incumbent’s optimal institutional decisions in
equilibrium. Part 1 focuses on the final period of analysis for which an institutional
13Since the institutional and democratic capital strategies are jointly determined, the proofs of
Propositions 3 and 4 are presented together in Appendix D.
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decision exists and indicates that reform is undertaken in this period if the cost is less
than the expected net utility from policies that would be realized under the `3 choice
of the period-2 incumbent. Specifically, the period-2 incumbent changes the executive
constraints such that 2.26 is satisfied whenever the expected benefit from doing so
exceeds the cost. In this model, the expected benefit of reform comes from enjoying
a policy in case of re-election that is closer to the incumbent’s ideal p̂i, whereas the
expected cost consists of the opponent’s potential policy choice that would be picked
under weaker constraints along with the out-of-pocket expense c2.
Part 2 of Proposition 3 describes the conditions under which we are more likely
to observe an eventual reform of the executive constraints. First, a lower initial
stock of democratic capital increases an incumbent’s payoff from reform, thereby
making reform more likely. Second, a higher probability of setting policy in the
future increases an incumbent’s stakes from reform, making any relaxation of the
given constraints more valuable. Third, the initial restrictiveness of the executive
constraints determines the cost of maintaining the status-quo, thereby making reform
more likely as the incumbent becomes more constrained. Specifically, the smaller the
initial interval of permissible policies, the further away the incumbent’s policy choices
will lie from his ideal point if status-quo is preserved, leading to a lower payoff in case
of his re-election.
Finally, Part 3 of Proposition 3 indicates that once an incumbent has decided to
reform the executive constraints eventually if given the office, doing this immediately
will be preferred to delaying it until the next period if depreciation does not work
for the incumbent’s advantage. In addition, delaying is less likely to be the optimal
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course of action if the cost of blocking his opponent is high. The intuition for why a
high blocking cost propels an incumbent to reform immediately lies in the possibility
of his own re-election. If the period-1 incumbent increases the stock of democratic
capital sufficiently to deter his opponent from reforming the executive constraints and
finds himself re-elected in t = 2, this would imply that he would need to pay this
now-higher cost of reform himself. Therefore, the incumbent would prefer immediate
reform in order to avert this risk.
Having described an incumbent’s institutional strategies, I now turn my attention
to his democratic capital strategies in equilibrium:
Proposition 4. Let T = 3. The Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibrium democratic capital
strategies of incumbent i are described as follows:
1. Given `1 and c1, if the period-1 incumbent i chooses to prevent his opponent
j from potentially choosing θj2(θ
i
1(`1, c1), c2) 6= θi1(`1, c1), his investment in the





2. The period-1 incumbent i becomes more likely to block his opponent j’s potential
institutional decision in t = 2 as qj increases, the potential policy cost of allowing
`3 = θ
j






3(`2)) increases, or the potential policy
benefit of `3 = θ
j






3(`2)) decreases, where `2 =





Based on the characterization of equilibrium presented in Appendix D, Proposi-
tions 3 and 4 together give a complete description of the model’s Subgame-Perfect
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Nash equilibrium. Part 1 of Proposition 4 characterizes the amount of investment
necessary to block an opponent’s potential institutional decision in the second period.
Since the cost of institutional reform does not vary with the extent of the reform, the
period-2 incumbent would choose `3 as characterized in 2.26 if he would change the
level of executive constraints at all. Therefore, an incumbent who wishes to block
his opponent invests just enough to ensure that condition 2.25 does not hold for his
opponent. Investing beyond this amount unambiguously decreases his payoff as doing
so further increases c2 without accomplishing any additional goals.
For Part 2 of Proposition 4, observe that the amount of investment necessary in







2(`1, c2)))− βqid(pi3(`1), pi3(θ
j
2(`1, c2))). (2.27)
This equation based on 2.24 implies that it becomes more expensive for incumbent
i to change his opponent j’s potential institutional decision in the next period as
agent j’s electoral power increases. This is due to the fact that agent j’s stakes from
changing the executive constraints increases with his political power. However, the
proposition also indicates that incumbent i also becomes more likely to block his
opponent as qj increases. The reason for why a higher level of qj can make blocking
more profitable all the while increasing the cost of doing so is the fact that incumbent
i’s stakes from preventing his opponent also increases with qj. Based on the result





higher value of qj implies a higher probability for incumbent i of having a period-3
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policy that lies further away from his ideal. As a consequence, it becomes ever more
important for incumbent i to block his opponent by investing the necessary amount.
In addition, Part 2 of Proposition 4 states that blocking becomes more likely as the
weaker constraints opponent j would potentially pick imply a high policy cost to
incumbent i in case of agent j’s election and a low policy benefit in case of his own
election for period 3.
An incumbent’s blocking decision is motivated by two opposing incentives, which
will be called the protection effect and the self-trap effect. The protection effect
propels an incumbent to invest the necessary amount in order to preserve the status-
quo `2, which was set by incumbent i himself. This ensures that the period-3 policy
does not diverge too far away from his ideal in case of his opponent’s election. On the
other hand, the self-trap effect decreases an incumbent’s incentive to invest, because
to the extent that he is likely to be re-elected for t = 2, higher stocks of democratic
capital make it more difficult for him to reform `2 according to his preferences if he
hasn’t already done so. Investing in this scenario would amount to falling in his own
trap as he ends up increasing the price of his own institutional decision. Overall, while
the protection effect is the main propellant behind the accumulation of democratic
capital and grows with the opponent’s political power, the self-trap effect works in the
opposite direction. Which one of these two effects dominates in equilibrium depends
on the distribution of political power.
The analysis of equilibrium suggests that a society’s stock of democratic capital
introduces some inertia to executive constraints. Specifically, if the cost of reform is
sufficiently high, institutional reforms we might have observed otherwise may not take
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place. This chapter offers differences in the stock of this capital as an explanation into
the varying degrees of inertia we observe across countries. The main results described
in Propositions 3 and 4 imply that the highest accumulation of democratic capital
takes place in societies with the greatest political turnover. The fact that initially
restrictive institutions and low levels of democratic capital increase an incumbent’s
payoff from reform also stresses the importance of initial conditions.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter analyzed the determinants and the persistence of strong executive con-
straints. I model a society’s democratic capital as determining the cost of changing
the level of executive constraints. The model yields an incumbent’s trade-off between
protecting himself from his opponent’s undesirable policies and not increasing the cost
of his future institutional decisions when deciding on the society’s stock of democratic
capital.
The model features two agents with exogenous re-election probabilities for office
who decide on the current policy, the level of executive constraints for the next pe-
riod, and the amount of investment into the stock of democratic capital when in
office. Each agent is purely policy-motivated. Hence, executive constraints and the
democratic capital stock are purely instrumental in the sense that an incumbent cares
about them only to the extent that they aid or hinder his ability to implement desired
policies.
There are a number of features of the model that can be built upon in future
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work. For example, while the exogenous re-election assumption makes the model more
tractable, it is important to note that introducing voters and thereby endogenizing
the election process would make the problem richer. As long as the policy-motivation
assumption is kept, the incumbent would still perceive the executive constraints and
the democratic capital as instrumental in this case. However, he would now have to
factor the voters’ policy preferences into each of these forward-looking decisions as the
voters would anticipate the policy consequences of his institutional and investment
decisions, and vote accordingly.
Second, the society’s stock of democratic capital is modeled in this paper as a cost
an incumbent incurs each time he executes a change in the institutions. This is clearly
a simplification intended to capture a country’s regime characteristics. The fact that
it is reduced-form is a simplification for more complicated institutional structures that
impose higher costs of changing institutions compared to policy. Such higher costs
may be rooted in the power of the opposition, an independent judiciary, a vibrant
media, or international pressure. For example, the difficulty of institutional reform
can be explicitly modeled using a bargaining framework between the executive and
the opposition. Further research into the root causes of institutional inertia promises






In this final chapter of the dissertation, I turn my attention to analyzing the process
by which institutional reform proposals get enacted. Most existing legislative bar-
gaining models assume that the agreed-upon allocation is final, whereas in practice,
there exist mechanisms for challenging passed legislation when there is lack of suf-
ficient consensus. Specifically, such mechanisms include popular vote requirements
following insufficient majorities in the legislature. In most parliamentary systems, a
bill that fails to win a certain majority of votes in the legislature can be presented
to a public vote as the final arbiter.1 For example, in a referendum in May 2011,
1I do not consider referenda that are constitutionally-mandated regardless of the level of consensus
in the parliament. For example, all but one US states require constitutional amendments to be
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Britain rejected a proposal to switch from a first-past-the-post election system to an
alternative vote system. In March 2011, shortly after the fall of the Mubarek regime,
Egypt approved in a widely contested referendum a series of constitutional reforms,
including presidential term limits and election supervision mechanisms.
Motivated by these examples, I analyze the effect of institutional mechanisms to
challenge agreed-upon legislation on the formation of these bills and the equilibrium
payoffs to the parties. I start by recognizing that both exogenous factors and en-
dogenous choices affect a party’s potential influence in a given post-bargaining stage.
For example, a large literature, including Matsusaka (2005a) and (2005b), documents
the surge in spending on referendum campaigns. Examples of such campaigns are
advertising, media coverage or political rallies. Moreover, there exists growing evi-
dence that the public is affected by these campaigns, as documented in de Figueiredo,
Ji and Kousser (2011). With a new empirical approach that attempts to deal with
the endogeneity of campaign spending, the authors find that spending both for and
against a proposal influences the probability of its passage in the campaigners’ in-
tended direction.2
Given the influence of these campaigns on voters, to what extent do the proposals
introduced in a parliament reflect the parties’ public vote calculus? For instance,
would the Egyptian constitutional reform package include more liberal propositions
approved in a referendum regardless of the level of congressional majority.
2The impact of campaign spending on referenda or citizen initiative outcomes has been studied
in Gerber (1999) and Broder (2000). Empirical studies, including Bowler and Donovan (1998)
that have treated campaign spending as exogenous find asymmetric effects of money of referendum
outcomes: While spending against a proposal decreases its chances of passage, a similar effect does
not exist when spending supports the proposal. Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) provides an overview
and discussion of these results.
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if the liberal faction were considered a more powerful player in the subsequent ref-
erendum? Specifically, how does a referendum process in which parties campaign to
influence the probability of its outcome affect the contents of a legislative proposal?
Under what conditions can the parties agree on a grand bargain that would obviate
a referendum? Within the context of a referendum, the main goal of this chapter
is to study the consequences of a strategic post-bargaining stage on the equilibrium
payoffs of the players endowed with varying degrees of “post-bargaining power”.
In order to address these questions, I build a one-period legislative bargaining
model in which parties bargain over a bill with single-dimensional policy and distribu-
tive rent components. After the party with the most number of seats proposes both a
policy and a rent allocation, other parties simultaneously vote on the proposal. If the
proposal fails to win a simple majority, it is rejected and the game ends. Otherwise,
the proposal passes. In the post-bargaining stage, parties can challenge the approved
bill depending on its level of support in the parliament. I model the post-bargaining
stage with a referendum in which parties can challenge the bill in a public vote only if
it fails to receive a supermajority in the parliament. Once the challenge stage begins,
parties campaign for or against the proposal to influence its outcome. The parties’
exogenous campaigning budgets characterize their post-bargaining power.
I define a political equilibrium for two and three-party parliaments and character-
ize it under the challenge model.3 I show that in the presence of looming institutional
challenges, surplus coalitions are possible. Moreover, measures of post-bargaining
3A two-party parliament can be considered as representing the outcome of a first-past-the-post
election system, and a three-party parliament as the outcome of a proportional representation system.
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power do not necessarily translate into higher equilibrium payoffs as the proposer
party faces a trade-off between a higher probability of having its bill upheld in a post-
bargaining challenge by including a “powerful” party in its coalition and proposing a
bill that captures a high share of benefits for itself. In two-party parliaments, a grand
bargain is more likely in equilibrium if the minority party commands a low status-quo
payoff and the proposer has a large campaigning budget. Similarly, parties reach a
grand bargain more easily in three-party parliaments when the smaller parties do not
command high status quo payoffs or if all parties are ideologically close. Moreover,
I find that the chances of a referendum are higher if the campaigning budgets of the
smaller parties diverge widely. This is because in equilibrium, only the status-quo
payoffs determine the proposer party’s utility from a grand bargain. Campaigning
budgets matter only to the extent to which the proposer party can benefit from pitting
one small party against another through coalition formation. More generally, a more
asymmetric distribution of post-bargaining powers within a parliament incentivizes
challenge procedures to the benefit of the proposer.
Having analyzed the factors that lead a dominant party to risk subsequent in-
stitutional challenges instead of inducing unanimity, the chapter then studies the
composition of simple majority coalitions in three-party parliaments. In any political
equilibrium, I show that the proposer party is more likely to partner with the party
that has a lower status quo payoff or a closer ideal point. On the other hand, whether
a large campaigning budget makes a party the preferred coalition partner depends
on the type of political equilibrium. In the referendum model, this ambiguity result
is a consequence of the proposer party’s essential trade-off that defines its decision-
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making: Although a rich partner and a poor opponent is desirable for increasing the
probability that its bill is upheld, it comes at the expense of higher concessions to
the rich partner in the bargaining stage. Which one of these effects dominates in
equilibrium depends on the parameters of the model.
3.2 Related Literature
Building on the seminal work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and the uniqueness of
payoffs result proved in Eraslan (2002), numerous models study the equilibrium conse-
quences of different sources of bargaining power by treating the agreed-upon allocation
as the final outcome. Some of these papers include Kalandrakis (2006) who studies
proposal rights, McCarty (2000) who studies proposal and veto rights, Snyder, Ting
and Ansolabehere (2005) who study weighted voting, and Yildirim (2007) who stud-
ies endogenous proposal power. Another branch of this literature studies bargaining
models with stochastic surplus to be divided and includes Eraslan and Merlo (2002)
and Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2002). In addition, dynamic bargaining models
such as Kalandrakis (2004), Duggan and Kalandrakis (2012), and Bowen, Chen and
Eraslan (2014) consider situations in which the agreed-upon allocation becomes the
new status-quo in the next bargaining period. However, these papers do not study
institutions outside of the bargaining environment through which the agreed-upon
outcome can be challenged. Veto-player models such as Winter (1996) are an ex-
ception for incorporating a post-bargaining stage in which bargaining outcomes can
be overturned. Another example is Powell (1996), who considers a bargaining model
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in which players can impose outside settlements to capture the whole pie, but this
happens with pre-determined probabilities. In contrast to these exogenous sources of
bargaining power, this chapter introduces a new source of bargaining power that is
generated from post-bargaining behavior.
The vote of confidence mechanism in legislatures, studied in Diermeier and Fedder-
sen (1998), is an example of a post-bargaining institution that affects the bargaining
equilibrium. The authors show that the existence of such a mechanism decreases
the price of building coalitions in the legislature and results in equilibrium coali-
tions that are more cohesive and rewarded more handsomely. Similar to the veto
procedure, their study is relevant to this chapter through its explicit recognition of
post-bargaining institutions directly affecting the outcomes of the bargaining game.
One of the main predictions of this chapter is the formation of surplus coalitions
even though minimum winning coalitions would be sufficient for the bills to formally
pass in the legislature. Even though minimum winning coalitions were the main
prediction of the baseline model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), other papers have
studied environments where this prediction fails to hold. For example, Goreclose and
Snyder (1996) show that equilibrium coalitions will exhibit surplus members because
such coalitions will be cheaper than minimum winning ones when certain bargaining
protocol conditions are met.
The institutions of direct democracy, represented by the post-bargaining refer-
endum option in this chapter, has been studied by both economists and political
scientists from different angles. Romer and Rosenthal (1979) is one of the first mod-
els that deviate from the Downsian median voter prediction to study the voter’s choice
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between the status quo policy and some alternative proposed by a bureaucrat with
agenda-setting power. Using the level of expenditures as the policy to be decided
upon, they show that the actual level of expenditures will be at least as great as
the one predicted in the Downsian model. Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) provide an
overview of the political science literature with a focus on the effects of campaign
money on the results of direct democracy exercises.
There also exists a large political science literature on the domestic ratification
of international treaties using the two-level games approach, building on the seminal
insight of Putnam (1988) that a smaller set of propositions that could get domestic
approval increases the bargaining power of the negotiator at the international stage.
Other relevant papers on two-level games include Iida (1996), Haller and Holden
(1997), and Humphreys (2007). Although the sequence of the moves are similar to
the referendum model, with a public vote following a bargaining stage, this chapter
models the players with an eye toward the same public vote constraint as opposed to
different domestic constituencies. Moreover, the constraint in the referendum model
is not set exogenously by the median legislator or the median voter’s ideal point, but
can be influenced through endogenous campaign spending.
The main results of this chapter have implications for public financing of issue
campaigns. Papers such as Coate (2004) and Ashworth (2006) study the welfare ef-
fects of private campaign finance by interest groups. Since I do not model interest
groups, this paper is silent on the impact of private campaign contributions. However,
comparative statics on the parties’ exogenous campaigning budgets yield implications
of public campaign finance for observed legislative outcomes.
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Finally, this chapter models the post-bargaining referendum option as a contest
between the bargaining parties and therefore draws upon many results in contest
theory. The most relevant of these theoretical papers are Baik (2008), who character-
izes the equilibrium in contests with group-specific prizes, and Skaperdas and Vaidya
(2012) who show how a Tullock contest function, which my model uses, can proxy
voter behavior in referendums. Other relevant papers in contest theory include Dixit
(1987), Hillman and Riley (1989) and Skaperdas (1996).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.3 introduces the model
and defines a political equilibrium. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively analyze equilib-
rium behavior in two and three-party parliaments. Section 3.6 discusses the implica-
tions of the equilibrium results on campaign finance policy and concludes.
3.3 The Model
I consider a situation of one-period legislative bargaining over a bill that consists
of ideology and distributive components, followed by a referendum if the number of
votes in the parliament falls within an institutionally designated interval.
Let N denote the set of parties and |N | the number of parties in the parliament.
In this chapter, only parliaments of two and three parties will be considered. The
model consists of two stages: the bargaining stage and the challenge stage. In the
bargaining stage, the party with the most number of seats proposes a bill and the
other party (or parties) votes on it. In a three-party parliament, I assume that the
two non-proposer parties vote simultaneously on the bill. Let x ∈ [0, 1] represent the
92
ideological component of the proposal and let x̂k denote party k’s ideal ideological
point. In addition, let y represent the proposed allocation of rents from the feasible
set
Y = {y :
|N |∑
k=1
yk ≤ 1 and yk ≥ 0 ∀ k}, (3.1)
where the fixed sum of rents is given by unity and yk denotes party k’s share. Hence,
a proposal can be represented by z ≡ (x, y) ∈ [0, 1] × Y . When the proposal is
introduced to the parliament, there exists a status-quo bill s ≡ (q, yq), where q ∈ [0, 1]
denotes its ideological component and yq ∈ Y its rent allocation. I assume that party
k’s preferences over a bill are represented by the quasi-linear utility function
uk(z) = −(x− x̂k)2 + αyk, (3.2)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is some fixed weight.
After the proposer party makes an offer z ∈ [0, 1] × Y and the other party (or
parties) votes on it, the proposal is accepted or rejected according to the following
criteria: Let k̄(z) denote the number of parties other than the proposer who support
the bill z. If k̄(z) = |N | − 1, the proposal z is unanimously accepted and becomes
the law with no subsequent challenges. If k̄(z) = 0, the bill is automatically rejected
in a three-party parliament. On the other hand, rejection without a challenge is not
feasible in two-party parliaments, since the proposer party always commands a simple
majority. Finally, if k̄(z) = |N | − 2, the proposal is temporarily accepted in the par-
liament to be challenged in a referendum. Any proposal that survives the challenge
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becomes the law.4 5
If the proposal passes in the parliament without unanimous support, the dis-
senting party takes the bill to a referendum. I describe this challenge stage as a
two-candidate competition in which the candidates are the proposal z and the status
quo s. Before the referendum takes place, each party k simultaneously chooses a
position t ∈ {Z, S} and an irreversible campaign spending amount c ≥ 0 to influence
the voters (who will not be explicitly modeled). Position Z indicates a preference for
the public acceptance of the proposal (yes vote on the referendum) and position S
indicates a preference for its failure (no vote on the referendum).
Each party k is allocated an exogenously given campaigning budget wk ∈ [0, 1].6
Upon observing the campaigns of each group, the public votes on the proposal in a
referendum. If the proposal wins a simple majority of the public vote, it becomes the
law. Otherwise, the status-quo bill prevails and all parties receive their status-quo
payoffs. I assume that all the parameters of the model are common knowledge.
I model the referendum as a contest between the positions Z and S in which
their winning prize is given respectively by z and s. Hence, the winning prize con-
stitutes a public good within each group of parties. Let Ct(z) denote the total cam-
paign spending of parties aligned with position t when the proposed bill is z and
4This acceptance criteria represents the following general rule in parliamentary systems for im-
portant legislation or constitutional amendment proposals. Let k̄ denote the number of support-
ive legislators. If k̄ ≤ |N |−12 , where |N | is odd, the proposal fails to win a simple majority and
fails. If k̄ ≥ λ(|N | − 1), where λ ∈ ( 12 , 1), it is accepted without a referendum. Finally, for all
k̄ ∈ ( |N |−12 , λ(|N | − 1)), the proposal becomes law only if it is accepted in a referendum. Here, λ
represents the supermajority parameter for the parliament.
5In a three party parliament, I assume without loss of generality that no party commands a
majority of the seats and that two parties together cannot control a supermajority.
6Although private interest groups play an important role in financing referendum campaigns, I
do not model them here in the interest of keeping the analysis tractable.
94
let pt(CZ(z), CS(z)) denote the probability that position t wins the referendum. I
assume that the contest success function takes the Tullock lottery form so that the





if CZ(z) + CS(z) > 0
1
2
if CZ(z) = CS(z) = 0
(3.3)
for t = Z, S and proposal z. The above Tullock specification assumes that neither
party has an inherent advantage in the contest. Moreover, it implies that a position’s
winning probability is increasing in the spending of the parties aligned with it and
decreasing in the spending for the other position.
The sequence of events can be summarized as follows:
• The proposer party offers a bill z to the parliament.
• The other party (or parties) votes on z. If the vote(s) is such that the decision
is not final, the challenge stage begins.
• Each party simultaneously and independently chooses a position t and an irre-
versible campaign spending c for the referendum.
• The public votes in the referendum. If the proposal wins a simple majority of
the public vote, it passes and becomes the law. If not, all players receive their
status quo payoffs.
A pure bargaining strategy for party k consists of a proposal z ∈ [0, 1]× Y if k is the
proposer party, and an acceptance rule ak : [0, 1] × Y → {0, 1} for the non-proposer
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parties k such that ak(z) = 0 indicates rejection of the proposal z and ak(z) = 1
indicates its acceptance.7 In addition, a pure challenge strategy for party k consists
of the following elements: a position rule ρk : [0, 1]× Y → {Z, S} such that ρk(z) = t
indicates that party k has chosen position t for the referendum; and a campaign
spending rule ζk : [0, 1]× Y → [0, wk] such that ζk(z) = c yields the amount party k
spends on his chosen position’s campaign. Specifically, ρk(z) = t indicates that party
k spends an amount c = ζk(z) for position t. A party jointly chooses its position and
campaign spending amount.
Without loss of generality, fix party 1 as the proposer party. Let σ ≡ (σ1, {σk}|N |k=2)
denote a strategy profile, where σ1 = (z, ρ1, ζ1) for the proposer party and σk =
(ak, ρk, ζk) for the non-proposer party (or parties) k 6= 1.
Let NZ = {k ∈ N : ρk(z) = Z} and NS = {k ∈ N : ρk(z) = S} respectively
denote the set of parties that align themselves with positions Z and S. Then, given





Given the equilibrium behavior of every other player, a political equilibrium to
this game consists of optimal party strategies during both the bargaining and the
challenge stages. Through backward induction, I solve for the Subgame-Perfect Nash
equilibrium of this model, which is defined below:
Definition 1. A strategy profile (σ1, {σk}|N |k=2) constitutes a political equilibrium if and
7I assume that a party votes to accept a proposal when indifferent.
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only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(E1) Given z and ak(z) for k 6= 1 from the bargaining stage, and other parties’
challenge strategies ρ−k and ζ−k, party k’s position rule ρk(z) = t and campaign








[uk(z)− uk(s)]− c. (3.5)
(E2) For any given proposal z, let
Vk(z;σ) = uk(s) + pZ(Cρk(z)(z), C−ρk(z)(z))[uk(z)− uk(s)]− ζk(z) (3.6)
denote party k’s maximized expected payoff from the referendum when each party
would be following its equilibrium challenge strategies. Then,
– If |N | = 2, or |N | = 3 and a−k(z) = 1, ak(z) = 1 if and only if uk(z) ≥
Vk(z;σ);
– If |N | = 3 and a−k(z) = 0, ak(z) = 1 if and only if Vk(z;σ) ≥ uk(s).
(E3) Party 1’s proposal z solves
max
z∈[0,1]×Y
u1(s) + pZ(CZ(z), CS(z)) · [u1(z)− u1(s)]− ζ1(z). (3.7)
Condition (E1) requires that each party’s position and campaign spending rules
jointly maximize its expected payoff from the referendum. Condition (E2) rules out
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the use of weakly dominated strategies by the non-proposer party (or parties) during
legislative voting. It requires that an acceptance vote is given to a proposal if and
only if it is weakly preferred to voting to reject it. Finally, condition (E3) requires
that given the subsequent optimal acceptance, position, and campaign spending rules
of all the parties, the proposer party 1 makes an offer that maximizes its expected
payoff. Before the bargaining stage begins, the referendum probabilities pt for t = Z, S
are within the control of party 1. Specifically, the proposer can induce any possible
outcome by making the right offer.
Given the existence of equilibria in contests that describe the challenge stage of
this model and the existence of a bargaining equilibrium for any profile of challenge
strategies, a political equilibrium exists. In the following sections, I characterize
the pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria of this model respectively for
parliaments of two and three parties.
3.4 Two-Party Parliaments
Two-party parliaments can be thought of as representing the outcome of a first-past-
the-post election system. In this context, I assume that the proposer party 1 controls
a simple majority, but not a supermajority, of the seats so that it needs the approval
of the smaller party 2 in order to avoid a challenge stage.
I solve for the political equilibrium in a two-party parliament through backward
induction. First, consider the parties’ equilibrium challenge strategies. If the game
reaches this stage, the parties’ position choices for the referendum are trivial: On the
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equilibrium path, party 1 never campaigns against its own proposal so that ρ1(z) = Z
always holds for any given proposal z. Similarly, if party 2 preferred a yes vote on
the referendum, it would have accepted the proposal z during bargaining in order to
secure a sure outcome and not incur campaigning costs. Hence, ρ2(z) = S always
holds as well on the equilibrium path.
Given the equilibrium position rules described in the above paragraph, the optimal
campaign spending of the two parties for any given proposal z from the bargaining
stage are given by
















For a more concise exposition in the following analysis, let
εk(z) = |uk(z)− uk(s)| (3.10)
represent party k’s stake from the challenge stage for any given proposal z, given by
the difference in its utility from the two potential outcomes z and s. Based on 3.8 and
3.9, the following lemma describes how the parties’ equilibrium campaign spendings
respond to the bargaining outcome:8
Lemma 1. Let z and z′ be two proposals such that εk(z) ≥ εk(z′) for party k ∈ {1, 2}.
Then, ζk(z) ≥ ζk(z′).
8All proofs are in Appendix E.
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Lemma 1 states that each party spends more in equilibrium as its stake from the
referendum increases. For example, if one of two proposals implies a much lower
payoff relative to the status-quo for party 2, then party 2 would fight harder for the
failure of this proposal in the referendum. The larger difference between the winning
and the losing prizes justifies a higher amount of equilibrium campaign spending
compared to the proposal with the lower stakes.
In the following analysis, I first present the general characteristics of a political
equilibrium in Proposition 1. Then, I focus on the parameter values that make a
political equilibrium in which the challenge stage is reached on the equilibrium path
more likely to be observed than one in which the parties settle in the parliament.
Proposition 1. In the political equilibrium of a two-party parliament,
1. The acceptance rule of party 2 is characterized as follows:
– Party 2 rejects any offer z for which ε1(z) and ε2(z) are such that ζ2(z) =
w2;
– For the range of proposals z for which ε1(z) and ε2(z) would imply a chal-
lenge stage equilibrium with ζ1(z) = w1 and ζ2(z) < w2 if rejected, party 2
accepts any offer z such that u2(z) + w1 ≥ u2(s);
– For the range of proposals z for which the implied challenge stage equilib-
rium is an interior one, party 2 accepts any offer z that yields u2(z) ≥
u2(s).
2. If party 1 chooses to induce unanimity, it proposes z such that u2(z) = u2(s)−
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w1, where
– z features equal compromise on ideology, i.e. x = x̂1+x̂2
2
;
– The difference between the parties’ rent shares, i.e. y1 − y2, increases as
u2(s) decreases or w1 increases;
– For low (high) values of α, party 1 may choose y1 = 0 (y1 = 1) and x
closer to x̂1 (x̂2).
3. If party 1 chooses to induce a referendum, it becomes more likely to do so by
proposing z = (x̂1, 1, 0) as opposed to any other proposal that yields a higher
utility for party 2 as the two parties diverge ideologically.
The first part of Proposition 1 characterizes party 2’s equilibrium bargaining strat-
egy. It indicates that any proposal that implies a sufficiently high stake for party 2
(either due to a high status-quo payoff, a very unfavorable proposal, or both) so that
it would fight by spending its entire campaigning budget in a subsequent challenge
will be rejected by party 2. On the other hand, party 2 may be willing to settle for
proposals that involve relatively lower stakes. For instance, if the proposal is such
that neither party’s stake would justify exhausting its whole budget in a potential
campaign, the typical criteria that party 2 accepts any proposal that leaves it at
least as well-off as the status-quo applies. However, there may also exist situations in
which the threat of a challenge allows the proposer to extract a surplus from party 2’s
status-quo payoff in a settlement. Specifically, if the parameters of the model are not
too extreme so that party 2 commands a sufficiently low status-quo and w1 is not too
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large, party 2 will settle for less than its status-quo payoff. This is due to the threat
a looming challenge stage poses for itself. With party 1 willing to exhaust its budget
to defend its relatively higher stakes from the proposal, party 2’s meagre winning
prize would not justify its counter campaign spending to defend the status-quo in
this situation. Therefore, it is willing to pay a premium to party 1 in order to avoid
this expensive challenge.
The second part of the proposition describes the optimal way to induce unanim-
ity from party 1’s point of view. The proposition states that party 1 would extract
a surplus of w1 from party 2 in a settlement, reflecting the threat discussed in the
above paragraph. The optimal proposal to induce this settlement involves an equal
ideological compromise between the parties. However, if the status-quo ideology is
such that party 2 would gain from this compromise, party 1 extracts these gains away
in the form of a higher rent share.
The final part of the proposition focuses on the type of challenge equilibrium that
would be preferred by party 1. The analysis indicates that the optimal proposal to
induce a challenge in which party 2 exhausts its campaigning budget is the one that
maximizes party 1’s winning prize, given by z = (x̂1, 1, 0). This is due to the fact that
the probability of winning for party 1 is not affected by how much further party 2’s
stake increases if party 2 is already spending its entire budget. For all other types of
challenge stage equilibria in which ζ2(z) < w2, the proposer faces the following trade-
off: Even though a more favorable proposal for itself increases party 1’s winning
prize, this comes at the expense of decreasing its winning probability as party 2 fights
more aggressively by spending more. As x̂1 and x̂2 diverge, party 1’s expected payoff
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from this challenge may decrease sufficiently that a proposal short of z = (x̂1, 1, 0)
is no longer justified. More specifically, as the value of ε2(z) increases due to this
divergence, leading to higher spending by party 2, the proposal compromise that was
made in the hopes of putting a check on party 2’s spending no longer pays off. In
this situation, party 1 would be better-off offering x = x̂1 with all the rent allocated
to itself, thereby provoking an all-out fight with ζ1(z) = w1 and ζ2(z) = w2.
Having described party 1’s incentives in choosing how best to realize a unanimity
outcome in the parliament or to induce a challenge, it remains an open question which
option party 1 will prefer. The following proposition takes up this task:
Proposition 2. Party 1 is more likely to prefer the unanimity outcome over a chal-
lenge for lower values of u2(s) and higher w1. A lower w2 incentivizes unanimity only
if w2 > α− u1(s).
The intuition for why a smaller status-quo payoff for party 2 unambiguously con-
tributes to a higher likelihood of observing unanimity is straight-forward: Since party
1 offers u2(z) = u2(s) − w1 to party 2 in order to get its acceptance, a lower u2(s)
increases its sure payoff from the settlement. On the other hand, while a higher w1
may contribute to a higher probability of winning for party 1 in a particular challenge,
it also increases its unanimity payoff as w1 is extracted from party 2. In equilibrium,
the effect of w1 on its unanimity payoff dominates the challenge stage effect, yielding
the result in Proposition 2.
The conditional result in Proposition 2 on how w2 affects party 1’s incentives be-
tween a settlement and a challenge illustrates another trade-off. In a challenge stage
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equilibrium with (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (w1, w2), changes in w2 only affect party 1’s prob-
ability of winning in the referendum. On the other hand, if the equilibrium is such
that ζ1(z) < w1 and ζ2(z) = w2, changes in w2 affect not only party 1’s probability of
winning, but also its campaign spending. Specifically, a higher w2 unambiguously de-
creases party 1’s winning probability in this equilibrium, while it also decreases ζ1(z)
when the condition in Proposition 2 holds. When this is true, the marginal effect of
lower campaign spending on party 1’s expected payoff from this challenge dominates
the marginal effect of a lower winning probability, resulting in an increase in party
1’s expected challenge payoff. Thus, in this challenge stage equilibrium, sufficiently
higher values of w2 do not act as threat instruments due to their indirect effect on
party 1’s campaign spending.
Based on this analysis, we would expect to observe a proposer party with a high
campaigning budget work towards achieving unanimity by buying the smaller party
out. In contrast, a small party would act more aggressively by shunning a settlement
if the stakes from the proposed bill are high enough. As the smaller party’s budget
grows, this can initially act as a threat and therefore encourage unanimity. However,
this effect may be reversed once a threshold is crossed. At this point, the smaller
party’s budget starts to constitute an impediment to settlement.
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3.5 Three-Party Parliaments
Studying a three-party parliament offers richer dynamics on coalition formation and
incentives for a grand bargain in a non-cooperative framework than the two-party
setting allowed. In this section, I assume that neither party controls a simple ma-
jority of the seats and that two parties together do not command a supermajority.
Therefore, at least two parties must agree in order for a bill to pass in the parliament.
A bill that has passed in the parliament with votes short of unanimity moves to the
challenge stage. To abstract away from potential informational advantages, I assume
that after party 1 makes an offer, the other two parties vote on it simultaneously.
When making a proposal, party 1 can induce one of the following four general
outcomes: A grand bargain with unanimous agreement among all the three parties;
rejection in the parliament; a challenge stage with party 2 as its partner and party 3
in the opposition; or a challenge stage with party 3 as its partner and party 2 in the
opposition. Looking for a political equilibrium in a three-party parliament involves
solving for the optimal offers that would induce each of the alternative outcomes and
comparing party 1’s maximum expected payoffs from those outcomes.
Baik (2008) characterizes the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of group contests in
which the winning prize is a public good within each group. Since the winning proba-
bility in the referendum is a function of each party group’s total campaign spending,
this characterization applies to the equilibrium of the challenge stage in this model.
Specifically, since there are always two parties aligned with position Z in a challenge,
the proposal z, which is the winning prize for members of group NZ , constitutes a
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public good within this group.
To start characterizing the equilibrium of the challenge stage, first consider the
parties’ position choices for a given proposal z. As in the two-party case, it can
never be optimal for the proposer to take a stand against its own bill so that we have
ρ1(z) = Z on the equilibrium path for any given z. In order to have reached the
challenge stage, it must have been the case that one party voted for the bill and one
against it in the parliament. Let h and j denote these two non-proposer parties such
that ah(z) = 1 and aj(z) = 0. If party h preferred a no vote on the referendum, it
would have voted to reject the proposal in the bargaining stage, leading to its defeat
and thereby avoiding a costly and risky referendum. Therefore, ρh(z) = Z on the
equilibrium path. Similarly, if party j preferred a yes vote on the referendum, it
would have voted to accept the proposal during bargaining, leading to a unanimous
agreement on z. Hence, it must be the case that ρj(z) = S on the equilibrium path.
Therefore, party h for whom ah(z) = 1 becomes party 1’s partner in the challenge
stage and party j for whom aj(z) = 0 becomes its opponent.
In the challenge stage, each group Nt, t ∈ {Z, S}, decides on a total campaign
spending C = Ct(z), where Ct(z) is as defined in 3.4. The members of a group do not
act cooperatively; instead, campaign spending choices are made independently. For a
given proposal z and the total campaign spending of group NS given by CS(z) = ζj(z),
let C1Z(z) denote the best response total campaign spending of group NZ to CS(z)
from the perspective of party 1 and let ChZ(z) denote the same best response from
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the perspective of its partner party h. Specifically, define C1Z(z) and C
h
Z(z) such that
















As long as the proposal z is such that ε1(z) 6= εh(z), party 1 and its partner have
different opinions as to how they should best respond to CS(z). Moreover, since the
winning prize z is a public good for them, the decision on how the burden of the total
spending CZ(z) = will be shared in equilibrium is not trivial.
The following lemma, based on Baik (2008), characterizes how the total campaign
spending CZ(z) of group NZ is determined and its burden is shared among parties
1 and h in a Nash equilibrium. This lemma will then be used to characterize the
challenge stage equilibrium.
Lemma 2. Suppose the proposal z is such that ε1(z) ≥ εh(z) > 0. Then, taking the
total campaign spending CS(z) = ζj(z) of group NS as given, parties 1 and h choose
their total equilibrium campaign spending CZ(z) and its allocation between ζ1(z) and
ζh(z) as follows:
1. If C1Z(z) ≤ w1, then CZ(z) = ζ1(z) = C1Z(z) and ζh(z) = 0.
2. If ChZ(z) ≥ w1 + wh, then CZ(z) = w1 + wh, ζ1(z) = w1, and ζh(z) = wh.
3. If C1Z(z) > w1 and C
h
Z(z) ≤ w1+wh, then CZ(z) = max{ChZ(z), w1}, ζ1(z) = w1,
and ζh(z) = max{0, ChZ(z)− w1}.
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Lemma 2 provides a full characterization of the equilibrium campaign spending
decisions of the members of group NZ . To gain some intuition, first note that the
party with the higher stake from a challenge, determined by the proposal z from
the bargaining stage, will have a higher total campaign spending best response to
group NS than its opponent. Part 1 of the lemma indicates that if the party with the
higher stake can afford its best response total campaign spending using only its own
resources, then it is the only member of group NZ that contributes to the campaign
in equilibrium; its partner free-rides on its spending. This campaign more than meets
the partner’s needs, obviating any spending on the partner’s part. On the other hand,
if the total resources of the group cannot cover even the lower best response of the
partner, then part 2 of the lemma indicates that each member exhausts its budget in
equilibrium. There exists no free-riding in this situation. Finally, if the party with
the higher stake cannot afford its best response total campaign spending with its
own resources but the partner’s lower best response can be met with the total group
budget, then the higher-stake party spends its entire budget on the campaign while its
partner contributes the difference (if the difference is positive). In this scenario, the
partner is at best a partial free-rider on the higher-stake party’s campaign spending.
In brief, Lemma 2 shows that unless the stakes from a challenge are sufficiently
high for both members of group NZ , the party with the lower stake free-rides on its
partner’s campaign spending that contributes positively to its probability of winning
in the referendum. The following lemma uses the results of Lemma 2 in order to
describe the general properties of a challenge stage equilibrium, which requires that
group NZ is in equilibrium and that both groups are best-responding to each other:
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Lemma 3. Let z and z′ be two proposals such that εk(z) ≥ εk(z′) for party k ∈
{1, 2, 3}. Then, ζk(z) ≥ ζk(z′) in equilibrium. Moreover, for any given proposal z,
the condition ε1(z) ≥ εh(z) needs to hold in order for party h ∈ NZ to free-ride on
ζ1(z) in a challenge stage equilibrium.
Lemmas 2 and 3 together describe the properties of a challenge equilibrium for
any proposal z from the bargaining stage. Based on this challenge equilibrium, the
political equilibrium of the model can be solved for via backward induction. The
following propositions present general results on a political equilibrium. Following the
same order of analysis as in the previous section, I study the structure of proposals
that would respectively induce a grand bargain in the parliament and a subsequent
challenge. Then, I focus in the remainder of the section on the conditions that make a
grand bargain among the three parties more likely to be observed on the equilibrium
path than a challenge.
Proposition 3. In the political equilibrium of a three-party parliament, the following
are true about inducing a grand bargain among the parties:
1. Any proposal z that would imply a challenge stage equilibrium with ζj(z) = wj
for j ∈ NS if rejected will move to a challenge.
2. In a unanimous agreement on a proposal z that would otherwise lead to a chal-
lenge with free-riding in group NZ, the party who would have been the free-rider
partner is punished.
3. In party 1’s optimal unanimity-inducing offer z, its rent share y1 increases in
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yq1, w1, and (q − x̂k) for k = 2, 3. Furthermore, its unanimity payoff u1(z)
increases as the three parties get ideologically closer.
The first part of Proposition 3 presents a result on the structure of proposals on
which a grand bargain is achievable. Specifically, it indicates that if an offer involves
very high stakes for at least one party, either due to a high status-quo payoff or an
unfavorable treatment in the proposal for that party, such that it would fight with all
its budget in a potential challenge, unanimity is impossible to achieve. For this party,
its certain payoff from unanimity is not high enough to justify foregoing the chance
of regaining its status-quo payoff in a challenge. This mirrors the result in part 1 of
Proposition 1 for a two-party parliament. In both cases, parties that have too much
to lose from a proposal will not settle.
Part 2 of Proposition 3 suggests that a proposal z on which a grand bargain is
possible reflects the division of CZ(z) among parties 1 and h ∈ NZ that would be
observed if z was instead rejected. For example, the proof shows that if an offer z
implies a challenge stage equilibrium in which ζ1(z) = w1 and ζh(z) = 0, party 1
extracts a premium from party h ∈ {2, 3} equal to w1 in a grand bargain. Likewise,
if the opposite is true, party 1 needs to offer party h a premium of wh in order to
persuade it to join in the agreement.
The final part of Proposition 3 characterizes the properties of the optimal offer
for party 1 that would induce unanimity. Not surprisingly, we observe that party 1
captures a higher share of the surplus as it becomes a more powerful player, either due
to a higher status-quo or a higher campaigning budget. The intuition for these effects
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is as follows: A higher status-quo rent share for party 1 means that the other parties
command less, thereby decreasing the amount they need to be compensated for in
a grand bargain. Likewise, the more non-proposer parties are away from their ideal
ideological points in the status-quo, the lower the compensation they require. On the
effect of w1 on y1, the proof shows that party 1’s optimal unanimity-inducing offer
z is such that if rejected, it would lead to a challenge equilibrium with ζ1(z) = w1.
Thus, w1 can be interpreted as party 1’s reward for making an offer that “saves” the
non-proposer parties the spending on their groups’ campaigns. Nonetheless, party 1
needs to compensate them for their ideological loss in the form of higher rent shares
in proposal z. Therefore, the results indicate that an ideologically-divided parliament
always hurts party 1 in a grand bargain.
Having studied the structure of a unanimous agreement in a three-party parlia-
ment and how to best get there from party 1’s point of view, the following proposition
focuses on the same questions for a referendum:
Proposition 4. In the political equilibrium of a three-party parliament, the following
are true about inducing a challenge with party h as the partner and party j as the
opponent of party 1:
1. For any challenge-inducing proposal z, party 1’s expected payoff from a challenge
increases as yqh decreases, (q − x̂h)2 increases, and x̂1 and x̂h get closer.
2. For any challenge-inducing proposal z for which ζh(z) > 0, a higher wh decreases
party 1’s expected payoff from the challenge if wh and u1(s) are sufficiently high;
3. All else constant, party 1 prefers to partner with party 2 instead of party 3 if
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– u2(s) ≤ u3(s);
– w2 > w3 for any proposal that implies a challenge stage equilibrium with
ζh(z) = 0;
– w2 ≤ w3 whenever wh and u1(s) are sufficiently high, and w2 > w3 oth-
erwise, for any proposal z that implies a challenge stage equilibrium with
ζh(z) > 0.
The results in Proposition 4 illustrate party 1’s incentives when deciding on the
identity of its partner in a challenge. First, the proposition states that it necessarily
increases party 1’s expected payoff from a challenge if its partner has a lower status-
quo payoff. This is due to the fact that a party always requires at least its status-quo
payoff in order to become party 1’s partner regardless of whether it will contribute
to group NZ ’s campaign spending or become a free-rider in equilibrium. Thus, a
lower status-quo payoff makes it more likely for a party to be designated as party 1’s
partner in a challenge-inducing proposal.
To gain an intuition for why party 1’s decision on whether to partner with the
high or the low-budget party depends on the type of challenge stage equilibrium con-
sidered and on the level of resources, note that the amount of a partner’s campaigning
resources have two opposing effects on party 1’s expected challenge payoff: In an equi-
librium with positive contributions from the partner, a higher wh weakly increases
the proposal’s winning probability. However, a party also demands a premium over
its status-quo payoff from party 1 for agreeing to become an active partner. The anal-
ysis indicates that for proposals that imply a challenge with an active partner, the
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positive effect of a higher wh on party 1’s expected challenge payoff due to a higher
probability of winning is dominated by its negative effect due to a higher payment
to the partner whenever wh is too high or party 1’s stakes from the challenge are too
low. In this case, a higher wh overall decreases party 1’s expected payoff from such
a challenge, because the high payment needed to persuade a rich party to become a
partner does not justify the increase in party 1’s winning probability. On the other
hand, for lower values of wh and u1(s) that imply high stakes from the challenge, the
payment to the partner is justified. In this situation, party 1 would prefer the richer
party as its partner.
However, Proposition 4 also indicates that this trade-off between a higher winning
probability and a higher partner premium disappears once an equilibrium with a free-
rider partner is considered. In these cases, a party can no longer demand a premium
for agreeing to become a partner and its budget no longer affects the proposal’s prob-
ability of winning. However, the opponent’s budget wj negatively affects party 1’s
expected challenge payoff, giving party 1 the incentive to designate the low-budget
party as its opponent.
Given the previous results in Proposition 3 on inducing a grand bargain and the
above results on possible challenges, the following proposition presents the main result
of this section on party 1’s choice between a grand bargain and a challenge outcome:
Proposition 5. In the political equilibrium of a three-party parliament, party 1 be-
comes more likely to prefer a grand bargain outcome over a challenge as
1. The non-proposer parties command lower status-quo payoffs;
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2. The three parties get ideologically closer; and
3. The non-proposer parties’s campaigning budgets become more similar.
The first and the second parts of Proposition 5 are a direct implication of party
1’s unanimity payoff. To see why similar campaigning budgets between the non-
proposer parties incentivizes a grand bargain, note that w2 and w3 do not affect
party 1’s unanimity payoff, but determine the proposal needed to induce a given
challenge equilibrium. In a challenge stage equilibrium in which the partner also
contributes, the premium it demands increases as its resources become more similar
to the opponent’s, because this increases the competitiveness of the referendum. Since
this decreases party 1’s expected payoff from this challenge, it will be more likely to
prefer a grand bargain.
The results on the proposer’s incentives between a grand bargain and a challenge
in a three-party parliament mirror those in a two-party parliament. Specifically, the
results in these sections indicate that lower status-quo payoffs of the non-proposer
parties always incentivize unanimity. Moreover, both sections suggest that a partner’s
higher budget can be a blessing in a challenge as long as it is not too high, a result
that spans both types of parliaments. However, due to the presence of an additional
party that the proposer can play against the other, the results on non-cooperative
coalition formation are richer in the three-party parliament setting.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter developed a model of legislative bargaining over a bill consisting of both
an ideology and a distributive component followed by a challenge stage. I addressed
the question of how an institutional challenge mechanism such as a referendum affects
the parties’ optimal behavior in a parliament. The analysis of a proposer’s incentives
between a grand bargain and a challenge indicates that post-bargaining power does
not necessarily translate into higher equilibrium payoffs. Although the focus of the
model is on legislative bargaining over proposals that can be subsequently challenged,
its insights are applicable to other settings, including private sector organizational
models. For example, the players in the model can be chosen to represent the board
of directors of a corporation, with the chairman as the proposer and shareholders as
the voters on proposals not approved with sufficient majority in the board room.
The results of this chapter have implications for campaign finance policies. Even
though referenda can be both publicly and privately financed in most countries, this
model is silent on this issue. The results for both two and three-party parliaments
indicate that whether high or low campaigning budgets incentivize grand bargains
depend on the parameters of the model. Therefore, if a planner’s goal is to propagate
unanimously-approved deals in the parliament over costly challenge procedures, the
appropriate campaign finance policy will depend on the status-quo commanded by
each party and their current resources.
There exists a number of directions in which the model employed in this chapter
can be extended. For example, while I assumed that all the parameters on campaign-
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ing budgets, ideal ideological points, and status-quo payoffs are common knowledge,
incorporating uncertainty with regards to either one of these parameters can be a
natural extension. Although I believe that complete information is a more realis-
tic setting in this model of a public interaction, incomplete information might be a
better depiction of reality in private interaction models such as the corporate board
example. Extending the model to N players for a more general setting or specifically
modeling voters with ideological preferences may also yield interesting results on the
dynamics of non-cooperative coalition formation.
Finally, this model does not entertain the possibility of new rounds of bargaining
following a challenge stage. However, in reality, political processes might reconsider
the same measures. Although I believe that introducing additional cycles of bargain-
ing and challenge stages to this model might make the model much less tractable with
little additional insights, it might be a useful endeavor for the purpose of capturing
the dynamic aspects of similar political processes. Similarly, an additional stage of
legislative elections would make voters strategic by giving them control over the iden-
tity of the proposer.
It is important to stress that I do not make any efficiency arguments in favor of
one policy over another. For example, if the results suggest caps on campaign financ-
ing to incentivize grand bargains for certain ranges of parameters, this study can still
not answer the question of how this policy would affect voter welfare. Any attempt
to answer this question would require a normative exercise I refrain from.
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Appendix A
Maximum Taxes as an Institution
We can alternatively think of an institutional decision as determining the maximum
amount of lump-sum taxes, denoted by τ̂ , that the next period’s incumbent can levy.
With this formulation, characterizing the evolution of executive constraints amounts
to characterizing the evolution of the maximum level of taxation allowed. In this







where the first term is the exogenous maximum taxable surplus created in the econ-
omy and the second term is the executive constraint chosen by the incumbent in
period t− 1. Since it is infeasible to tax above K̄, the inequality τ̂t ≤ K̄ always holds
so that an incumbent’s only constraint becomes τ̂t.
Since he receives no utility from transferring resources to the other agent, an in-










Figure A.1: An example of Γt with the institution-as-maximum-taxes approach.
in R2. To visualize a feasible set in this environment, suppose the stock of public cap-
ital is g and the ideal policies for the two agents are represented by ẑig. With costless
disinvestments, Figure A.1 represents a possible Γt+1 choice for an incumbent.
Although both the model presented here and the one employed in the model
treat an institution as a constraint on policy-making, the tax approach is an inade-
quate substitute for more general institutional constraints. Specifically, while it also
imposes simultaneous bounds on private transfer and positive investment decisions,
that is not the case with disinvestments. With executive constraints boiling down
to a financial constraint, any policy that has a zero price is permitted within this
framework. For example, the incumbent is allowed to disinvest the society’s entire
stock of the public good. In contrast, the structure employed in the model abstracts
away from the prices of the policies in its restrictions. Even though disinvestment is
a policy with a zero price, it is still restricted as eating up all of a country’s public
good stock is deemed a too-extreme policy.
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Appendix B
Solutions to the Dictatorship
Problem
This appendix presents a dictator’s optimal choice of investments in periods t =
1, 2, 3, 4. Following the notation in the text, let I∗t (gt) denote this optimal choice in
period t when the level of the public good is given by gt.
Period 4: Since this is the last period in the model, the optimal decision of a dictator
is to not invest in the public good:
I∗4 (g4) = 0. (B.1)
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Period 3: The dictator chooses I∗3 (g3) in order to maximize the dynamic component
of his utility (since the investment and the private transfer components are separable).
max
I3
Āgα3 − pI3 + β
[




I3 ≥ −g3; (B.3)
g4 = (1− δ)g3 + I3. (B.4)
Solving this program yields











− (1− δ)g3. (B.6)
Period 2: The dictator solves
max
I2
Āgα2 − pI2 + β
[








I2 ≥ −g2; (B.8)
g3 = (1− δ)g2 + I2; (B.9)
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g4 = (1− δ)g3 + I∗3 (g3). (B.10)
Solving this program yields









(1− δ)2g2 + (1− δ)I2 + I∗3 (g3)
]α−1 [









= −(1− δ), (B.12)
the final component of B.11 disappears, resulting in
βĀα [(1− δ)g2 + I2]α−1 − p[1− β + βδ] = 0. (B.13)




p(1− β + βδ)
) 1
1−α
− (1− δ)g2. (B.14)
Period 1: In the first period, the dictator solves
max
I1
Āgα1 − pI1 +
4∑
t=2
βt−1[Āgαt − pI∗t (gt)] (B.15)
subject to
I1 ≥ −g1; (B.16)
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g2 = (1− δ)g1 + I1; (B.17)
g3 = (1− δ)g2 + I∗2 (g2); (B.18)
g4 = (1− δ)g3 + I∗3 (g3). (B.19)
Solving this program yields












(1− δ)2g1 + (1− δ)I1 + I∗2 (g2)
]α−1 [







(1− δ)3g1 + (1− δ)2I1 + (1− δ)I∗2 (g2) + I∗3 (g3)
]α−1 [












= −(1− δ), (B.21)




Thus, we can re-write B.20 as follows:
βĀα [(1− δ)g1 + I1]α−1 = p[1− β + βδ]. (B.23)
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p(1− β + βδ)
) 1
1−α
− (1− δ)g1. (B.24)
The equation B.24 expresses the dictator’s optimal choice of investment in period
1 only as a function of the parameters of the model and the exogenously given g1.
Using the fact that g2 = (1 − δ)g1 + I∗1 (g1) when the dictator is behaving optimally
and substituting B.24 into B.14, we get
I∗2 (g2) = δ
(
βĀα























The solutions in this Appendix will provide the basis for evaluating public good
provision under political uncertainty.
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Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1. Based on the definition of an institutionally feasible set Γ(r) as a
circle with origin (0, 0) and radius r, defining r̄(g) = min{r | (I∗(g), y∗i ) ∈ Γ(r)} for
i = A,B implies that
r̄(g) =
√
(I∗(g))2 + (y∗i )
2. (C.1)
Since the amount of ideal private transfers to an incumbent is the same regardless of
his identity, I omit the subscript i from y∗i in the following analysis.
First, consider g > ĝ so that γ∗(g) = (1− δ)ĝ and I∗(g) = (1− δ)ĝ − (1− δ)g =
−(1 − δ)(g − ĝ). Let gk for k = 1, 2, 3 denote a state of the public good such that
gk > ĝ for all k, g1 > g2 > g3, and | g1 − g2 |=| g2 − g3 |. Define the function
I∗ : R+ → R, where I∗(g) is the (common) ideal level of investment when the public
good is given by g. Note that the values of the function I∗ are equivalent to the levels
of investment that would be chosen by either dictator type for any given level of g.
Since I∗ is a linear function for all g > ĝ with a first derivative equal to −(1 − δ),
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it follows that | I∗(g1) − I∗(g2) |=| I∗(g2) − I∗(g3) |. By the equivalence of either
dictator type’s transfers to himself and the fact that | I∗(g1) |>| I∗(g2) |>| I∗(g3) |,
it follows that
r̄(g1) > r̄(g2) > r̄(g3). (C.2)
Hence, r̄ is increasing for all g > ĝ.
To see why r̄ is convex for g > ĝ, consider the second derivative of r̄(g) =√





(y∗)2 + (1− δ)2(ĝ − g)2
]− 1
2 (1− δ)2 (g − ĝ) , (C.3)




(y∗)2 + (1− δ)2(ĝ − g)2
]− 3
2 (ĝ − g)2+(1− δ)2
[












[(y∗)2 + (1− δ)2(ĝ − g)2]
]
. (C.4)
Since (y∗)2 > 0, the value of the fraction in C.4 is less than 1 and positive. Hence, the
final term in brackets in C.4 is positive so that the second derivative of the function
r̄ becomes positive for all g > ĝ.
Second, consider g < ĝ, where the dictatorial investment rule γ∗ is increasing and
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concave. Accordingly, for any gk for k = 1, 2, 3 such that gk < ĝ for all k, g1 < g2 < g3,
and g2 − g1 = g3 − g2, the equality I∗(g1)− I∗(g2) = I∗(g3)− I∗(g2) no longer holds
since the function I∗ is no longer linear. In contrast, I∗(g) decreases at a decreasing
rate, albeit taking only positive values since we are below the investment cut-off state.











Since I∗(g) is decreasing for all g < ĝ, it follows that C.5 is negative. To obtain the





















Since the second derivative of I∗ with respect to g is negative for all g > ĝ, C.6 implies
that the second derivative of the r̄ function with respect to g is negative for all g < ĝ.
Finally, suppose g = ĝ so that γ∗(ĝ) = (1 − δ)ĝ, which implies I∗(ĝ) = 0. By
the continuity of I∗ and the fact that y∗ is constant for both agents, r̄ is continuous.
Since dr̄(g)
dg
< 0 for all g < ĝ and dr̄(g)
dg
> 0 for all g > ĝ, it follows that the derivative
of the function r̄ evaluated at g = ĝ is equal to 0 and ĝ ∈ argmin
g
r̄(g). Moreover,
the argmin set is a singleton. Hence, this completes the proof that the function r̄ is
increasing at an increasing rate as g moves away from the investment cut-off state
ĝ.
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Proof of Proposition 1. The solution to the second period incumbent’s problem is
summarized in the text. Here, I only solve for optimal behavior in the first period.
By the same argument that led to 1.23, we have Υij,1(r1, g1) = 0 for all r1 and g1, and
j 6= i. To solve for the optimal choices of I1, yi,1, and r2, define the Lagrangian for
κ1 = i as follows:
Li = yi,1 − x(yi,1)− x(yj,1) + Āgα1 − pI1 (C.7)
+β[qiV
i
2 (r2, g2) + (1− qi)W i2(r2, g2)]
+λ1[(r1)
2 − (I1)2 − (yi,1)2] + λ2(I1 + g1),
where j 6= i. The first-order conditions for C.7 are yi,1 ≥ 0, I1 ≥ −g1, r2 ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0,
λ2 ≥ 0, and
1− b(yi,1)b−1 − 2λ1yi,1 ≤ 0; (C.8)
[1− b(yi,1)b−1 − 2λ1yi,1] yi,1 = 0; (C.9)
Āβα[(1− δ)g1 + I1]α−1 − p− 2λ1I1 + λ2 ≤ 0; (C.10)






















2 − (I1)2 − (yi,1)2 ≥ 0; (C.14)
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[(r1)
2 − (I1)2 − (yi,1)2] λ1 = 0; (C.15)
I1 + g1 ≥ 0; (C.16)
(I1 + g1) λ2 = 0. (C.17)
Note that C.12 and C.13 already reflect the fact that Υij,2(r2, g2) = 0 for j 6= i.
Consider the policy choices of incumbent κ1. First, I look for a solution where
λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0 so that neither of the two constraints is binding. When this is the









Υii,1(r1, g1) = b
1
1−b . (C.19)
Second, I look for a solution where λ1 = 0, so that the executive constraint is not
binding, and λ2 > 0. This implies that I1 = −g1 and therefore γi1(r1, g1) = 0. Since
r1 is not binding, incumbent i chooses yi,1 according to C.19. This solution implies
that λ2 = p.
Finally, I look for a solution where λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0. Then, C.9 and C.11 imply
that
1− b(yi,1)b−1 − 2λ1yi,1 = 0 (C.20)
and
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Āβα[(1− δ)g1 + I1]α−1 − p− 2λ1I1 = 0. (C.21)
Moreover, λ1 > 0 implies that the executive constraint is binding and hence yi,1 =√
(r1)2 − (I1)2. Substituting this equality for yi,1 into C.21 yields two equations
with two unknowns, λ1 and I1. Solving this system of equations yields the implicit
equation 1.26 that defines the optimal choice of investment in period 1 when r1 is
binding. Accordingly, we characterize the optimal choice of private transfers for agent
i himself by 1.29.
Now, consider the institutional choice of incumbent κ1. An interior solution to










Notice that regardless of an incumbent’s identity, the optimal amount of private
transfers is always the same to the incumbent himself. Therefore, Υii,t(rt, gt) =













This is because an agent i always pays for a unit of private transfers through taxes
regardless of whether he is the recipient or not, but only enjoys it if he is receiving
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the transfer.
By 1.24, Υii,2(r2, g2) = r2 whenever r2 is binding. Hence, C.24 becomes
qi − b(r2)b−1 = 0. (C.25)








On the other hand, if Υii,2(r2, g2) = b
1
1−b , any r2 such that r2 ≥ b
1
1−b is optimal. Hence,
any institutional strategy ρi1 such that ρ
i
1(r1, g1) ≥ b
1
1−b constitutes an equilibrium
strategy.
This completes the full characterization of an incumbent’s policy and institutional
strategies when T = 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. I solve the four-period model via backward induction. First,
consider the private transfer strategies of incumbent κt as described in Part 1 of the
proposition. Since incumbent i does not receive any utility from making positive
transfers to the other agent, we have Υij,t(rt, gt) = 0 for all t and j 6= i. For private
transfers to himself, incumbent i’s optimal decision is given by C.19 from the proof




(rt)2 − (It)2 when it
is, where It = γ
i
t(rt, gt)− (1− δ)gt. Since the private transfer decision is purely static,
this is true for all t.
Second, consider the investment decision of incumbent i for all periods, described
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in Part 2 of the proposition.
Since period-4 is the final period, the optimal decision is to not invest so that the
optimal I4 equals zero and γ
i
4(r4, g4) = (1− δ)g4.
Since period-3 when T = 4 is equivalent to the first period in the two-period
model considered in the previous section, the optimal I3 is obtained by solving C.7,
which yields the first-order conditions C.10, C.11, C.15 and C.17. As summarized
in Proposition 1, this yields 1.26 and 1.27 for the optimal choice of I3. Note that
there exists no part in either expression that is agent-specific. Therefore, the optimal
choice of I3 is the same for both types of agents.
For period-2, the Lagrangian for incumbent κ2 can be written as
L2i = yi,2 − x(yi,2)− x(yj,2) + Āgα2 − pI2 (C.27)
+β[qiV
i






















2 − (I2)2 − (y2i,2)] + λ2[I2 + g2],
where j 6= i. We have already shown in Part 1 of the proposition that Υij,t(rt, gt) = 0
for all t so that the optimal choice of yj,2 is zero. Using the fact that γ
A
3 (r3, g3) =
γB3 (r3, g3) for all r3 and g3, the first-order conditions based on C.27 for incumbent i’s
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policy decisions are yi,2 ≥ 0, I2 ≥ −g2, λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, and
1− b(yi,2)b−1 − 2λ1yi,2 ≤ 0; (C.28)
[1− b(yi,2)b−1 − 2λ1yi,2] yi,2 = 0; (C.29)






































−2λ1I2 + λ2 ≤ 0;






































−2λ1I2 + λ2][I2 + g2] = 0;
(r2)
2 − (I2)2 − (yi,2)2 ≥ 0; (C.32)
[(r2)
2 − (I2)2 − (yi,2)2] λ1 = 0; (C.33)
I2 + g2 ≥ 0; (C.34)
(I2 + g2) λ2 = 0. (C.35)
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I first look for a solution in which λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0. Solving for the optimal I2
yields the implicit equation in 1.31 when r2 is binding. Since γ
A
3 (r3, g3) = γ
B
3 (r3, g3)
for all (r3, g3) ∈ R2+ and 1.31 does not contain agent-specific parameters, it follows
that the agents follow the same γi2 rule.
Solving for the optimal first period investment choice of incumbent κ1 requires
writing a period-1 Lagrangian as in C.27 that accounts for three-period forward-
looking. This yields the implicit equation 1.32. The analysis is similar to the analysis
for period-2 and therefore will not be repeated here. This completes the proof of Part
2 of the proposition.
Finally, consider the institutional strategies of incumbent κt in all periods.
The optimal choice of r4 in period-3 is equivalent to the only institutional decision
in the two-period model and hence is characterized by 1.30.
Consider the r3 decision of incumbent κ2. Based on C.27, the first-order conditions
for the institutional choice in period-3 can be written as























r3 = 0. (C.38)
Note that the period-4 policies drop from the first-order conditions for the following
two reasons: First, the optimal r4 as defined in 1.30 does not depend on r3. Second,
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possible final period policies given by Υki,4(r4, g4) and γ
k
4 (r4, g4) for k = A,B do not
depend on g4, because the optimal investment I4 is always zero and as a result the
optimal private transfers only depend on r4, which does not depend on r3. Hence, an
interior solution to r3 is implicitly defined by
[
qi − b(Υii,3(r3, g3))b−1
] ∂Υii,3(r3, g3)
∂r3




where I3 = γ
i
3(r3, g3)− (1− δ)g3 and the absolute values are necessary to account for
disinvestments.
Finally, solving for the optimal r2 decision of incumbent κ1 again requires writing
a period-1 Lagrangian that accounts for three-period forward-looking. This analysis
yields the implicit equation 1.34. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. For t = 3, the conclusion of the proposition is straight-
forward: As qi increases, the value of ρ
i
3 increases for any g3 ∈ R+ since b > 1.
To show that the optimal choice of r3 is increasing with qi, I implicitly differentiate


























Note that the first, second, and the third expressions in C.40 are always non-negative.
In the fourth component of the summation, bΥii,3(r3, g3)
b−1−qi is always non-positive,
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because an incumbent would never choose a level of private transfers at which the
marginal cost of an additional unit, bΥii,3(r3, g3)
b−1 exceeds its expected marginal




(r3)2 − (I3)2 when r3 is binding, its second
derivative is non-positive. Hence, the fourth component of C.40 is non-negative as




The second-period analysis is identical and hence is not repeated here. Therefore, we
conclude that re-election probability and the level of executive constraints move in
the same direction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Implicitly differentiating 1.33 with respect to g2 and evalu-
ating the resulting expression on both sides of ĝ yield the desired result that ∂r3
∂g2
is
negative for all g < ĝ and positive for all g > ĝ.
A more intuitive proof is obtained by noting that as g approaches ĝ from either
direction, the expression | p−Āαgα−14 | goes to zero. This implies setting r3 with more
weight on private transfer preferences and less weight on investment. For example,








. As g moves away from ĝ,
resulting in investment or disinvestment needs, r3 =
√
(y3)2 + (I3)2 must increase to
accommodate them. Therefore, r3 must be increasing as g2 moves away from ĝ in
either direction. This concludes the proof of the first part of Proposition 4.
To see that the difference between r̄(gt) and ρ
i
t(rt, gt) is positive for all possible
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values of rt and gt, recall from Lemma 1 that r̄(g) =
√
(I∗(gt))2 + (y∗i )
2. Hence,
√
(I∗(gt))2 + (y∗i )
2 −
√
[γit(rt, gt)− (1− δ)gt]2 + [Υii,t(rt, gt)]2 (C.42)
must be always positive since | I∗(gt) |>| γit(rt, gt) − (1 − δ)gt | and y∗i > Υii,t(rt, gt)
for all gt ∈ R+ and rt > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. The equation 1.32 that implicitly defines the optimal choice
of I1 contains a single agent-specific parameter, which is qi. Hence, as the difference
between qA and qB increases, the difference between the agents’ optimal choices of I1
will increase.
Proof of Proposition 6. Since the optimal choice of I4 always equals zero, I begin the
comparison of political equilibrium with the dictatorial benchmarks established in
Appendix B in period 3. In that period, the dictator invests in the amount of I∗3 (g3)
as characterized in B.6, whereas incumbent i facing political uncertainty chooses
I3 = γ
i
3(r3, g3)−(1−δ)g3 as given in 1.26 and 1.27. Note that B.6 and 1.27 indicate the
same choices of investment for the dictator and incumbent i, because 1.27 corresponds
to the case in which r3 is not binding. On the other hand, if the executive constraint
r3 is binding so that the political I3 choice is as given in 1.26, we have I3 < I
∗
3 (g3).
To see this, note that 1.26 is derived using the first-order condition
Āβα[(1− δ)g3 + I3]α−1 − 2λ1I3 = p, (C.43)
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where λ1 > 0. Comparing C.43 with B.5 indicates that the marginal benefit of
investing under political uncertainty is reduced by the value of 2λ1I3, which implies
a lower optimal choice of I3 compared to the dictator’s.
For t = 2, compare the dictatorial decision I∗2 (g2) given in B.14 with the political
choice of I2 implicitly defined in 1.31. By the same argument as in the previous
paragraph and the added effect of βp ∂I3
∂g3
that contributes to a lower marginal benefit
of investing, we have I2 < I
∗
2 (g2). The fourth period follows the same argument.
Hence, this completes the proof that for all t, I∗t (gt) ≥ It for g < ĝ and I∗t (gt) ≤ It
for g > ĝ.
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Appendix D
Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Let T = 3.1 Since there exist no institutional or investment
decisions in the final period, consider t = 2. Note that investing in period 2 determines
the level of c3, which in turn determines the cost of choosing `4 6= `3. Because there




Given that he neither invests nor disinvests in c2, the dictator’s payoff in t = 2
from choosing `3 6= `2 is given by
−d(p̂A, p∗2(`2))− c2 − βd(p̂A, p̂A), (D.1)
whereas his payoff from keeping `3 = `2 is
−(1 + β)d(p̂A, p∗2(`2)). (D.2)
1This is also the number of periods for which the model under political uncertainty will be solved.
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The dictator reforms the executive constraints whenever his dynamic payoff from
doing so is greater than his payoff from maintaining the status-quo. Hence, based on
D.1 and D.2, it is profitable for the dictator to choose `3 6= `2 whenever
c2 ≤ βd(p̂A, p∗2(`2)), (D.3)




2(`2) if `3 = `2, and `3 6= `2 is such that p̂A ∈ Γ(`3).
Condition D.3 indicates that dictator A reforms the executive constraints in t = 2 if
the policy cost of keeping `3 = `2 justifies paying the cost of reform given by c2.
Now consider t = 1. Given `1 and the optimal I1 decision that will be subsequently
analyzed, the dictator’s payoff from choosing `2 6= `1 is




since choosing `2 6= `1 such that p̂A ∈ Γ(`2) allows the dictator to have p∗t (`t) = p̂A
for t = 2 and 3. On the other hand, if he maintains the status-quo, then his dynamic
payoff depends on whether he will choose `3 = `2 in t = 2 or not. Specifically, if
condition D.3 holds, which can be re-written as
(1− δ)c1 + I1 ≤ βd(p̂A, p∗2(`2)), (D.5)
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the dictator will reform the executive constraints in t = 2 and his payoff from choosing
`2 = `1 in t = 1 becomes
−d(p̂A, p∗1(`1))− I1 − βd(p̂A, p∗2(`1))− βc2 − β2d(p̂A, p̂A). (D.6)
In contrast, if D.3 does not hold so that the dictator will not reform in t = 2, his
payoff from keeping `2 = `1 is given by
−d(p̂A, p∗1(`1))− I1 − βd(p̂A, p∗2(`1))− β2d(p̂A, p∗3(`1)). (D.7)
When D.5 holds, comparing D.4 and D.6 yields the condition that needs to hold
for the dictator to reform in t = 1 when he would reform in t = 2 if he did not reform
today. Likewise, when D.5 does not hold, comparing D.4 and D.7 yields the similar
condition for the case in which the dictator would not reform thereafter if he did not
reform today. Note that D.5 cannot hold if the dictator has already reformed in t = 1
so that p̂A ∈ Γ(`2). This is because `2 6= `1 would imply p∗2(`2) = p̂A, thereby making
d(p̂A, p
∗
2(`2)) = 0. Since it is not possible to have c2 ≤ 0, we must have `2 = `1
whenever D.5 holds.
Since these comparisons depend on the optimal I1 in each scenario, we first need
to characterize its choice in equilibrium. First, notice that the dictator will never
choose I1 > 0 so that γ
∗
1(`1, c1) ∈ [0, (1− δ)c1]. Second, if dictator A chooses `2 6= `1,
resulting in the payoff given in D.4, he will let I1 = 0.
For the optimal investment choice in the two scenarios whose payoffs are repre-
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sented by D.6 and D.7, first suppose the dictator chooses I1 and `2 such that D.5
holds, i.e. that the resulting c2 would allow him to reform the constraints in t = 2 if
he did not already reform in t = 1. Since D.5 can only hold if `1 = `2, I1 has to be
such that
I1 ≤ min{0, d(p̂A, p∗1(`1))− (1− δ)c1}. (D.8)
In this case, dictator A’s payoff from choosing `2 = `1 and `3 6= `2 becomes
−d(p̂A, p∗1(`1))− | I1 | −βd(p̂A, p∗2(`1))− β[(1− δ)c1 + I1]− β2d(p̂A, p̂A), (D.9)
where the last term equals zero. Choosing I1 in order to maximize D.9 implies that
since the dictator always pays | I1 | for any disinvestment today just to recoup it
tomorrow in cost savings of β | I1 |, any I1 that satisfies D.8 is a solution to this




2(`1)) + (1 + β)I1
1− β + βδ
, (D.10)
where I1 satisfies D.8.
Now suppose that D.5 does not hold so that dictator A would not be reforming in
t = 2 regardless of whether he reforms in t = 1 or not. Since he never pays c2 in this
scenario, there exist no future savings from disinvestments and the optimal action is
to choose I1 = 0. Then, comparing D.4 and D.7 yields
c1 ≤ (β + β2)d(p̂A, p∗2(`1)). (D.11)
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The above analysis indicates that there are three possible outcomes to the dic-
tatorship problem, depending on the given parameters and the initial states of the
world: Immediate reform in t = 1, delaying reform until t = 2, and foregoing reform
altogether. Dictator A prefers immediate reform over delaying whenever D.10 holds,
which is more likely if c1 is low, d(p̂A, p
∗
2(`1)) is high, and δ is low. On the other
hand, he prefers immediate reform over never reforming whenever D.11 holds. This
condition has a similar relationship with c1 and d(p̂A, p
∗
2(`1) as D.10. However, note




2(`1)) + (1 + β)I1
1− β + βδ
≤ (β + β2)d(p̂A, p∗2(`1)), (D.12)
where I1 satisfies D.8. If we have d(p̂A, p
∗
1(`1)) > (1 − δ)c1, D.12 reduces to the
following condition:
1− δ < 1
β
, (D.13)
which has to hold for all values of δ and β.2 Thus, we can summarize the results of
the analysis as follows:
First, immediately reforming is the unique optimal outcome for dictator A when-
ever D.10 holds, which would imply that D.11 also holds. Second, delaying reform is
2If d(p̂A, p
∗








2(`1)) + (1 + β)I1
1− β + βδ





where I1 again satisfies D.8. Finally, if c1 is such that




dictator A never reforms the executive constraints. This completes the proof of Propo-
sition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose without loss of generality that p̂i > 0 and p̂j < 0 for
j 6= i. Then, it follows that pi2(`2) > 0 and p
j
2(`2) < 0. Focusing on the first period
incumbent i’s institutional choice, the Lagrangian for 2.13 can be written as
Li = −βqA | p̂i − pA2 (`2) | −βqB | p̂i − pB2 (`2) | +λ`2. (D.16)
The corresponding first-order conditions for this problem are `2 ≥ 0 and
−βqA(p̂i − pA2 (`2))
d | pA2 (`2) |
d`2
− βqB(p̂i − pB2 (`2))
d | pB2 (`2) |
d`2
+ λ ≤ 0; (D.17)
[
−βqA(p̂i − pA2 (`2))
d | pA2 (`2) |
d`2
− βqB(p̂i − pB2 (`2))




`2 = 0. (D.18)
Whenever qi > 0, `2 = 0 cannot be a solution. Therefore, I look for a solution where
λ > 0. Then, D.17 holds with equality so that the following equation implicitly
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defines the optimal choice of `2:
qA(p̂i − pA2 (`2))
d | pA2 (`2) |
d`2
+ qB(p̂i − pB2 (`2))
d | pB2 (`2) |
d`2
= 0. (D.19)
In order to see how the equilibrium value of ρi(`1) = `2 responds to changes in qi,
fix agent A as the first period incumbent without loss of generality and implicitly





(p̂A − pA2 (`2))− qA





d | pA2 (`2) |
d`2








(p̂A − pB2 (`2))− qB













Incumbent i’s policy choice pit(`t) that minimizes the distance to his ideal policy
p̂i implies that the second derivative of p
i
t(`t) with respect to `t is zero. Therefore,
D.20 reduces to
[
(p̂A − pA2 (`2))− qA










(p̂A − pB2 (`2))− qB





d | pB2 (`2) |
d`2
= 0.






(p̂A − pA2 (`2))
d|pA2 (`2)|
d`2
















is positive for k = A,B, we conclude that d`2
dqA
is positive. This completes
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the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4. Since there exists no institutional or investment de-
cision in t = 3, I start characterizing the equilibrium from t = 2. First, consider
incumbent i’s investment decision in this period. Since T = 3, either incumbent type
chooses I2 = 0 so that γ
i
2(`2, c2) = (1− δ)c2 for both i = A,B.
Second, consider incumbent i’s institutional strategy. Given `2, his payoff from
letting `3 = `2 is given by
3
−βqid(p̂i, pi3(`2))− βqjd(p̂i, p
j
3(`2)), (D.23)
where j 6= i. On the other hand, if incumbent i chooses θi2(`2, c2) 6= `2, the optimal
choice of `3 is derived using the analysis in Proposition 2 that leads to the implicit
equation D.19. Specifically, the optimal `3 is given by the solution to
qA(p̂i − pA3 (`3))
d | pA3 (`3) |
d`3
+ qB(p̂i − pB3 (`3))
d | pB3 (`3) |
d`3
= 0. (D.24)
Then, his payoff from choosing `3 6= `2 such that D.24 is satisfied is given by
−c2 − βqid(p̂i, pi3(`3))− βqjd(p̂i, p
j
3(`3)). (D.25)
Therefore, incumbent i reforms the executive constraints whenever D.25 evaluated at
3I suppress the period-1 policy payoff in order to reduce clutter since it only depends on the
exogenously given `1.
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the optimal `3 given in D.24 is at least as great as D.23, which implies
c2
β







3(`2)) < d(p̂i, p
j
3(`3)) and d(p̂i, p
i
3(`2)) > d(p̂i, p
i













Condition D.28 indicates that incumbent i reforms the executive constraints in
t = 2 if the given cost c2 is lower than the present value of the expected net policy
benefit of reform in t = 3. This proves part 1 of Proposition 3.
Now consider t = 1 and let agent A denote the first-period incumbent without
loss of generality. If incumbent A reforms the executive constraints in t = 1 so that
θA1 (`1, c1) 6= `1, he will not reform again in t = 2 if re-elected, resulting in the following
payoff:
−c1 − I1 − βqAd(p̂A, pA2 (θA1 (`1, c1)))− βqBd(p̂A, pB2 (θA1 (`1, c1))) (D.29)
−β2qAqAd(p̂A, pA3 (θA1 (`1, c1)))− β2qAqBd(p̂A, pB3 (θA1 (`1, c1)))
−β2qBqAd(p̂A, pA3 (θB2 (θA1 (`1, c1), c2)))− β2qBqBd(p̂A, pB3 (θB2 (θA1 (`1, c1), c2))).
146
On the other hand, if he sets `2 = `1, then his dynamic payoff depends on whether
he will choose `3 = `2 in t = 2 if he is re-elected. Suppose incumbent A chooses I1
such that D.28 holds, i.e. that he would reform in t = 2 if he were re-elected. Then,
his payoff from choosing `2 = `1 is given by
−I1 − βqAd(p̂A, pA2 (`1))− βqBd(p̂A, pB2 (`1))− βqAc2 (D.30)
−β2qAqAd(p̂A, pA3 (θA2 (`1, c2)))− β2qAqBd(p̂A, pB3 (θA2 (`1, c2)))
−β2qBqAd(p̂A, pA3 (θB2 (`1, c2)))− β2qBqBd(p̂A, pB3 (θB2 (`1, c2))).
In contrast, if D.28 does not hold, his payoff from choosing `2 = `1 becomes
−I1 − βqAd(p̂A, pA2 (`1))− βqBd(p̂A, pB2 (`1)) (D.31)
−β2qAqAd(p̂A, pA3 (`1))− β2qAqBd(p̂A, pB3 (`1))
−β2qBqAd(p̂A, pA3 (θB2 (`1, c2)))− β2qBqBd(p̂A, pB3 (θB2 (`1, c2))).
Since these payoffs depend on I1, we first need to characterize its optimal choice in
each scenario.
If the optimal I1 satisfies D.28, comparing D.29 and D.30 yields the condition that
needs to hold in order for incumbent A to reform the level of executive constraints
in t = 1 as opposed to delay reform until t = 2 (and risk it since it is only with
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probability qA that he will be back in office). In this range, I1 needs to satisfy
I1 ≤ βqAd(pA3 (`1), pA3 (θA2 (`1, c2)))− βqBd(pB3 (`1), pB3 (θA2 (`1, c2)))− (1− δ)c1 (D.32)
in order for the resulting c2 to make it profitable for the potential period-2 incumbent
A to reform in that period.4 Based on D.28, inequality D.32 can be written more
concisely as
I1 ≤ εA3 (θA2 (`1, c2))− (1− δ)c1. (D.33)
First, consider the case in which incumbent A would delay reform until t = 2 by
letting `2 = `1. Then, maximizing the relevant payoff D.30 by choosing I1 subject to
D.33 yields the following first-order condition:
−1− βqA − β2qAqA(p̂A − pA3 (θA2 (`1, c2)))





−β2qAqB(p̂A − pB3 (θA2 (`1, c2)))




−β2qBqA(p̂A − pA3 (θB2 (`1, c2)))




−β2qBqB(p̂A − pB3 (θB2 (`1, c2)))









is equal to zero. However, incumbent A can manipulate his
4Note that D.28 can only hold if incumbent A has not already reformed the executive constraints
in t = 1. If not, since the optimal level of executive constraints is the same once the decision to
reform has been made, we would have `1 6= `2 = `3, resulting in c2 < 0. Since this cannot be true, it
follows that an incumbent can find it profitable to reform in t = 2 only if he himself has not reformed
in t = 1.
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opponent’s decision on whether to reform in t = 2 or not if in office by appropriately
choosing I1. Specifically, given that D.28 holds and focusing on the case in which
`2 = `1, incumbent A’s payoff from preventing his opponent from choosing `3 6= `2 if
agent B is the period-2 incumbent is given by
−I1 − βqAd(p̂A, pA2 (`1))− βqBd(p̂A, pB2 (`1))− βqAc2 (D.35)
−β2qAqAd(p̂A, pA3 (θA2 (`1, c2)))− β2qAqBd(p̂A, pB3 (θA2 (`1, c2)))
−β2qBqAd(p̂A, pA3 (`1))− β2qBqBd(p̂A, pB3 (`1)),
whereas his payoff from letting agent B reform the executive constraints under the
same scenario is given by D.30. In order to prevent agent B from choosing θB2 (`1, c2) 6=




≥ εB3 (θB2 (`1, c2)). (D.36)
Specifically, the amount of investment to prevent the potential period-2 incumbent B
from choosing θB2 (`1, c2) 6= `1 must satisfy
I1 ≥ βqBd(pB3 (`1), pB3 (θB2 (`1, c2)))− βqAd(pA3 (`1), pA3 (θB2 (`1, c2)))− (1− δ)c1. (D.37)
Since incumbent A cannot manipulate the level of `3 but only whether reform
is carried out or not, the minimum investment that achieves his desired goal is the
optimal choice of I1. Hence, if incumbent A wants to prevent the potential period-2
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incumbent B from reforming `2 = `1, he chooses I1 such that D.37 holds with equality.
This proves part 1 of Proposition 4.
On the other hand, if incumbent A has no such goal, the only inequality I1 needs
to satisfy is D.33. Since the only effect of investment in this case is on incumbent
A’s future ability to reform the executive constraints, he chooses I1 = 0.
5 Then, it is
optimal for incumbent A to prevent agent B from potentially reforming the executive
constraints whenever D.35, evaluated at the investment choice such that D.37 holds
with equality, is greater than or equal to D.30 evaluated at I1 = 0.
Still considering the case in which the optimal I1 satisfies D.28, consider the
institutional choice `2 6= `1 by incumbent A. Since he never reforms the executive
constraints twice, this scenario can never be optimal. Therefore, we conclude that if
the I1 choice is such that it is optimal for incumbent A to reform in t = 2 if he were
re-elected, he will not reform in t = 1. This leaves D.30 and D.35 as the relevant
payoffs whenever D.28 holds, depending on whether agent B will be blocked. This
comparison yields the following simplified condition:









3 (`1))− d(p̂A, pA3 (θB2 (`1, c2)))],
5Note that there would not be disinvestments in this case as he can recoup the disinvestment
only with probability qA.
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2 (`1, c2)) based on D.36. Given θ
A
1 (`1, c1) = `1 and that he would
reform in t = 2 if re-elected, the condition D.38 indicates that incumbent A is more
likely to prevent agent B from potentially reforming the executive constraints in t = 2
if the cost of preventing opponent B is low (first line in D.38), the policy cost in t = 3
in case of agent B’s election of allowing the potential period-2 incumbent B to set `3
is high (second line in D.38), and the policy benefit to incumbent A from enjoying
the weaker `3 set by his opponent B if incumbent A retakes office from agent B in
t = 3 is low (third line in D.38).
Now, consider the case in which I1 is such that D.28 does not hold. In this
scenario, comparing D.29 and D.31 yields the condition that needs to hold in order
for incumbent A to reform the level of executive constraints in t = 1 as opposed to
forgoing reform altogether. As before, we first characterize the optimal levels of I1.
Focusing on the range of I1 for which D.28 does not hold, the optimal I1 needs to
satisfy
I1 ≥ βqAd(pA3 (`1), pA3 (θA2 (`1, c2)))− βqBd(pB3 (`1), pB3 (θA2 (`1, c2)))− (1− δ)c1, (D.39)
which can again be re-written more concisely as
I1 ≥ εA3 (θA2 (`1, c2))− (1− δ)c1. (D.40)
151
However, since θA2 (`1, c2) = `1 in this scenario, D.40 reduces to
I1 ≥ −(1− δ)c1. (D.41)
First, consider the case in which incumbent A does not reform in t = 1. Maxi-
mizing the relevant payoff D.31 by choosing I1 subject to D.41 yields the following
first-order condition, which already reflects the fact that incumbent A’s period-2 in-
stitutional decision is determined under the considered case that D.28 does not hold:
−1− β2qBqA(p̂A − pA3 (θB2 (`1, c2)))





−β2qBqB(p̂A − pB3 (θB2 (`1, c2)))





Given that D.28 does not hold and focusing on the case in which `2 = `1, incumbent
A’s payoff from preventing agent B from choosing `3 6= `2 if agent B is the period-2
incumbent is given by
−I1 − βqAd(p̂A, pA2 (`1))− βqBd(p̂A, pB2 (`1)) (D.43)
−β2qAqAd(p̂A, pA3 (`1))− β2qAqBd(p̂A, pB3 (`1))
−β2qBqAd(p̂A, pA3 (`1))− β2qBqBd(p̂A, pB3 (`1)),
whereas his payoff from letting agent B pick his desired executive constraints is given
by D.31. By a similar logic, in order to prevent the potential period-2 incumbent
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B from choosing θB2 (`1, c2) 6= `1, incumbent A needs to invest an amount such that
D.36 is satisfied. Specifically, incumbent A must choose I1 such that D.37 holds
with equality. On the other hand, if incumbent A chooses to let agent B reform
the executive constraints according to his preferences, he would neither invest nor
disinvest, since he doesn’t reform in t = 2. Then, incumbent A will prevent the
potential period-2 incumbent B from reforming the executive constraints whenever
D.43, evaluated at the investment choice where D.37 holds with equality, is greater
than or equal to D.31, evaluated at I1 = 0. This comparison yields
εB3 (θ
B
















2 (`1, c2)). Condition D.44 indicates that incumbent A is more likely
to prevent agent B’s potential reform if the cost of doing so and the policy benefit
from letting agent B choose `3 = θ
B
2 (`1, c2) are low.
6
Second, still keeping the assumption that D.28 does not hold given the chosen I1,
consider the case in which `2 6= `1. Maximizing the relevant payoff D.29 by choosing
I1 subject to D.41 yields the following first-order condition, again reflecting the fact
that investment does not affect incumbent A’s institutional decision in the case under
6Specifically, the negative of the expected distance of period-3 policy from p̂A is high when the
period-3 executive constraints are set according to agent B’s preferences.
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consideration:
−1− β2qBqA(p̂A − pA3 (θB2 (θA1 (`1, c1), c2)))




1 (`1, c1), c2)
dc2
(D.45)
−β2qBqB(p̂A−pB3 (θB2 (θA1 (`1, c1), c2)))




1 (`1, c1), c2)
dc2
≤ 0.
Given that D.28 does not hold and focusing on the case in which there is immediate
reform, incumbent A’s payoff from preventing the potential period-2 incumbent B
from choosing θB2 (θ
A
1 (`1, c1), c2) 6= θA1 (`1, c1) is given by
−c1 − I1 − βqAd(p̂A, pA2 (θA1 (`1, c1)))− βqBd(p̂A, pB2 (θA1 (`1, c1))) (D.46)
−β2qAqAd(p̂A, pA3 (θA1 (`1, c1)))− β2qAqBd(p̂A, pB3 (θA1 (`1, c1)))
−β2qBqAd(p̂A, pA3 (θA1 (`1, c1)))− β2qBqBd(p̂A, pB3 (θA1 (`1, c1))).
On the other hand, his payoff from letting agent B choose θB2 (θ
A
1 (`1, c1), c2) is given by
D.29. The optimal investment set by incumbent A that would prevent the potential
period-2 incumbent B from reforming the executive constraints and the amount that
would let him choose his desired `3 are the same as in the above case that considered
`2 = `1. Hence, comparing D.46 with D.29 yields the following condition that needs to
hold in order for incumbent A to prevent the potential incumbent B from designating
`3 as he wishes, given D.28 does not hold and `2 6= `1:














1 (`1, c1)))− d(p̂A, pA3 (θB2 (θA1 (`1, c1), c2)))].
The above inequality has a similar interpretation as the previous conditions D.38 and
D.44. Since all three conditions D.38, D.44, and D.47 yield the same conclusion,
I focus on D.38 for its relative simplicity in order to derive the conditions on the
parameters of the model that need to hold in order for incumbent A to find it profitable
to block his opponent B’s potential institutional decision in t = 2 by investing the
necessary amount I1 that makes D.37 hold with equality.
Substitute the expression for εB3 (θ
B
2 (`1, c2)) into D.38 and re-arrange to get





2 (`1, c2))), p
B




2 (`1, c2))), p
A
3 (`1))] ≥ 0,




2 (`1, c2)) based on D.36. Further simplifying yields





2 (`1, c2))), p
B
3 (`1))[1 + β] ≥ 0.
To re-iterate, this is the condition that needs to hold in order for incumbent A to pre-
vent agent B from reforming the executive constraints in a particular scenario. There
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are two other conditions pertaining to different scenarios, but they yield the same
relationships as D.49. This condition implies that incumbent A becomes more likely




2 (`1, c2))), p
B
3 (`1))
increase and d(pA3 (θ
B
2 (`1, c2))), p
A
3 (`1)) decreases. This proves part 2 of Proposition 4.
In order to complete the proof of Proposition 3, we now return to analyzing the
conditions that need to hold in order for incumbent A to prefer one reform path over
another. Note that there are three possible decisions he can make in t = 1: Reform
the executive constraints immediately, delay reform until t = 2 with the expectation
of re-election, or never reform. Since an incumbent never reforms twice, we need to
focus on the cases in which D.28 does not hold in order to see when immediate reform
is optimal for incumbent A.
Suppose D.47 holds such that incumbent A finds it profitable to prevent his oppo-
nent’s institutional decision in t = 2. Then, to see when immediate reform is preferred
by incumbent A over foregoing reform altogether, we first need to compare D.46 with














1 (`1, c1)), p
A
2 (`1))[1 + β].
Second, we need to compare D.46 with D.31, which is the payoff from letting `2 = `1
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1 (`1, c1)), p
A
2 (`1))[1 + βqA].
Conditions D.50 and D.51 both imply that incumbent A prefers immediate reform over
foregoing reform altogether whenever c1, qB, and the policy cost to him of reforming
in case agent B becomes the incumbent are low, and qA and the policy benefit of
reforming in case of his re-election is high. On the other hand, if we suppose D.47
does not hold so that incumbent A does not invest sufficiently to block his opponent
B, we need to compare D.29 with the same payoffs D.43 and D.31, which yield the
same relationships and hence are not repeated here.
Now consider incumbent A’s decision between delaying reform until t = 2 and
foregoing reform altogether. Suppose D.38 holds so that incumbent A would prevent
his opponent from choosing `3 6= `2. Then, we compare D.35 with D.43 and D.31
as in the above paragraph in order to obtain the condition that needs to hold for
incumbent A to prefer delaying reform until t = 2 as opposed to never reforming.
These comparisons respectively yield the following conditions:








































where I1 is again such that D.37 holds with equality. Conditions D.52 and D.53 both
imply that incumbent A prefers to delay reform over foregoing reform altogether
whenever c1 and qB are low. On the other hand, if we suppose that D.38 does not
hold so that incumbent A will not block his opponent, then we compare the same two
payoffs D.43 and D.31 with D.30. As these comparisons yield a similar relationship
as observed in D.52 and D.53, this exercise is not repeated here. These comparisons
together prove part 2 of Proposition 3.
Finally, to see when immediate reform may be preferred to delaying until t = 2, we
compare D.50 versus D.52, and D.51 versus D.53. These comparisons indicate that
immediate reform is more likely to be preferred over delaying whenever (1− δ)c1 + I1
is high. Together with the above inequalities, this proves part 3 of Proposition 3 and
hence completes the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4.
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Appendix E
Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Based on 3.8 and 3.9, the first-order conditions for the parties’








≥ 0 if ζ1(z) > w1
= 0 if ζ1(z) ∈ [0, w1]










≥ 0 if ζ2(z) > w2
= 0 if ζ2(z) ∈ [0, w2]
≤ 0 if ζ2(z) = 0.
(E.2)
Solving for ζ1(z) and ζ2(z) based on E.1 and E.2 implies that the unique pair of
campaign spending rules (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) is given by one of the following four equilibrium
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candidates, depending on the outcome of the bargaining stage:
1. (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (w1, w2) if and only if ε1(z) ≥ (w1+w2)
2
w2




2. (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (w1,
√







3. (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (
√




















Notice that if the challenge stage equilibrium is such that ζk(z) = wk, then ζk(z) is
constant in the value of εk(z). On the other hand, if ζk(z) =
√
w−kεk(z) − w−k or
if we have an interior equilibrium as characterized in item four above, then ζk(z) is
increasing in the value of εk(z). This is straightforward to see for the first case. To see
this for the interior challenge stage equilibrium, differentiate ζk(z) as characterized in
item four with respect to the value of εk(z) ≡ ε̄k to get
(2ε̄k ε̄−k)(ε̄k + ε̄−k)
2 − (2ε̄2k ε̄−k)(ε̄k + ε̄−k)
(ε̄k + ε̄−k)4
, (E.3)
whose both numerator and denominator are positive. Hence, we conclude that the
interior equilibrium level of campaign spending of each party k is increasing in the
value of εk(z). This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Using backward induction, I first characterize the equilibrium
acceptance strategy a2(z) of party 2 for any given proposal z.
If party 2 accepts party 1’s proposal z, its payoff would be given by u2(z) with
certainty. Since it is risk-neutral, party 2 will accept any offer that yields a sure
payoff of u2(z) that is at least as great as its expected payoff from the challenge stage
equilibrium that would be observed based on ε1(z) and ε2(z).
Given w1, w2, and the status-quo bill s, suppose party 1 makes an offer z such
that εk(z) ≥ (w1+w2)
2
w−k
for both k. If rejected, this offer would imply (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) =
(w1, w2). Therefore, given ρ1(z) = Z and ρ2(z) = S in any challenge stage equilib-







[u2(z)− u2(s)]− w2. (E.4)
Comparing the sure payoff u2(z) with E.4 implies that party 2 accepts z if and only
if u2(z) ≥ u2(s)− (w1 +w2), which can also be written as ε2(z) ≤ w1 +w2. However,







w1 +w2, the acceptance criteria can never be satisfied. Therefore, any proposal z that
would pave the way for a challenge stage with (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (w1, w2) if rejected will
be rejected by party 2.
Second, suppose party 1 makes an offer z such that the conditions for a challenge
stage equilibrium in which (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (w1,
√
w1ε2(z)− w1) as listed in item two
in the proof of Lemma 1 are satisfied. This offer implies the following expected payoff
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w1ε2(z) + w1. (E.5)
Comparing the sure payoff u2(z) with E.5 implies that party 2 accepts z if and only
if










where the last term is negative since ζ2(z) =
√











which reduces to ε2(z) ≤ w1. Therefore, party 2 will accept any proposal z that would
imply a subsequent challenge stage with (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (w1,
√
w1ε2(z)−w1) as long
as ε2(z) ≤ w1.
Third, suppose party 1 makes an offer z such that the equilibrium campaign
spending if z were rejected is given by (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (
√
w2ε1(z) − w2, w2). The





[u2(z)− u2(s)]− w2. (E.8)
Then, party 2 accepts any offer z that yields a sure payoff of u2(z) that is at least as
great as E.8, which reduces to the condition that z must satisfy ε2(z) ≤
√
w2ε1(z).










Therefore, party 2 will reject all offers that would subsequently lead to a challenge
stage with (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (
√
w2ε1(z)− w2, w2).
Finally, suppose party 1’s offer z is such that the equilibrium campaign spending
in any challenge to z would be given by the interior equilibrium as listed in item four
in the proof of Lemma 1. Constructing the expected payoff from the challenge stage
as in the above cases yields the condition that z must satisfy ε2(z) ≤ ζ1(z) + ζ2(z)
in order to be accepted by party 2. Plugging in the equilibrium values of ζ1(z) and





which reduces to the condition that party 2 will accept any offer z for which u2(z) ≥
u2(s) whenever the subsequent challenge stage equilibrium if z is rejected would be
an interior one.
Bringing together the above characterization of party 2’s acceptance rules for
each possible challenge stage equilibrium, we observe that any proposal z for which
ζ2(z) = w2 is rejected (although these are not the only offers that will be rejected).
In addition, whenever z is such that ζ2(z) < w2, party 2 accepts any offer for which
ε2(z) ≤ w1 if ζ1(z) = w1 and any offer for which u2(z) ≥ u2(s) if ζ1(z) < w1. This
proves part 1 of Proposition 1.
Given the equilibrium acceptance strategy of party 2 for any proposal z, I now
solve for party 1’s optimal proposals. In the rest of Proposition 1, part 2 solves for
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the best way to induce unanimity, whereas part 3 solves for the optimal proposal that
would push the game to the challenge stage.
Suppose that party 1 will make an offer that will get party 2’s acceptance, thereby
avoiding a challenge stage. The proof of part 1 indicated that there exist two methods
with which party 1 can induce unanimity in the parliament: By offering z such that
a) ε1(z) ≥ w1ε2(z)√
w1ε2(z)−w1
and ε2(z) ≤ w1; or b) εk(z)
2ε−k(z)
(ε1(z)+ε2(z))2
< wk for both k and
u2(z) ≥ u2(s). Since the first method implies that party 1 only needs to propose a z
for which u2(z) = u2(s)− w1, whereas the second method requires u2(z) = u2(s) for
acceptance, party 1 would choose the first method if it wanted to induce unanimity.1
To solve for the specifics of this offer, party 1 maximizes u1(z) subject to party 1’s
acceptance constraint u2(z) ≥ u2(s)− w1 and the technical constraint z ∈ [0, 1]× Y .
The Lagrangian of this problem can be written as follows:
L = −(x− x̂1)2 + αy1 + λ1[−(x− x̂2)2 + α(1− y1)− u2(s) + w1] (E.10)
+µ1x− µ2(x− 1) + γ1y1 − γ2(y − 1).
The first-order conditions for E.10 are x ∈ [0, 1], y1 ∈ [0, 1], λ1 ≥ 0, µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0,
γ1 ≥ 0, γ2 ≥ 0,
−2(x− x̂1)− 2λ1(x− x̂2) + (µ1 − µ2) ≤ 0; (E.11)
[−2(x− x̂1)− 2λ1(x− x̂2) + (µ1 − µ2)]x = 0; (E.12)
1To rule out extreme parameter cases such that no proposal z would justify ζ1(z) = w1, I impose
the restriction that if ε2(z) ≤ (w1+w2)
2
w1




, which implies ε1(z)ε2(z) ≥ (w1)
2.
This assumption ensures that we can restrict our attention to the first of the two methods for
inducing unanimity.
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α− λ1α + (γ1 − γ2) ≤ 0; (E.13)
[α− λ1α + (γ1 − γ2)]y1 = 0; (E.14)
−(x− x̂2)2 + α(1− y1)− u2(s) + w1 ≥ 0; (E.15)
[−(x− x̂2)2 + α(1− y1)− u2(s) + w1]λ1 = 0; (E.16)
along with µ1x = 0; µ2(1− x) = 0; γ1y1 = 0; and γ2(1− y1) = 0. An interior solution





Solving for y2 using the fact that party 1 will not make an offer z that gives party 2







− (q − x̂2)2 + αyq2 − w1
]
. (E.18)
Therefore, an equilibrium proposal z characterized by the ideology component in E.17
and the rent component with y2 as given in E.18 and y1 = 1− y2 induces an optimal













Therefore, the difference between the rent shares of the two parties is given by










Notice that this difference increases as party 2’s status-quo payoff decreases and w1
increases.
Now consider possible corner solutions to this maximization problem. First, I
claim that there exists no solution with x = 0 or x = 1. To see this, first let
µ1 > 0 and µ2 = γ1 = γ2 = 0. This yields λ1 = 1 as before, resulting in the
equality 2x̂1 + 2x̂2 + µ1 = 0. Since this would imply µ1 < 0, the desired result is
achieved. Second, let µ2 > 0 and µ1 = γ1 = γ2 = 0. This situation yields the equality
−4 + 2x̂1 + 2x̂2−µ2 = 0, implying that µ2 must be negative. Hence, we can conclude
that the optimal ideology component of z must be such that x ∈ (0, 1).
Second, I claim that solutions with y1 = 0 or y1 = 1 are possible for certain values




. Then, the condition (x− x̂1) + λ1(x− x̂2) = 0 implies
x− x̂1
x− x̂2







which can hold for small values of α, yielding y1 = 0. In this situation, party 1 chooses
x closer to x̂1. Likewise, letting γ2 > 0 implies
x− x̂1
x− x̂2







which can hold for larger values of the parameter α, yielding y1 = 1. Here, party 1
chooses x closer to x̂2 in order to secure party 2’s acceptance. This concludes the
proof of part 2 of Proposition 1.
For part 3, suppose that party 1 will make an offer that will lead to a challenge
on the equilibrium path. Note that of the four methods with which party 1 can
push the bill into a challenge as summarized in part 1, two of these methods involve
proposals that would imply ζ2(z) = w2 in the referendum. In this case, the optimal
z is such that x = x̂1, y1 = 1, and y2 = 0. This is due to the fact that once party 2
starts spending a constant sum of w2, the proposal z no longer affects the probability
of winning for party 1. Therefore, party 1 maximizes its expected payoff from the
referendum by maximizing the value of ε1(z).
To see when inducing a challenge stage equilibrium with ζ2(z) < w2 would be
preferred to one with ζ2(z) = w2, I focus on the challenge stage equilibrium in which
(ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (w1,
√
w1ε2(z) − w1), which arises if the rejected proposal z is such








.2 For any proposal z that satisfies







maximizing which subject to the above conditions yields x = x̂1+x̂2
2
.
Party 1 prefers this challenge stage equilibrium with proposal z to the one in which
2This is also justified by the parameter restriction imposed in Footnote 1.
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, the probability of winning is
always at least as high for party 1 on the left-hand side of E.24 as on the right-hand
side of it. Therefore, this inequality needs the proposal z that would induce the
challenge stage equilibrium with (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (w1,
√





(α− u1(s)), (α− u1(s))
]
(E.25)




(α−u1(s)), party 1 prefers the challenge stage equilibrium with
ζ2(z) = w2. Since the optimal proposal to induce a challenge with ζ2(z) < w2 involves
equal compromise on ideology, ε1(z) decreases as (x̂1 − x̂2)2 increases. This proves
part 3 of Proposition 1.3
Proof of Proposition 2. If party 1 induces unanimity by offering u2(z) = u2(s)− w1,











+ (q − x̂2)2 + αyq1 + w1. (E.26)
Suppose the parties are sufficiently distant ideologically so that party 1 prefers a
3Carrying out similar comparisons between other types of challenge stage equilibria yield similar
results and hence are not repeated here.
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challenge stage equilibrium with ζ2(z) = w2. With the optimal proposal given by




[α− u1(s)]− w1 (E.27)














Comparing E.26 first with E.27 suggests that party 1 becomes more likely to
prefer a settlement over a challenge for low values of u2(s), and high values of w1
and w2. Comparing E.26 with E.28 confirms the relationship with u2(s) and w1.
However, differentiating E.28 with respect to w2 indicates that higher values of w2
make settlement more likely to be preferred only if w2 < α− u1(s).
To complete the proof, suppose that the parties are ideologically closer so that
party 1 would prefer a challenge stage equilibrium with ζ2(z) < w2. Focusing on
the equilibrium with (ζ1(z), ζ2(z)) = (w1,
√
w1ε2(z) − w1), party 1’s expected payoff









. Comparing E.26 with E.23 confirms the above results on u2(s)
and w1. Therefore, we can conclude that a lower u2(s) and a higher w1 unambiguously
make settlement more likely to be observed. This completes the proof of Proposition
2.
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Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is an application of the main result in Baik (2008) for
players with a budget constraint.









≥ 0 if C1Z(z) > w1 + wh
= 0 if C1Z(z) ∈ [0, w1 + wh]
≤ 0 if C1Z(z) = 0.
(E.29)









≥ 0 if ChZ(z) > w1 + wh
= 0 if ChZ(z) ∈ [0, w1 + wh]
≤ 0 if ChZ(z) = 0.
(E.30)
Accordingly, the individual campaign spending of parties 1 and h must satisfy the








≥ 0 if ζ1(z) > w1
= 0 if ζ1(z) ∈ [0, w1]










≥ 0 if ζh(z) > wh
= 0 if ζh(z) ∈ [0, wh]
≤ 0 if ζh(z) = 0.
(E.32)
First, suppose that C1Z(z) ≤ w1 so that solving E.29 yields C1Z(z) =
√
ε1(z)CS(z)−
CS(z). Then, the individual best response of party 1 to its partner must also be less
than or equal to w1. Furthermore, it must equal C
1
Z(z). By the assumption in
Lemma 2 that ε1(z) ≥ εh(z), it must be true that C1Z(z) ≥ ChZ(z). Therefore, the best
response of party h to party 1’s best response of choosing C1Z(z) for any given ζh(z) is
to spend a zero amount on the group’s campaign. In equilibrium, simultaneous best
responding implies ζ1(z) = C
1
Z(z) and ζ2(z) = 0 for a total equilibrium campaign
spending of CZ(z) = C
1
Z(z). This proves part 1 of Lemma 2.
For part 2, suppose that ChZ(z) ≥ w1 + wh, which implies C1Z(z) ≥ w1 + wh.
Then, the individual best response of each party to the other must be greater than
its respective budget. This implies that we must have ζ1(z) = w1 and ζh(z) = wh in
equilibrium, for a total campaign spending of CZ(z) = w1 + wh. This proves part 2
of Lemma 2.
For the final part of the lemma, suppose the proposal z is such that C1Z(z) > w1
and ChZ(z) ≤ w1 + wh. First, consider the case in which ChZ(z) ≤ w1. For any
ζ1(z) ∈ [ChZ(z), w1], party h’s individual best response to party 1 is to choose a
zero amount of campaign spending since ζ1(z) ≥ ChZ(z). This would imply a total
campaign spending of CZ(z) ∈ [ChZ(z), w1]. However, since C1Z(z) > w1, this cannot
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be optimal for party 1. Specifically, party 1 would have an incentive to increase its
spending up to w1. Similarly, for any ζ1(z) < C
h
Z(z), party h best responds by choosing
ζh(z) = C
h
Z(z) − ζ1(z), resulting in a total campaign spending of CZ(z) = ChZ(z).
However, since C1Z(z) > C
h
Z(z), this also cannot be optimal for party 1. Therefore,
the only equilibrium occurs at ζ1(z) = w1 and ζ2(z) = 0, yielding CZ(z) = w1. In this
case, party 1 cannot increase its individual spending since it is already exhausting its
budget and does not have an incentive to decrease it since C1Z(z) > w1. Party h does
not have an incentive to increase its spending either since ChZ(z) ≤ w1. Therefore, if
C1Z(z) > w1 and C
h
Z(z) ≤ w1, the equilibrium is such that ζ1(z) = w1 and ζ2(z) = 0.
Second, consider the case in which w1 < C
h
Z(z) ≤ w1 + w2. We know that any
ζ1(z) < w1 cannot be an equilibrium, since party h would best respond to it by
choosing ζh(z) = C
h
Z(z) − ζ1(z) and the resulting total campaign spending CZ(z) =
ChZ(z) would be suboptimal from party 1’s point of view. Specifically, party 1 would
have an incentive to increase its spending from ζ1(z) < w1 to w1. Therefore, the
only equilibrium is such that ζ1(z) = w1 and ζh(z) = C
h
Z(z) − w1, yielding the same
CZ(z) = C
h
Z(z). This completes the proof of part 3 of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3. Lemma 2 characterized the optimal campaign spending of parties
1 and h within the group NZ . For any given CZ(z), the optimal campaign spending
of the only member of group NS, party j, is such that

















≥ 0 if ζj(z) > wj
= 0 if ζj(z) ∈ [0, wj]
≤ 0 if ζj(z) = 0,
(E.34)
where CZ(z) = ζ1(z) + ζh(z). Note that party j cares only about CZ(z) and not
about how its burden is shared among the members of group NZ . Thus, for any given
CZ(z), party j best responds by choosing a campaign spending equal to either wj or√
εj(z)CZ(z)− CZ(z), whichever is smaller.
To solve for the best response of group NZ to any given amount of CS(z), first
suppose the proposal z is such that ε1(z) ≥ εh(z). Based on E.29 and E.30, the best




ε1(z)CS(z)− CS(z) if C1Z(z) < w1
w1 + wh if C
h
Z(z) ≥ w1 + wh
max{w1, ChZ(z)} if C1Z(z) > w1 and ChZ(z) ≤ w1 + wh.
(E.35)
On the other hand, if the proposal z is such that εh(z) ≥ ε1(z), then the best response
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εh(z)CS(z)− CS(z) if ChZ(z) < wh
w1 + wh if C
1
Z(z) ≥ w1 + wh
max{wh, C1Z(z)} if ChZ(z) > wh and C1Z(z) ≤ w1 + wh.
(E.36)
Thus, solving for the unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the challenge stage in which
both groups are simultaneously best responding to each other yields the following
candidates for the equilibrium triplet (ζ1(z), ζh(z), ζj(z)):
1. (ζ1(z), ζh(z), ζj(z)) = (
√




; and εj(z) ≥ ε1(z)wj√
ε1(z)wj−wj
.

















3. (ζ1(z), ζh(z), ζj(z)) = (w1,max{
√
εh(z)wj−wj−w1, 0}, wj) if and only if ε1(z) ≥
εh(z); ε1(z) ≥ (w1+wj)
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wj
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εh(z)wj−wj
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5. (ζ1(z), ζh(z), ζj(z)) = (max{
√
ε1(z)wj−wj−wh, 0}, wh, wj) if and only if εh(z) ≥
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, where ε̄(z) ≡ max{ε1(z), εh(z)}.
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εj(z)wh − wh} < wj.
In each of these equilibrium candidates, it can be observed that ζk(z) is increasing
as the value of εk(z) increases. In addition, party h free-rides on party 1’s campaign
spending only if the proposal z is such that ε1(z) ≥ εh(z). This can be seen by
inspecting the above candidates in which ζh(z) = 0 and ζh(z) = C
h
Z(z) − w1. This
completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consistent with backward induction, I first focus on the ac-
ceptance strategies a2(z) and a3(z) of the non-proposer parties 2 and 3 for any given
proposal z. Each party’s payoff from voting to accept or reject the proposal de-
pends on the other party’s vote. First, for any given proposal z, if ak(z) = 1 for
both k, then each party k gets a sure payoff of uk(z). Second, if a2(z) = 1 and
a3(z) = 0, then the bill moves to a challenge stage in which ρ1(z) = ρ2(z) = Z and
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ρ3(z) = S, with the associated equilibrium campaign spending of each party given by
(ζ1(z), ζ2(z), ζ3(z)). In this case, each party’s receives an expected payoff determined
by the specified challenge. Third, if a2(z) = 0 and a3(z) = 1, the challenge stage
features ρ1(z) = ρ3(z) = Z and ρ2(z) = S, along with each party’s associated equi-
librium campaign spending. Finally, if ak(z) = 0 for both parties, then each party k
receives its status-quo payoff uk(s).
For any given proposal z, a2(z) = 1 is a dominant strategy for party 2 if a) u2(z)
is at least as great as its expected payoff from a challenge with ρ1(z) = ρ3(z) = Z and
ρ2(z) = S; and b) its expected payoff from a challenge with ρ1(z) = ρ2(z) = Z and
ρ3(z) = S is at least as great as u2(s). Similarly, a3(z) = 1 is a dominant strategy
for party 3 if a) u3(z) is at least as great as its expected payoff from a challenge with
ρ1(z) = ρ2(z) = Z and ρ3(z) = S; and b) its expected payoff from a challenge with
ρ1(z) = ρ3(z) = Z and ρ2(z) = S is at least as great as u3(s).
In order for party 1 to induce unanimity as the unique equilibrium outcome of
the game, the proposal z must be such that the following conditions based on the
non-proposer parties’ acceptance strategies hold:4
• uk(z) is at least as great as party k’s expected payoff from a challenge with
ρk(z) = S for k = 2, 3;
• The following two conditions for k = 2, 3 do not simultaneously hold: uk(s) is
at least as great as party k’s expected payoff from a challenge with ρk(z) = Z.
To solve for the optimal proposal z from party 1’s perspective that would induce
4I again assume that a party k votes to accept a proposal z when indifferent.
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unanimity in the parliament by satisfying the above conditions, we need to find the
unanimity-inducing offer z for each of the possible challenge stage equilibrium can-
didates identified in Lemma 3 and compare party 1’s unanimity payoff for all such
offers.
I first focus on the first five equilibrium candidates listed in the proof of Lemma 3
in which ζj(z) = wj. Consider a proposal z such that ε1(z) ≤ (w1+wj)
2
wj
, ε1(z) ≥ εh(z),
and εj(z) ≥ ε1(z)wj√
ε1(z)wj−wj
, which would give rise to a challenge stage equilibrium listed
in item one if rejected. Suppose party 1 chooses h = 2 and j = 3 so that if rejected,
this proposal would imply a challenge stage equilibrium with ρ2(z) = Z, ρ3(z) = S,
and (ζ1(z), ζ2(z), ζ3(z)) = (
√
ε1(z)w3−w3, 0, w3). Party 3’s expected payoff from this











Then, party 3 accepts this offer if and only if u3(z) is at least as great as E.37, which
implies that we must have ε3(z) ≤
√
ε1(z)w3.
To derive party 2’s acceptance condition, suppose that party 1 now chooses
h = 3 and j = 2 so that this offer goes to a challenge in which ρ2(z) = S and
ρ3(z) = Z. In this scenario, the equilibrium levels of campaign spending are given by
(ζ1(z), ζ2(z), ζ3(z)) = (
√













Then, party 2 accepts this offer if and only if ε2(z) ≤
√
ε1(z)w2.
In order for unanimity to be realized, the additional condition that uk(s) is not at
least as great as party k’s expected payoff from a challenge with ρk(z) = Z for both
k = 2, 3 needs to be met. To check for this, construct party k’s expected payoff from











The condition that uk(s) is at least as great as E.39 reduces to uk(s) ≥ uk(z) for
k = 2, 3. Thus, unanimity requires that u2(s) ≥ u2(z) and u3(s) ≥ u3(z) are not
simultaneously true for proposal z.
First, suppose without loss of generality that the proposal z is such that u2(s) <
u2(z). Then, the conditions that need to hold for unanimity are u2(z) ≥ u2(s) and
u3(z) ≥ u3(s) −
√
ε1(z)w3. Since the challenge stage equilibrium under considera-
tion requires that ε2(z) ≤ ε1(z) ≤ (w1+w3)
2
w3
and ε3(z) ≥ ε1(z)w3√
ε1(z)w3−w3
, bringing these
conditions together with the parties’ acceptance criteria implies the following: Party




exists no proposal z that simultaneously satisfies ε3(z) ≥ ε1(z)w3√
ε1(z)w3−w3
and party 3’s
acceptance criteria. Second, suppose the proposal z is such that u3(s) < u3(z).
Carrying out the same analysis as above this time yields the result that party 2’s
acceptance criteria cannot be reconciled with the equilibrium conditions on z. There-
fore, any proposal z that would imply a subsequent challenge stage equilibrium with
(ζ1(z), ζh(z), ζj(z)) = (
√
ε1(z)wj − wj, 0, wj) if rejected cannot induce unanimity in
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the parliament.
Carrying out the same analysis for equilibrium candidates numbered two through
five in the proof of Lemma 3 yields the same result as the first equilibrium candidate
above. In the interest of space, each of these analyses will not be presented separately.
As a result, we can conclude that any proposal z for which ζj(z) = wj will be rejected
by party j ∈ NS. This proves part 1 of Proposition 3.
Consider the sixth equilibrium candidate listed in the proof of Lemma 3 in which










. Based on their expected payoffs, the acceptance cri-
teria for parties k = 2, 3 become εk(z) ≤ 0. Moreover, if a proposal z meets either
one of these acceptance criteria, then the final condition for achieving unanimity is
also met. Therefore, if party 1 wanted to induce unanimity with a proposal z that
would lead to the challenge stage equilibrium in item six if rejected, it chooses z in
order to maximize u1(z) subject to the parties’ acceptance criteria and the equilib-
rium conditions. Solving this program yields the following two alternative optimal
unanimity-inducing offers: First, party 1 can choose x = x̂1+x̂3
2
, thereby compromising
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Second, it can choose x = x̂1+x̂2
2




αyq1 + (q − x̂2)2 + (q − x̂3)2 −
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αyq3 − (q − x̂3)2 +
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Having solved for the optimal way to induce unanimity with a proposal that
would induce a challenge stage equilibrium as listed in item six if rejected, now
consider the seventh equilibrium candidate characterized by (ζ1(z), ζh(z), ζj(z)) =
(w1, wh,
√
εj(z)(w1 + wh) − w1 − wh). Based on their expected payoffs, the accep-
tance criteria of parties k = 2, 3 become εk(z) ≤ w1 + w−k. Moreover, the final




for at least one
k ∈ {2, 3}. Without loss of generality, suppose that this condition holds for party 2.
Then, the unanimity conditions yield ε3(z) ≤ w1 + w2 and ε2(z) ≤ w2. Confirming
that there exist proposals z that can simultaneously satisfy these and the equilib-
rium conditions for item seven, party 1 maximizes u1(z) by choosing z subject to
the above two constraints. Solving this program yields the following two alternative
unanimity-inducing offers: First, party 1 can choose x = x̂1+x̂3
2





αyq1 + w1 + (q − x̂2)2 + (q − x̂3)2 −
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αyq1 + w1 + (q − x̂2)2 + (q − x̂3)2 −
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αyq3 + w3 − (q − x̂3)2 +
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. A similar analy-
sis suggests that there again exist two unanimity-inducing offers corresponding to two
different acceptance criteria: First, u2(z) ≥ u2(s)−w1 and u3(z) ≥ u3(s); and second
u2(z) ≥ u2(s) and u3(z) ≥ u3(s) − w1. Checking that there exist proposals z that
satisfy both the acceptance criteria and the equilibrium conditions, we can proceed
with party 1’s maximization problem. If party 1 chooses a unanimity-inducing offer
z based on the first acceptance criteria, the offer z involves x = x̂1+x̂3
2
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On the other hand, if it chooses the offer based on the second acceptance criteria, the
offer z now involves x = x̂1+x̂2
2













αyq3 − w1 − (q − x̂3)2 +
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The ninth equilibrium candidate is similar to the sixth candidate in the sense that
the partners completely free-ride in both cases and the groups fight unconstrained
against each other. The only difference is the identity of the partner. Thus, partner
party h’s acceptance criteria is stricter, requiring a higher premium from party 1.
Thus, this way to induce unanimity will never be optimal for party 1.
Finally, consider the tenth equilibrium candidate, which implies the following
alternative acceptance criteria: First, u3(z) ≥ u3(s) and u2(z) ≥ u2(s) + w2, and
second u3(z) ≥ u3(s)+w3 and u2(z) ≥ u2(s). If party 1 chooses a unanimity-inducing
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On the other hand, if it chooses this offer based on the second acceptance criteria,
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The above analysis indicates that the utility each party settles for in a grand bargain
reflects its strength in the post-bargaining stage. To see this, first consider equilibrium
candidate seven in which both members of group NZ fight against NS with all their
resources. In this case, the two parties who would belong to NZ if the proposal z
is rejected can each extract a premium equal to their campaigning budgets from the
party that would belong to NS in a grand bargain. In the equilibrium candidate
eight, the non-proposer partner party is at least partially free-riding on party 1’s
campaign spending. Thus, party 1 is able to extract from its partner an amount
equal to its campaigning budget when inducing a settlement. Equilibrium candidate
ten demonstrates the reverse of this situation with party 1 free-riding on its partner’s
campaign spending. This proves part 2 of Proposition 3.
Part 3 of the proposition describes the optimal way for the proposer to induce
unanimity. Comparing the maximum value of u1(z) from a unanimous agreement
in each of the cases considered above, it can be observed that party 1 can secure
the maximum payoff from unanimity with a proposal z that satisfies the equilibrium
conditions of items seven or eight. Although the optimal z that induces unanimity
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in these two cases is different, they both imply the same sure-payoff for party 1.
Specifically, for each of these cases, party 1 can induce unanimity by proposing either
x = x̂1+x̂3
2
and E.46 for itself, or x = x̂1+x̂2
2
and E.49 for itself. Its rent share in either
of these cases indicates that it is increasing in yq1, w1, (q− x̂2), and (q− x̂3). Moreover,
since each party gets compensated for their ideological utility loss in the grand bargain
through its rent share as can be observed in E.47, E.48, E.50, and E.51, party 1’s
unanimity payoff strictly increases as the three parties get ideologically closer. This
completes the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4. In order to analyze the optimal proposals to get to a given
challenge stage equilibrium for party 1, I first focus on the non-proposer parties’ voting
strategies. In order for a proposal z to induce a unique challenge stage equilibrium
with ρh(z) = Z and ρj(z) = S for h, j ∈ {2, 3} and h 6= j, the following conditions
must hold:
• Party h’s expected payoff from a challenge with ρh(z) = Z must be at least as
great as uh(s);
• Party j’s expected payoff from a challenge with ρj(z) = S must be at least as
great as uj(z);
• The following conditions do not simultaneously hold: Party h’s expected payoff
from a challenge with ρh(z) = S is at least as great as uh(z); and party j’s
expected payoff from a challenge with ρj(z) = Z is at least as great as uj(s).
Consider the challenge stage equilibrium candidate listed in item one in the proof of
184
Lemma 3. In order to induce a challenge stage equilibrium with ρh(z) = Z, ρj(z) = S,
and (ζ1(z), ζh(z), ζj(z)) = (
√
ε1(z)wj −wj, 0, wj), party 1’s proposal z must meet the
corresponding equilibrium conditions, satisfy party h’s acceptance criteria, and violate
party j’s acceptance criteria. The analysis in Proposition 3 indicated that party j will
reject any offer z that would give rise to this equilibrium if rejected. In addition,
among the range of proposals that would give rise to this challenge if rejected in the




In equilibrium, party 1 will not offer any higher surplus to party h than is required
to get its acceptance. Thus, the optimal z to induce this challenge will be such that
uh(z) = uh(s). Moreover, since ζj(z) = wj for any proposal z in this range, party 1
cannot influence the amount of CS(z). Thus, the proposal z need not worry about
party j’s rejection as long as it satisfies the equilibrium conditions. The Lagrangian




































Proceeding with a similar analysis for the remaining equilibrium candidates yields
the result that the optimal proposal z to induce any challenge stage equilibrium in-
volves offering x = x̂1+x̂h
2
. Since party h requires at least uh(s) in order to become
party 1’s partner in a challenge regardless of how much it will spend, it can be ob-
served from E.63 and E.64 that party 1’s winning prize increases as yqh decreases,
(q − x̂h)2 increases, and it gets ideologically closer to party h. Moreover, since εh(z)
increases as uh(s) decreases for any proposal z, Lemma 3 indicates that ζh(z) would
be weakly higher, thus weakly increasing the proposal’s winning probability. There-
fore, party 1’s expected payoff would increase. This proves part 1 of Proposition 4.
Part 2 of Proposition 4 is concerned with how party 1’s expected payoff from a
challenge is affected by its partner’s campaigning budget. In the interest of brevity,
I do not present here the solutions for the optimal proposals that would induce each
possible challenge stage equilibrium. Instead, I focus on two examples that demon-
strate party 1’s different incentives with regards to the other parties’ campaigning
budgets.
Consider the equilibrium candidate listed in item two in the proof of Lemma 3.
Solving for the optimal proposal to induce this particular challenge equilibrium yields
x = x̂1+x̂h
2




























As a result, party 1’s maximum expected payoff from this type of challenge becomes
(
w1 + wh
















Differentiating E.67 with respect to wh yields
(wj)
2ε1(z)− 2(w1 + wh)(w1 + wh + wj)
(w1 + wh + wj)2wj
(E.68)
where ε1(z) is calculated using the optimal proposal and equals the expression in
brackets in E.67. The sign of this expression depends on the parameters of the
model. Specifically, it is negative if
ε1(z) <
2(w1 + wh)(w1 + wh + wj)
(wj)2
, (E.69)
and positive otherwise. Thus, we conclude that a higher wh decreases party 1’s
expected payoff from the type of challenge in item 2 of Lemma 3 if ε1(z) is sufficiently
small, which happens if u1(s) is large, or if w1 or wh are high. Analyzing other
equilibrium candidates in which ζh(z) > 0 indicates that this relationship holds more
generally. This proves part 2 of Proposition 4.
For Part 3, consider party 1’s decision on the identity of party h. Since a lower
uh(s) and higher uj(s) necessarily increase party 1’s expected payoff in any challenge
equilibrium, it follows that holding everything else constant, party 1 would prefer to
partner with the party that commands the lower status-quo payoff.
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To see how the partner decision is affected by the parties’ campaigning budgets,
consider an alternative challenge equilibrium in which the proposal z is such that
ζh(z) = 0. Since it has already been analyzed, I focus on the equilibrium given in the
first item in Lemma 3. With the proposal z given by x = x̂1+x̂h
2
, yj = 0, y1 as in E.63,







ε1(z) + u1(s), (E.70)





+ yqj + (q − x̂1)2 + (q − x̂h)2. It can be observed from
E.70 that it does not depend on wh and depends negatively on wj. Furthermore, this
relationship holds in other challenge equilibrium candidates in which ζh(z) = 0. Thus,
party 1 would prefer to have as its opponent the party with the lower campaigning
budget in such challenge equilibria. The rest of the proposition follows from the
analysis for part 2. Thus, this completes the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5. Analyzing party 1’s incentives between inducing a grand bar-
gain and a challenge requires comparing its maximum payoff from each of the two
outcomes. However, since the type of challenge equilibrium that will maximize party
1’s expected payoff depends on different conditions on the parameters of the model, I
only present here the relevant results from comparing party 1’s maximum unanimity
payoff with certain types of challenge stage equilibria for the sake of brevity.
First, consider the challenge stage equilibrium listed in item one in the proof of
Lemma 3, where (ζ1(z), ζh(z), ζj(z)) = (
√
ε1(z)wj − wj, 0, wj). Given the optimal
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proposal z characterized in the proof of Proposition 4 that would give rise to this
challenge equilibrium, party 1’s maximized payoff from this challenge is as given in





+yqj +(q− x̂1)2 +(q− x̂h)2. The proof of Proposition
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Therefore, party 1’s maximum payoff from unanimity is given by
αyq1 + w1 +
∑
k=2,3
(q − x̂k)2 −
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Comparing E.71 with the maximum expected payoff from the considered challenge
indicates that party 1 prefers a grand bargain over this challenge if
w1−
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where ε1(z) is given as before. Condition E.72 is more likely to hold if the non-
proposer parties h and j each commands a lower status-quo payoff. Moreover, this
relationship carries over to other types of challenge equilibria. This proves Part 1 of
Proposition 5.
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Notice that condition E.72 becomes more likely to hold as
−
(














increases, which, when manipulated, suggests that all parties need to be ideologically
close for unanimity to be preferred. This is also a relationship that carries over to
other types of challenge equilibria. This proves Part 2 of Proposition 5.
Proposition 4 indicated that the individual roles wh and wj might play on party 1’s
incentives between a grand bargain and a challenge are ambiguous and depend on the
particular challenge equilibrium considered. However, to see how party 1’s incentives
respond to the relative budgets of the non-proposer parties, consider a challenge
equilibrium such as item five in the proof of Lemma 3 in which (ζ1(z), ζh(z), ζj(z)) =
(max{
√
ε1(z)wj−wj−wh, 0}, wh, wj). Solving for the optimal proposal z that would
lead to this challenge yields x = x̂1+x̂h
2
, yj = 0,
y1 = y
q






















The condition obtained by comparing the maximum expected payoff from this chal-
lenge and E.71 is more likely to hold as wh
wj
increases. Note that if wh > wj, this
would require the two parameters to diverge, whereas if wh < wj, they must become
more similar. However, since this is a challenge equilibrium in which the low-budget
party is more likely to become the partner based on Proposition 4, it is more likely
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that wh < wj. Thus, more similar budgets decrease the payoff from this challenge.
This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
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